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Abstract 
 
The epidemic of diet related disease is a fundamental fact of epidemiology that our societies are 
increasingly facing. It calls for policy responses and amendments of our systems of health care. 
These actions and reforms intersect several loci of moral and political disagreement in the public 
sphere: the acceptability of public paternalism, the appropriate consideration of personal 
responsibility in health care and the moral and political significance of social health inequalities. I 
offer a treatment of these three broad normative issues in order to inform discussions about 
appropriate responses to diet related diseases. (1) I argue that antipaternalism is overstated if not 
understood in welfarist terms: within the latter framework, evidence for poor capability in dietary 
choices is a sound reason for intervention. (2) I distinguish distributive and efficiency concerns 
regarding personal responsibility for health, arguing that there is no defensible conception of the 
former. (3) I dismiss efforts to understand the moral importance of social health inequalities in 
terms of health entitlements and reject investment-like approaches to inequalities framed in terms 
of “equality of opportunity”: the fight against health inequalities is vivified by a renewed interest in 
the social goods attached to robust socio-economic egalitarianism. Together, these three theses lead 
away from policies focused on individuals, their responsibility and their productive importance for 
society and support both public health interventions on the environment where people live and 
continuous defense of traditional unconditional health care provision.  
	  
	  
Abstract (italiano) 
 
Le politiche sanitarie volte a fronteggiare le malattie legate alle scelte alimentari costituiscono un 
punto d’osservazione privilegiato per l’analisi di alcuni aspetti cruciali della moralità politica 
riguardanti la legittimità del paternalismo, la rilevanza distributiva della responsabilità personale e 
l’importanza morale delle diseguaglianze socio-economiche negli esiti di salute. In questo lavoro si 
propone un trattamento di tali temi con lo scopo di informare sia il dibattito teorico-morale sia la 
discussione pubblica. In particolare, si difendono le seguente tesi. (1) L’importanza dei principi 
antipaternalisti basati sulla protezione della sovranità individuale deve essere ridimensionata nel 
caso della sanità preventiva. Il sospetto liberale verso il paternalismo può essere ricostruito in senso 
welfarista e può giustificare un approccio interventista in presenza di dati comportamentali e 
neurofisiologici che suggeriscano l’inadeguatezza delle scelte alimentari. (2) L’appello alla 
responsabiltà personale in sanità si declina in una versione economica e in una versione 
distributiva: la prima indica possibili inefficienze dovute ad eventuali esternalità sociali delle scelte 
personali pericolose, la seconda attribuisce valore morale alla distinzione scelte-circostanze a fini 
distributivi. Nel caso sanitario, non esistono ricostruzioni difendibili della seconda versione e ci 
sono ragioni empiriche per ritenere che la prima versione non sia pertinente. (3) Mentre la 
riflessione sulle diseguaglianze sanitarie è stata per lo più condotta a partire da teorie dei diritti 
personali o sulla base del principio di eguali opportuntà (di solito giustificato sulla base di teorie 
del capitale umano), le diseguaglianze socio-economiche nella salute invitano a riconsiderare 
l’eguaglianza economica quale orizzonte auspicabile delle politiche pubbliche, illustrandone gli 
effetti benefici e fornendo a tali politiche un importante bersaglio. Nel complesso, le tre tesi qui 
difese mal si adattano agli approcci che tematizzano la responsabilità personale, la struttura degli 
incentivi che gli individui incontrano e il loro ruolo produttivo per la società.  Si invoca invece una 
nuova attenzione alle diseguaglianze nelle risorse individuali e negli ambienti in cui le persone 
vivono, insieme al continuo supporto alle forniture sanitarie universali e non condizionali. 
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This thesis focuses on the policy responses to the epidemic of diet related diseases, including public 
policies that aim at countervailing the epidemic and the calibrations of health systems motivated by 
the spread of these conditions1. There are indeed two distinct branches of public measures that are 
being proposed and implemented as a consequence of preventable diseases that are associated with 
diets. On the one hand, there are public health measures targeting unhealthy behaviors and their 
consequences. These are campaigns that can be mounted at various levels by different kinds of 
administrative agencies (e.g. municipalities, public health departments, private actors). On the other 
hand, existing arrangements regarding health systems (e.g. reimbursement schemas) might be 
adapted in the light of the new epidemiological circumstances. This requires large-scale 
organizational changes, more often at national level. Both policy issues are addressed here. 
Chronic diseases due to nutritional choices claim a high death toll yearly in most countries, push 
people into conditions that worsen their quality of life and increase the employment of resources in 
health and social systems, resources that could be used fruitfully otherwise for morally 
recommendable purposes. These might seem important reasons as such to mount a policy response 
against the epidemic and apparently the only issue that is worth exploring for policy analysts 
should be how to act effectively. This is not the approach taken here.  
Both means and ends of public health policy intersect several loci of normative disagreement - loci 
that are often explicitly explored in heated public debates - regarding what public authorities and 
other actors should and cannot do. All these preliminary questions regarding the moral and political 
philosophy of health policy fall within the scope of this thesis. I aim at offering a reasoned analysis 
of different approaches to these problems for the sake of public deliberation on public health and 
nutritional choices. 
Shall the state interfere with the personal choices of its citizens if they are clearly dangerous for 
them and only for them? Shall health systems provide equal treatment to everyone who falls sick 
irrespectively of whether his condition is a result of reckless behaviors or bad luck? Is there a moral 
duty toward other citizens to maintain a prudent conduct that will not result in increased health 
costs? If so, what shall we do with non-compliers? What shall we think about the fact that bad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For the notion of “calibration” of welfare state regimes in the face of evolving sociological contexts, see 
Ferrera (2013). 
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choices and most diseases are more common among the socio-economically disadvantaged in our 
societies? Are universal welfare regimes sustainable and morally justified if many health risks 
depend on individual choices? Which is the moral rationale of the fight against socio-economic 
inequalities in health-behaviors? Shall we provide everybody with equal chances to be healthy, 
with equal health or none of these two? Is social justice a relevant prescriptive notion when 
reasoning about public health? 
While the purpose of this thesis is to provide reasoned answers to these questions, the deliverable 
will not be an analysis of whether or not this or that particular food policy is “ethical”, legitimate or 
justifiable. Rather, I will discuss moral and political principles that might guide the design and 
implementation of health policy for the fight of diet related diseases. Schmidt (2008) has 
distinguished three layers of prescriptive analysis that fuel the processes of political decision 
making: the layer of political theory, the layer of political programming (e.g. government “white 
papers”, think-tank reports, etc.) and the layer of detailed policy programming (e.g. technical files 
from departments, drafts of laws, etc.)2. Among the three layers, this work intends to contribute to 
the first and thus detailed discussions of particular pieces of policies are beyond its scope and will 
not pursued, if not for illustrative purposes. There are of course downward implications regarding 
applied policy making, but their content will depend a lot on the specificity of contexts and must be 
discussed case by case. 
I anticipate here the main results in the form of three theses that I will defend. They correspond to 
three traditional thematic sections of public health ethics3: the acceptability of state paternalism, the 
place of personal responsibility for health in distributive decisions and the moral significance of 
social health inequalities. The three theses can be briefly summarized as follows. 
(1) There is a wider space for paternalistic interventions (i.e. beneficent interference with free and 
autonomous choices) than it is usually thought, since evidence is accumulating as for the extent to 
which human food choices are often bad. When it is justified from these premises, paternalism 
does not violate the main liberal concerns against paternalism, at least if the latter are understood as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Schmidt’s theoretical framework in political science is a form of institutionalism that focuses on the role of 
ideas and discursive actors in institutional changes. See infra in the introduction the section dedicated to 
moral theory and democracy for a lengthier discussion of the topic. 
3 See infra in the introduction the section dedicated to moral theory. 
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concerns about welfare and nothing else and put in their place in the evaluation of benefits and 
costs. I provide detailed theoretical argument for this last proposition and review the empirical 
literature on food choices and their limitations, explaining how this material can be employed in 
prescriptive deliberation. 
(2) The drive toward responsibilization of individuals that is widespread in contemporary health 
systems is largely unwarranted if conducted on the basis of duties and distributive theories that are 
sensitive to personal responsibility, efforts and investments. The very same process of 
responsibilization could be instead justified on the bases of considerations of efficiency (i.e. 
effective employment of resources), which are at the bases of “activating” supply-side4 approaches 
to social policy. Alas, the latter do not seem to apply to the case of food choices. This illustrates a 
more general point about responsibilization: costs and benefits calculus rather than distributive 
theories should underpin in each case the implementation of responsibility-oriented reforms. 
(3) Social health inequalities in health behaviors suggest paying attention to substantial socio-
economic equality as candidate ideal endpoint of public policy, including health policy. I criticize 
previous moral analyses of health inequalities, contending that the notions of ‘health inequities’ 
based on personal entitlements or equality of opportunity are less interesting than it is usually 
thought. I argue that the fight against health inequalities must be justified looking at its potential 
consequences, in particular its distributive consequences – and that social disparities in health 
behaviors illustrate the benefits that we may expect from social policies aimed at leveling 
disparities in resources. 
Taken together, the three theses flesh out a picture of the objectives of health policy in the light of 
the evidence regarding food choices, dietary diseases and social inequalities in health behaviors. 
While conducted with food choices in mind, I hope that the picture - if coherent - may be unfolded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 While the distinction between “supply side” and “demand side” economic policy is mostly ignored in 
philosophical literature concerning public health, it can be employed here to tell apart the topics of chapter 3 
(in part 2) and 4 respectively. Supply-siders point out the economic benefits of investments in productive 
factors, most typically human resources in the case of social policy. Demand-siders advocate instead 
distributions of economic resources that can sustain economic demand. See Saraceno (2013) for the 
relevance of the distinction in social policy and a diagnosis of the current trends in policy analyses in this 
respect. Notice that while the disagreement is formally empirical, the distinction tracks a crucial political 
divide obviously underpinned by different moral options and interests. 
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in further directions. In particular, I take a clear stance between two kinds of development of public 
health analyses and practices in the last decades.  
On the one hand, theorists of human decision making have studied in detail how individuals behave 
and react to specific environmental settings and structures of incentives - including settings that are 
relevant for health - reacting to a too schematic or simplistic representation of human behavior in 
the social sciences5. The paradigmatic work in this direction is Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
libertarian paternalist approach to policy making, which has been influential in the health sector as 
well as in broader areas of decision making.  
On the other hand, social epidemiologists renewed the long-standing tradition of epidemiology-
based social critique in the context of the increasing socio-economic inequalities in economically 
developed nations. The paradigmatic specimen of this tradition is the influential volume edited by 
Marmot and Wilkinson (2006) on the social determinants of health, whose influence has spread 
well into international organizations (e.g. the World Health Organization6) and governments. 
These two traditions need not be opposed and indeed they are often taken to be allied in discussions 
regarding issues of personal responsibility for health7. This is not surprising because both traditions 
might perceive as suspicious the notion of individual responsibilization and the underlying 
devolutionist attitude toward public intervention. Indeed, they both start from a common 
progressive and “reformist” mindset. As it were, they both assume that the human condition can be 
ameliorated through political actions and reforms, quite independently from the cultivation of 
individual “morality” and virtuous behavior. Yet their different focuses - their partisan Einseitigkeit 
(Weber 1949 [1904])8 - do correspond to very different normative outlooks. Basic moral options 
are revealed in this case not so much in explicit principles but in the kind of leverages that different 
traditions believe can be acted upon for betterment of some pressing social problems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is a development somehow internal to microeconomics, fostered by progresses toward more realistic 
depictions of human behaviors. See Roncaglia (2005) for a critical comment. 
6 WHO reports on the social determinants of health – with a global focus - can be downloaded at: 
www.who.int/social_determinants/ [Accessed: 1st October 2013] 
7 See infra section 3.2.3b. 
8 Weber’s observations on the neutrality of the social sciences are fruitful here. Fundamental value judgments 
are intrinsic to the choice of certain disciplines on the part of researchers, though this does not impinge on the 
neutrality of their results and methods as such. 
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Behavioral economics, psychology, neurophysiology and the other sciences of decision do prefer 
policies that will not hurt anyone, for both historical and theoretical reasons. They indeed 
developed within the framework of economics and its particular understanding of neutrality: 
acceptable policies must improve human well being without imposing (non-compensable) costs to 
anybody9. It is neutrality so understood that leads these theorists to propose closer attention to the 
physical environment and human biology in order to tinker with the “architecture of choice”. We 
might say that their proposals are ultimately technological.  
The problem, at the end of the day, is whether this can suffice – a problem of efficacy. The 
traditional focus of public health officials and campaigners on comprehensive health services, 
adequate economic resources for all individuals and healthy environments do not shy away from 
controversial statements, robust calls for social and economic reform and political egalitarianism. 
Their proposals are not technological in nature but social, in the sense that those researchers do 
accept that political choices might further some interests at the expenses of others. 
This work is ideally a small contribution to the latter tradition: the results of social epidemiologists 
can be embedded in very different normative pictures of political action and I aim at providing 
some landmarks for the depiction of a coherent one. An interventionist stance against unhealthy 
behaviors, the rejection of responsibility-sensitive distributive theories and egalitarians value are 
key components of traditional public health: I hope to provide some philosophical support to these 
ideas explaining why their underlying morality is sound. 
 
Public health and moral theory 
 
Before describing the overall plan of the thesis, some words about the kind of work it intends to be 
are necessary. First, there exists an established discipline to which this work belongs: public health 
ethics. The ethics of public health is a discipline that developed in the last twenty years and by now 
has its own recognized community, experts, journals and cultural references. While being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See infra section 3.2.4 for a discussion of the moral rationale of this approach. 
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associated at its beginning with medical ethics and its core theoretical preoccupations (i.e. personal 
autonomy and beneficence), it has afterward developed apart and stands on its own with a 
distinctive intellectual program. Themes and objectives of this thesis unfold entirely within that 
discipline. In the following, I will address the moral problems that are encountered when societies 
promote the health of the population by means of interventions that go beyond health care settings 
and the moral problems that arise from the general organization of both health care and public 
health actions. This is by convention what public health ethics is about. Particular methods have 
become influential in this enterprise, in particular contemporary moral philosophy and political 
theory: in the literature, we might recognize a characteristic mainstream liberal Anglo-Saxon10 
approach on which I will rely for conceptual tools, language and argumentative strategies. Alas, 
this option is not neutral and I hope not to take on board too many unstated assumptions or 
overlook interesting options by taking this route.  
Some assumptions that are instead characteristic of my approach and are not included in the tacit 
knowledge of mainstream moral theoreticians are listed below. They pertain to the nature and 
content of moral theory, the role of moral experts in democratic societies and the use of empirical 
data and results of the descriptive sciences in the latter. Some things will be obvious for the readers 
with an expertise in philosophy, as many of the scientific facts will be trivial for physicians and 
biologists later on. Please consider that I am just declaring my assumptions, which I take to be 
either relatively uncontroversial or necessary if one is to enter the kind of discussion that I intend to 
develop. 
To begin with, this thesis is a piece of moral reasoning. I describe some arguments regarding what 
we ought to do and what we should not do. It mostly regards very specific kinds of action, namely 
policies that are implemented by public authorities. While the principles and topics that I discuss 
here are thus - in a simple sense - “political”, I do not draw a sharp distinction between normative 
political theory and moral theory. The latter is the inquiry about what we ought to do, the former its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The English-speaking philosophical community share some methodological standards and values that can 
be referred to – with the approximation permitted by the vagueness of the term – the liberal tradition. 
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subset regarding political actions11. Political actions are defined here both as individual actions that 
exert effects on society at large and actions that could be attributed to social collectives, e.g. public 
authorities. There are no precise boundaries – I maintain - that distinguish political actions from 
other kind of actions and, since this distinction does not make any crucial work in what follows, we 
can safely ignore the issue: while moral reasoning in the political domain has its own particular 
topics, problems and principles, I assume there is much continuity with other fields of moral 
inquiry, or at least enough continuity to employ the same tools of moral inquiry in general in this 
specific field. 
What kind of things must be considered when reasoning about what we ought to do, politically or 
otherwise? In other words, what matters in political and individual actions as far as morality is 
concerned? What is the ultimate source of our moral concerns when we deliberate about the best 
course of action? Which state of affairs should we want to bring about and why? Most of us do not 
think that we can do whatever we please, yet what are the kind of constraints and obligations that 
determine what we are forbidden or required to do?  
Certainly there are people that will say that nothing of this kind exist, or that obligations and 
constraints exist but do not have moral force, e.g. they might say that obligations are just 
entrenched social habits, evolutionary wired features of human beings with no normative bite or 
merely subjective beliefs. If this were indeed true, there would not be any theorizing about ethics 
that was independent from positive anthropology or sociology. This position is however very 
revisionists, since most people do believe there are genuine moral obligations, and they will 
probably admit it if pressed to reason about very blatant cases of violation of moral obligations. Yet 
people (and moral theorists) are very likely to disagree about the source of the force of moral 
obligations. I will assume in this work that there are interesting moral truths and good answers to 
many questions regarding what we should do and what we should not. I also assume that the best 
way to discover these truths utilizes rational analysis and argumentations. I do not offer general 
argumentation for neither of the theses: a good way to prove that moral philosophy is possible is – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The independence of political theory from ethics is a debated topic in contemporary political philosophy 
(Galston 2010), with the mainstream applied ethics approach speaking against it. As for all these 
foundational issues, I ask the reader to evaluate my approach a posteriori, judging from whether or not the 
work presented here illuminates important political issues. 
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possibly - doing it. Yet we should begin considering what kinds of argumentations will matter in 
this pursuit. What shall moral reasoning in the following pages be all about?  
Different theorists and, more generally, different people endorse a variety of answers to the latter 
questions. In other words, they disagree on the content of moral theory, i.e. they have different 
ideas as for what ultimately matters and should concern us when reasoning about morality.  
Let us take for illustration a moral obligation, say “thou shalt not kill”. Why is this true, as you may 
agree it is? Or, for those who dislike the truth-talk in moral theory, why is this really an obligation? 
If pressed to answer, different people and theorists will refer to the human right to life, reciprocity 
(“do not do upon others etc.”), individual interests, the holiness of life, etc. These are moral 
theories, or sketches thereof. 
By expanding these answers we can come to know that some believe that some beings, more often 
persons, are endowed with a set of natural entitlements that nobody can infringe without 
committing injustice (i.e. right-based theories). Some others argue that the source of morality must 
be the basic fact that some beings - moral agents - can enter cooperative schemata and discuss what 
they owe to each other for the sake of effective and/or peaceful cooperation (i.e. contractualism). 
Some believe that God created some beings of special value and set on stones the rules that they 
ought to follow (i.e. some religious world views). Others argue that the only plausible sources of 
value are needs, desires of preferences (in short, interests) of those beings that are capable of 
having this sort of things (i.e. utilitarianism). 
In this work, I will discuss pieces of moral reasoning that derives from any kind of moral theory12. 
Nonetheless, the thesis is not entirely neutral on the issue. Though I do not assume the truth of any 
moral theory, I will suggest that my thesis gives some weak support to the idea that the latter 
conception sketched above - utilitarianism - is the correct theory of what morality should be about. 
I take utilitarianism simply to be the thesis that the whole source of morality are interests (needs, 
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  I will not discuss religious views, in part because they are not relevant for the issues at stake here and in 
part because they normally do not fulfill some requirements of publicity that we might ask in order to count 
something as a moral reasoning. This is somewhat arbitrary without further explanations but luckily does not 
bother us in this field.	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desires, preferences) and the consequent13 thesis that we should aim at their maximal satisfaction. 
On the one hand, I will explain why - in many circumstances - considerations regarding rights and 
duties and several theories of justice that do not stem from utilitarian considerations are either 
unsound or irrelevant for the issue at stake. On the other hand, I will argue that most moral 
concerns in the field under the lenses of this thesis can be reconstructed starting from human 
interests in the utilitarian sense.  
Now, why should this result suggest that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory? After all, my 
result just shows that we could explain our moral concerns in utilitarian terms in a very small 
fragment of moral deliberation. Perhaps there are other possible reconstructions and/or pieces of 
the moral world that do not fit the utilitarian perspective. Plus, these conceptual reconstructions can 
be often made on the opposite direction, thus hinting exactly at the opposite conclusion. 
The argument for the thesis that any reduction to utilitarianism suggests that utilitarianism is the 
true moral theory was proposed by Singer (2002 [1979]) and depends on the idea that utilitarianism 
is - so to say - the default moral theory. That is, everybody should prima facie accept utilitarianism 
and give case by case reasons to ignore interests and/or general reasons to add non-utilitarian 
considerations into moral deliberation. Let us see why Singer defends this idea. First, nobody 
denies that interest matters, though theories do disagree as for why interests matter (for instance, a 
right-based theorist would say that the respect for persons is what ultimately ground the obligation 
to protect personal interests, which then have a purely derivative value). Second, if we assume that 
moral theory should be universal, it is natural to start by assuming the truth of utilitarianism. 
Indeed, universality is simply the assumption that every being that is morally worthy must be 
considered equally by any plausible moral theory. This is a very weak sort of egalitarianism: it 
permits treating beings differently if their conditions are different in morally relevant ways. Singer 
does not think that we should provide an argument for this principle, and here we repeat the same 
judgments: the principle explains by inspection why it must be accepted. We can also say: that is 
by analysis what morality is about: if somebody does not accept the principle, he is not speaking of 
morality at all. Now, needs and desires are - by inspections - things whose satisfaction is good for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 If interests are the only source of morality, the principle of maximal satisfaction does not seem to be 
escapable. 
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the deliberating moral agent: as we have seen above, nobody denies that interests matter. When a 
deliberator starts thinking morally, he will learn that de facto there are several others beings 
capable of having needs and desires and, given the universal point of view that is intrinsic to ethical 
deliberation, he must at least prima facie attribute to those interests and their satisfaction equal 
weight. My interests matter to me, hence the interests of the others matter equally when taking the 
moral standpoint. This is close to utilitarianism, minus the thesis that what matter are only interests. 
This is at the end to be argued for case by case: it is a general statement and no proofs are available 
in this field. So utilitarianism is prima facie plausible and any different source of moral concern is, 
in one sense, additional. If this is correct, utilitarianism is the default moral theory and thus any 
reduction of pieces of moral reasoning to utilitarian considerations suggests the truth of 
utilitarianism.  
While this is not strictly necessary for the soundness of my general arguments, I wanted to signal 
this underlying utilitarian bending so the reader might take it into account in order to keep together 
different sort of arguments in a coherent whole14. From the anticipation of my results above, it 
should be already clear how I will stay away from right-based theories of justice and focus on 
goods and bads in utilitarian terms. This is argued for in every single circumstance but it obviously 
stems from the general theoretical option that I disclosed here. 
 
Moral theory, politics and democracy 
 
Even if one accepts the very possibility of moral theorizing, he may be puzzled by the seemingly 
problematic consequences of moral theory in the political sphere. Indeed, it seems that if moral 
theorizing succeeds – i.e. describing truthfully what we should do and what we should not do - 
there is no need of additional decisional processes to take correct political decisions. In particular, 
the democratic decisional processes that most of us take to legitimize political decisions seem 
redundant. This would put moral theory in a dangerous predicament, since democratic values are – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In section 3.3.1 I will discuss in some details what I take to be the content of utilitarianism (i.e. I will 
sketch a theory of interests). 
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for good reasons - held in high esteem: any clash with democratic values might jeopardize the 
edifice of moral philosophy15. Let us see whether we can overcome this important obstacle. 
Apparently, successful moral reasoning is incompatible with any independent (i.e. non 
epistocratic16) political process of decision making. A moral theory provides independent criteria 
for the evaluation of the outcomes of political processes and these criteria alone would confirm or 
repudiate any actual political decision stemming from any instance of the process. Assume for 
instance that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory: then if policy A brought about a state of 
affair that is morally superior in terms of utility to the consequences of policy B and the political 
process decides for B, the latter decision would not be legitimate, i.e. we would not be under moral 
obligations of upholding policy B or obeying the statute B, etc. On the other hand, we would have 
these obligations if the political process brought about A, but the source of this obligation would be 
the moral theory rather than the political process itself. In both cases, the political process is 
redundant and does not add anything to the legitimacy of the decision. 
This is however too swift and assumes that the theory of legitimacy must equate good decisions 
with legitimate decisions. This is not necessary and does not follow from any of our premises. The 
true content of the theory of legitimacy (a crucial part of morality indeed) might require political 
decision making being made democratically independently from the coherence of its results with 
other pieces of moral theory (Estlund 2010). This divergence is not odd, and might happen in 
several manners depending on which moral theory is actually correct17.  
Within utilitarianism, democratic decision making might tend to reliably approximate good 
decisions in utilitarian terms, for instance for epistemic reasons related with the fact that actual 
desires and needs of people are effectively sought for with voting and/or with some other epistemic 
virtue of democratic deliberation. This is why the outcomes of these processes are legitimate even 
if in some cases they happen not to track the best or even a good decision. Also, it is possible that 
any other decision making process, for instance the deference to moral experts, would tend to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This is of course a problem that surface in several guises in political theory, most notably in debates 
regarding substantive and procedural justice. 
16 Epistocracy is a form of government where political authority is attributed to those who know better, 
including moral philosophers – the obvious ancestor of these views can be found in Plato’s Republic. 
17 See for instance Valentini (2012) on a general treatment of the contradiction between legitimacy and 
justice in another context and within a different moral theory, which starts from equal respect for persons.	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produce even worse outcomes and/or would not be accepted because of some entrenched 
sociological facts (i.e. suspect toward experts) that would cause at the end serious social bads18. I 
take some refined version of this sketch of a theory of legitimacy to be correct, though any other 
composition of the divergence between procedural legitimacy and substantial justice will do the job 
as well. What is then the role of moral experts in democratic societies? What is the whole point of a 
work in moral philosophy aside from its theoretical merits, if any? 
If some theory of legitimacy on the lines above is correct, any defensible view of the role of moral 
experts in democratic societies will situate them in the process of deliberation rather than anywhere 
in the formal decisional process. That is, moral experts will not be endowed of authoritative power 
(i.e. formally sanctioned sui generis causal power on decisional procedures) but rather will 
contribute in some particular non-authoritative way, most likely in the deliberative steps of 
democratic political processes.  
The process of deliberation is here just the set of activities (normally verbal activities) that precede 
formal procedures of decision making (e.g. voting). In the deliberative phases, people discuss about 
political decisions explicitly, confronting their own interests and their own views of the good and 
justice. These discussions will not happen in a vacuum but they will necessarily employ existing 
references, e.g. books, pieces of reasoning, shared social ideals. The moral expert is simply a 
scholar who takes care of this sort of things.  
There can be different functions that he might exercise. There is first of all a fundamental house-
keeping role: since some ideas could spread despite their moral deficiencies, it could be very useful 
to have scholars dedicated to find them out and get rid of them, if they can. Also, some ideas could 
be poorly developed, and some scholars will try to flesh out their consequences and discuss about 
their foundations in order to evaluate them more carefully in the public arena. This can be thought 
as a sort of consultancy role. Also, some other moral experts will propose genuinely new 
prescriptive ideas for discussion: this is the inventive role.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This can be understood starting from the distinction between act and rule consequentialism: though any 
particular act of acceptance of a political decision that is taken democratically might be bad, as a rule it is 
better to comply with democratic outcomes because in the long term or overall the result will be morally 
superior. 
xv	  
	  
The role of these experts is obviously continuous with that of laymen: there are no clear criteria to 
distinguish who can take up the role of moral expert and who cannot19. Yet this is not a reason to 
believe that the role of moral philosophers is dispensable. It could be good that we appoint people 
who are dedicated quite specifically to these activities rather than others. At the end, the proof of 
the usefulness of moral philosophers will be in the quality of the debate and the goodness of 
political decisions that moral experts will be able to foster.  
Although I am confident that such role for moral experts is defensible, the actual influence and 
usefulness of moral experts in the real world is matter of debate on theoretical grounds. While I 
mentioned above some empirical theorists in political science that believe that prescriptive ideals 
(in their three layers) are causally influential on political processes, there is a whole tradition in the 
political sciences that denies that morality – let alone moral experts - is causally relevant, namely 
political realism (Petrucciani 2003). If this main tenet of political realism is true, then the role of 
moral experts is de facto nil in real world settings. 
There are several versions of political realism, from skeptical Machiavellian versions ultimately 
due to pessimistic views of human nature (i.e. moral motivations are never an important cause of 
successful political action) to the historic materialist version that declares that class warfare is the 
only engine of history. These frameworks might all describe truthfully some or all political 
processes, since they are bona fide positive theories of politics that can be confirmed or refuted in 
any particular instance. However, we may observe that in societies were the discussion about the 
good is systematically organized and channeled into the political process, it is hard to deny any 
causal role - if only proximal - to normative political and moral theory. If so, many of us live in 
societies where political and moral theory could have more than a merely theoretical interest. 
Perhaps the world is not really “ruled by little less” than ideas of “economists and political 
philosophers”, as Keynes famously put it (1997 [1936]), but some influence of these ideas - 
especially in democratic societies - is hard to deny. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is matter of debate. See Gesang (2010), Archard (2011) and Gordon (2012) for different positions on 
the problem. My very weak statement should not be undermined by any of the rival solutions. 
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Normative reasoning and the sciences 
 
In this work, I will employ quite often scientific data and theories20. Sometimes data and theories 
are necessary to explain the general context of a discussion and the relevance of the issues that I am 
tackling, for instance when I describe how many people are affected by certain health conditions in 
chapter 1. I take this to be quite uncontroversial.  
Sometimes empirical material is instead embedded in the kernel of my normative reasoning, so I 
need to explain why this is acceptable given the common skeptical attitude of moral philosophers 
toward the use of empirical materials in normative reasoning21. There are three main patterns of 
uses of results from the positive sciences in this work. I explain here why they are unproblematic.  
First, I will sometimes use empirical results in arguments that are consequentialist in nature. One 
key example may be the section 4.3.3 where I will argue that recommendations of two purportedly 
different principles of distributive justice overlap substantially as for their recommendations given 
what we know about how social health inequalities are transmitted across generations. If p ought to 
be the case, there will be better or worse ways to bring p about and empirical evidence is obviously 
necessary for picking up the best policy option. Notice that this is a widespread pattern of 
argumentation in moral reasoning, since we often criticize general principles pointing out what we 
would have to carry out if the principle was true. This is especially important in moral and political 
philosophy, where issues of feasibility of certain political actions and outcomes are most relevant.  
Second, data from sociology, behavioral economics and psychology will illuminate some issues 
regarding paternalism and responsibility in chapter 2 and 3. I will touch upon various explanatory 
hypotheses that shed light on the agency vs. structure debate22 in the explanation of a particular set 
of decisions: nutritional choices. This should also be considered uncontroversial: the application to 
specific cases of concepts as “responsibility” and the like will depend on the actual details of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Here, I speak alternatively of “descriptive” and/or “empirical” material. While the two concepts are distinct 
- they indicate respectively how the world is and function and a particular set of methods to study it - as a 
matter of fact there is no other way to know how the world is if not through methods that are empirical in 
nature.	  
21 See Holm (2004) for a book-length treatment of this issue in the case of bioethics. 
22 A common pattern of empirical disagreement in human sciences regards the apportioning of causal weight 
to individual choices or sociological structures: this is the agency vs. structure debate. 
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circumstances of choice, which are empirically analyzable. More importantly, empirical evidence 
urges philosophers to devise analyses of descriptive concepts (e.g. “free choice”) that are 
compatible with what we know about our world. It is not as if empirical sciences alone might give 
the best analyses of concepts that are normatively laden (e.g. responsibility). Normally, they cannot 
and neither are they too interested in the pursuit. Nevertheless, results from the sciences function as 
side constraints as for which concepts are useful in our world as it is. For instance, a concept of 
personal identity that does not mention the genome or other biological features at all is probably 
empty for all we know about human beings, thus being useless for any practical and theoretical 
purpose. I will make a similar point for conceptions of responsibility that require choices to be free 
in a supernatural sense in section 2.2.3. This use of empirical material is also logically harmless: 
the employment of the sciences in philosophical analyses of concepts is indeed widespread. 
Third, moral philosophers are often skeptical of those who make use of empirical results in their 
prescriptive reasoning for Humean reasons: the world as it is cannot give us indications as for how 
the world ought to be. In one trivial sense, this is correct, for bare logical reasons. Yet once we do 
have a prescriptive moral theory among our assumptions, the Humean prohibition will not prevent 
the use of relevant empirical material, again for logical reasons. The Humean prohibition bans only 
those arguments that conclude to a prescriptive conclusion from a set that contains only non 
prescriptive premises. Given a suitable prescriptive premise, any kind of empirical material 
becomes relevant. Let us for instance assume that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory: then 
any evidence regarding human interests is very relevant for moral deliberation, from sociological 
and econometric studies of people’s actual desires to anthropological, historical and biological 
inquiries on the human nature and its constraints. This are cases where what people actually do and 
think is central to the question regarding what they and others should do and cannot do. 
There is of course a more general way in which “the world as it is” matters. Philosophical work is 
not that kind of pure science that might appear to be in mainstream analytic theorizing. It depends 
on a very specific cultural history and particular human interests. There is nothing particularly 
worrisome about these facts; neither this secularity threatens as such the objectivity of the results of 
philosophical inquiries. No matter how much some epistemic tools are historically situated and 
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were developed for non-epistemic purposes, they might still be epistemically reliable, in the 
sciences as in moral inquiry. Yet it is very important to acknowledge what kind of mundane 
objectives philosophy might serve: some of them are indeed praiseworthy, other much less so. This 
requires some sociological theory: I will try – where I can – to describe at least roughly the kind of 
contexts where some prescriptive principles have been used23. Though this is somehow less than 
standard in normative reasoning, I hope it may allow for a better all-things-considered judgment. 
So far I have outlined the main methodological premises of this work. In particular, I suggested 
which the underlying moral theory of this thesis is, I explained what can be the role of moral 
theorizing in democratic societies and I defended the role of descriptive and empirical material in 
moral reasoning. The next section outlines the program of the work. 
 
Plan of the work 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. There are chapters (n), subchapters (n.n) and sections 
(n.n.n). Chapters are intended to be independent one from the other: aside from the introduction 
and the conclusion, they correspond to the three main theses above regarding paternalism, 
responsibility and social health inequalities. Subchapters contain each a main thesis that coalesces 
with the others in the general argument of the chapter. Sections are instead small arguments that are 
closed on their own. Sometimes they are short reviews, sometimes independent pieces of 
reasoning, sometimes corollaries that ought to be developed for completeness.  
The next chapter is a review. The only kind of work that I did there has been a simple collection of 
useful material from the scientific literature. The chapter contains the bare bases to discuss the 
issue of diet related diseases in context. Mainly, I will discuss the extent of the problem and the 
strength of the evidence that connects nutritional choices with major chronic diseases. I also 
discuss the social distribution of these conditions and their effects on social services, plus a brief 
review about the kind of interventions that are being devised, implemented, and/or evaluated by 
public authorities and other actors to halt the epidemic. I will mention briefly issues of clinical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Especially in sections 2.1.3, 3.2, 4.1.1, 4.2.1, and 4.3.	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effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these interventions: why I will not reserve too much space 
to these issues, they are obviously as important as the moral discussion - from which they are not 
entirely distinguishable - for a complete evaluation of those proposals. 
The second chapter deals with paternalism. Subchapter 3.1 is my reconstruction of the debate in 
terms of kinds of antipaternalism and my evaluation of previous approaches to paternalism in 
public health ethics. 3.2 explains why what I will call “liberty based antipaternalism” is less 
important than it is normally assumed, both in public health and in general. 3.3 reconstructs what I 
call “welfare based antipaternalism” and discusses its application to the case of interventions on 
food choices. 
The third chapter deals with responsibility and the social value of personal good health. It is 
divided in a subchapter on productivity (3.1) and one about costs (3.2), each containing an 
introduction regarding the social value of, respectively, productivity and decreased health costs and 
a longer section with normative arguments regarding whether we should appeal to personal 
responsibility for health - and why. 
The fourth chapter tackles social health inequalities in health behaviors and their moral 
significance. Subchapter 5.1 reviews the social surroundings of that debate and explains to what 
extent health policy could be considered as such an issue of distributive justice. 5.2 reviews and 
criticizes previous proposals due to Norman Daniels (2008) and Powers and Faden (2006), while 
5.3 mounts an attack to equality of opportunity on behalf of resource (or welfare) equality. 
The fifth chapter wraps up the entire work and summarizes the main conclusions, suggesting 
further directions of analysis. 
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This introductory chapter collects some important facts regarding diet related diseases. Its main 
purpose will be the characterization of the epidemic and a proof of its medical and social relevance. 
Some scholars have argued that the epidemiology of risk factors might have been used to 
medicalize conditions that are not medically worrisome and/or to further the interests of powerful 
drug companies (Greene 2007). The epidemiology of risk factors, in this view, would be a tool in 
the hands of companies to open up new niches for sales and expand their markets for dubious 
drugs. While worries about disease mongering are an important concern, I would like to dispel 
some common doubts about the importance of diet related health conditions for contemporary 
societies. This sheds light on the relevance of the prescriptive issues that I will address afterward.  
I divided the material that I present here in three parts: the biology and natural history of diet 
related diseases (1.1), their impact on societies (1.2) and a short part dedicated to policy responses 
(1.3) that have been envisaged and/or implemented. 
 
1.1 The natural history of diet related diseases 
 
For most readers, food will be something which can be taken for granted. Both its availability and 
its quality are not threatened in economically developed countries. There, concerns about food 
emerge at most when frauds or malpractices do put at risk the health of people, as it was the case - 
for instance - with the bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the ‘90s. Although the latter is truly a 
scaring condition, those cases, from the standpoint of sheer numbers, did not have a huge impact on 
public health and yet ignited public debates and reactions that are not to be seen in the case of other 
issues pertaining to food. In reality, the food system is a most sophisticated apparatus which can 
boast some truly stunning achievements and equally impressive flaws. Indeed, it would deserve 
broader discussions than it is usually given. Despite its invisibility, the food system is a major 
determinant of societal well being and, indeed, of the very viability of the human fabric as we 
know it.  
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In this subchapter, I will discuss in some detail the role of the food system in the determination of 
the prevalence of (and the mortality from) chronic conditions. I start from a brief history of the 
impact of food on major demographic patterns in human populations, moving then to 
epidemiological data regarding diseases and, finally, to mechanistic explanations grounded in 
molecular biology as for how bad diets might cause obesity and serious illnesses. 
 
1.1.1 Food and well being: the dynamics and consequences of nutritional transitions 
 
Food plays a major role, albeit paradoxical, in human well being. The collection of food is a chief 
preoccupation for traditional and poor societies. In the first case, a great amount of time is spent in 
activities that are associated with the provision of adequate calories and nutrients24. In the second 
case, most of the household income is spent in purchasing food – and so most time is spent again 
for the collection of food working in other sectors. This contrasts with the fewer hours of work that 
are on average spent in richer societies for the same task (e.g. 14% of income in Italy, one of the 
highest among high-income countries according to ERS/USDA data, the US federal agency for 
agricultural research). 
The major food problems of poor societies are (1) fluctuations – in harvests or prices – that may 
lead to the edge of starvation entire populations and/or (2) systematic malnutrition. In current 
terms, the problem is one of “food security”. The liberation from these threats is a major 
achievement in the history of humankind, an achievement that alas is not completed for billions of 
people. Malnourishment still kill to a massive extent and indeed impair further perspectives of 
economic growth, given the well-studied circular feed-back effects between food availability, 
productivity, and wealth (Floud et al. 2011, Strauss and Thomas 1998). 
Yet even when societies enter the path of economic growth, the gains in well being that were 
brought about by the extended availability of food might peak and, at the end, decline - for several 
(partially interwoven) reasons. I mention here two major points. First, the production of food is one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Though see Sahlins (1972) for a different analysis of harvesting time in traditional societies.	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of the major drivers of environmental depletion and its dire consequences on human well being 
and, second, the plentitude of food might be a direct threat for health as well, the topic of this work.  
Few words about the first issue: the major determinant of biodiversity loss worldwide is habitat 
conversion, i.e. the transformation of natural ecosystems in productive lands (Reid 2005). This is 
driven to a great extent by agriculture and much less so by other human activities (e.g. urban 
development). The problem has indeed grown increasingly worrisome in the last decades, since 
diets are becoming based more and more on meat worldwide, which requires wider areas for the 
production of an equal output of human nourishment. Alimentation based on meat causes further 
environmental damages, since a substantial proportion of greenhouse gases emissions are due 
directly to animal husbandry (i.e. enteric fermentation + husbandry associated transportations) for 
human feeding. These are certainly the major concerns as for the ultimate unintended consequences 
of the “green revolution”.  
Under the label of “green revolution”, it is usually meant the progresses in agricultural technology 
that started at the end of XIX century, were boosted by the invention of artificial nitrates in the ‘30s 
and continued well into the ’70s with the development of chemicals that increased massively the 
yields of common crops. Aside from environmental depletion, there is a further dark side of the 
green revolution: the increase in the incidence of diseases that are associated to unhealthy diets. 
There are indeed well-studied correlations between agricultural modernization and the appearance 
of diet related disease (Popkin 2010).  
According to the “evolutionary mismatch theory”25, the plentitude of food that characterizes 
contemporary societies does not fit humans whose biological machinery was wired in an 
environment in which scarcity of nutrients was endemic. Together with the increasing prevalence 
of sedentary works and lifestyles, the availability of cheap calories-rich and nutrient-poor food 
caused a visible increase in the average body mass index (BMI)26 of several human populations. By 
now the epidemic of obesity is indeed clearly pandemic, with most of the countries affected, indeed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For the first mention of this theory, see Pani (2000) – who applied the concept to the explanation of 
common psychological conditions. 
26 The body mass index is defined as follows: weight[kg]/height2[m]. See infra 1.1.3 for discussion. 
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even those where malnutrition is still endemic, causing a worrisome “double burden” of nutritional 
health conditions that menace those populations and their frail health systems (Popkin 2001). 
While once the problem of diet related diseases was perceived to be mostly esthetic or at most 
associated with musculo-skeletal issues, there is now substantial evidence that obesity and other 
forms of dietary malpractices are associated with chronic conditions27, conditions that are the 
leading causes of mortality and disability in most countries28. Which are the broader drivers of this 
epidemiological process and how do they mediate between increases in wealth and dietary 
malpractices?  
There are several recurrent demographic processes that have accompanied national economic 
development in several circumstances. Within this bundle of processes, we might distinguish the 
nutritional, the urban, the epidemic and the demographic transition29. Taken together, these 
transitions explain why there is up to 5000$ a positive and linear relationship between the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and average Body Mass Index30 (Swinburn et al. 2011) and how chronic 
conditions become endemic afterward.  
Poor societies are characterized by food insecurity, young populations with high mortality and high 
fertility rates, life in the countryside (i.e. employment in the agricultural sector) and a high 
incidence of infectious diseases. While GDP increases, several processes modify all these 
demographic patterns. Food becomes secure given the increased resources that are available for 
local production and import. The population ages because both fertility and mortality rates drop - 
the first as a result of social change31 and the second because of sanitation. Massive groups of 
people become urban dwellers and, in many cases, pick up more sedentary jobs and lifestyles. Last, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See next section for a description of diet associated chronic conditions. 
28 See the section of www.who.int dedicated to non-communicable diseases.	  
29 There is considerable debate on whether the “transition model” is a simple description of a pattern that – 
for idiosyncratic reasons – characterized Western-style modernization or an explanatory robust pattern with 
which we may predict the effect of future transitions (Borowy 2012). 
30	  The relationship becomes almost flat afterward and variance between countries must be explained by other 
leading causes (ibidem).	  
31 Fertility rates and GDP are inversely correlated: this is also called the “economic-demographic paradox”, 
given the intuitive idea that since child-bearing is costly, it should increase rather than decrease along with 
wealth. 
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chronic diseases, that are in fact common even in poorer societies32, become the leading cause of 
death because infectious diseases disappear altogether or shrink to a considerable extent and the 
aging of the population brings to light maladies that are typical of the last decades of life. 
These are of course positive developments: all these phenomena contributed substantially to 
societal well being and indeed no one has ever advocated poverty as a solution for dietary diseases. 
Needless to say, there is good evidence that wealth is a main driver of social welfare - at least from 
low to middle-high levels of GDP pro capita (UNDP 2011)33. Yet there are clear drawbacks of the 
processes that led to decent levels of wealth, drawbacks that should be addressed in order not to 
jeopardize the results of the important ameliorations to life that wealth brings about. 
 
1.1.2 The epidemiology of diet related diseases 
 
While in the next section I will focus more specifically on which dietary determinants are related 
with specific health outcomes, here we will employ obesity as a proxy for the illustration of the 
trends of the epidemic of diet related diseases worldwide.  
The definition of obesity is controversial: typical measures include the Body Mass Index (BMI), 
waist circumference and waist-hip ratio. A BMI higher than 30 points is taken to be the benchmark 
for a diagnosis of obesity in most publications, for both practical and theoretical reasons and 
despite obvious methodological limitations due to differences in body structure between sexes, 
ages and ethnicities. Body Mass Index is readily measurable and approximates a measure of total 
fat mass of an individual, while waist circumference and waist-hip ratio seem to correlate with 
intra-abdominal fat content (i.e. central adiposity) only, which is independent risk factors for some 
conditions, as type II diabetes, but is not the variable that explains most of the excess of mortality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Mortality due to chronic conditions could indeed even bigger in some poorer countries than in richer ones 
while infectious diseases are still common: mortality rates are indeed sometimes much higher in poorer 
countries. 
33 The calibration of the objectives of development is a major site of political disagreement, with several 
critics of economic growth as unique and/or overarching political objective pointing out several flaws and 
anomalies of the mainstream wisdom. Here I only remind that the only reason why that debate is 
controversial and important is indeed that wealth and its growth are key determinants of human well being 
and anyway proxy measures for valuable achievement in human development.  
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due to bad diets. The epidemic of obesity - as measured by BMI of individuals - appeared in most 
high-income countries in the ‘70s. The estimates for 2008 show that 1.46 billion adults were 
overweight globally (body-mass index  > 25) and 0.5 billion adults were obese. There were 170 
million children (younger than 18 years old) globally that were classified as overweight (Swinburn 
et al. 2011).  
For Italy, recent data were collected by the local health authorities in Milan under the program 
PASSI (“Progressi delle Aziende Sanitarie per la Salute in Italia”) for the surveillance of the impact 
of local health services in Italy. According to this research, 31.6% of people in Milan are 
overweight, while 10.6% are obese – in line with the world-wide data. 
The epidemic of obesity has severe health effects on the population. BMI over 25 correlates with 
type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular conditions and many kinds of cancer (i.e. Non-Communicable 
Diseases, also known as “NCD”). Also, mortality for all causes as a function of BMI takes a typical 
U-shape with a minimum between 20 and 25 points of BMI. Taken this relation into account, in 
2004 there was an estimate of 36 million of disability-adjusted life years attributable to obesity34.  
The condition is often clustered with other conditions related to diet, with a recognizable clinical 
facet: the metabolic syndrome (i.e. dyslipidemia, insulin resistance, glucose intolerance, elevated 
blood pressure). We will avoid this term altogether since there is disagreement as for whether the 
term “metabolic syndrome” is of any clinical use, since many researchers believe that the 
therapeutic approach will in any case consist in targeting these conditions separately (Wubben and 
Adams 2006). 
NCDs are the main cause of death in most countries, indeed in all countries if we exclude some 
sub-Saharian states where infectious diseases are still endemic or increasingly so (i.e. due to HIV 
infection). The main preventable risk factor for NCDs are dietary factors according to the World 
Health Organization, and indeed recently diets may have overtaken tobacco as the chief 
preventable threat to the health of human population, partly because smoking campaigns have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The DALYs are a common metric in epidemiology and health economic evaluation that combines in a 
single measure the loss of life-expectancy and the loss of health due to morbidity. It has been widely used in 
the publications of the World Health Organization and it is has become a crucial tool to measure the burden 
of disease.  
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successful in several countries and partly because of the worrisome trends of the epidemic of diet 
related diseases.  
Indeed, there are no signs that the epidemic has peaked, if not in some European countries where 
incidence seems to have reached a plateau or declined among the younger, e.g. in Sweden and 
France (Swinburn et al. 2011). In developing countries, there is a growing tendency of co-existence 
of infectious diseases and NCDs due to lifestyles. In the case of diets – as briefly mentioned above 
- there are even paradoxical situations where obesity appears where malnourishment is still 
endemic (e.g. Mexico), and indeed there are cases of rapidly growing countries where the two 
problems are flanked in the same households. This is however not surprising if we bear in mind the 
sharp social stratification of the condition, which is the object of section 1.2.1 below. 
 
1.1.3 The biology of obesity and diet related diseases 
 
Which is the underlying biological driver of the epidemic of obesity? As for any other human trait, 
we may start looking at the biology of obesity and diet related conditions from the standpoint of the 
key question of most biological thought: are these conditions innate or acquired?  
This question is most often given the interpretation that equates innate conditions to those due to 
endogenous genetic factors and acquired conditions to those due to exogenous environmental 
factors, usually with the implicit premise that a mark of the first causal pathway is its heritability. 
While these questions remain an important first sketch of the terrain, the biological world does not 
lend itself to these sharp distinctions, and the biology of diet related diseases is no exception. There 
exist genetic and non genetic endogenous heritable factors and sometimes they are not innate (e.g. 
epigenetic marks). There are indeed even environmental and exogenous heritable factors (e.g. 
channels of social inheritance). In practice, any combination of the distinctions innate/acquired, 
endogenous/exogenous and genetic/environmental is possible. 
Also, it is impossible for most complex traits to characterize them univocally employing those 
distinctions. The following is most often the case: the occurrence of a trait in development and its 
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specific features are neither acquired nor innate, nor they are genetic or environmental, they are 
developed (Mameli 2005). That is, individual traits result from endogenous and environmental 
determinants that coalesce to build up - in our case - a specific health outcome. In the following, I 
will mention some of these drivers telling apart genetic, epigenetic and environmental factors. 
While we may disentangle epidemiologically their causal contribution, there is no obvious answer 
to the key biological question above in this case: diet related diseases are neither innate nor 
acquired, they are both. Part of the explanation resides in the human body, part of the explanation 
around us. 
 
Genetics 
 
The search for a “gene of obesity” has been facilitated by the possibility of massively sequencing 
human DNA from different patients and genome-wide comparing the data thus obtained. To 
summarize the main insights of this research in one sentence we may say the following: while there 
are several polymorphisms (i.e. genetic variants) disproportionately associated with obesity, none 
of them is either a necessary or a sufficient factor for the occurrence of the disease. In technical 
terms, “the most common forms of obesity are polygenic, with each [genetic] variant contributing 
to very small effect” (Fall and Ingelsson 2012). 
At the beginning of genetic studies of obesity, family, twin, and adoption studies35 have shown that 
adiposity is highly heritable: according to Maes et al. (1997), estimates of heritability range in the 
literature from 20% to 84%. The study of murine models of obesity and the confirmation in 
humans of the relevance for obesity of loss-of-function mutations36 of genes previously identified 
in animal models prompted further investigations on the genetic underpinnings of obesity. While 
cases of early-onset extreme obesity have been indeed confirmed to be due to monogenic or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Twin and adoption studies are crucial for disentangling biological and environmental effects, since the 
former can be kept fixed while the latter change in these conditions.  
36 Loss-of-function mutations are genetic variants, normally in protein-coding regions, where the gene does 
not retain any functionality. 
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oligogenic37 mutations (e.g. MC4R defects and mutations over 15 different gene in Bardet-Biedl 
syndrome, respectively), the overwhelming majority of cases are confirmed to be highly polygenic.  
After the first estimates of heritability, the search of genetic variants linked to common forms of 
obesity through candidate-genes approaches38 has failed to succeed. Since the publication of the 
data from the human genome consortium (McPherson 2001), the first comprehensive map of 
common haplotypes and the availability of several full-genome sequences for humans39, the 
research has turned instead toward unbiased approaches, searching for single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) that are associated with the trait of interest, in this case obesity. The result 
of this approach have been summarized recently in a meta-review by Fall and Ingelsson (2012): 
they included 39 studies linking SNPs with BMI, waist circumference, waist-hip ratio, fat 
percentage, fat mass or metabolic syndrome. The top hit of the search has been a gene that was 
dubbed FTO (i.e. “FaT mass and Obesity associated gene”). FTO - however - explains only 0.34% 
of the variance in human populations, pointing decisively toward a highly polygenic condition.  
Animal models of obesity have been also developed - following the results of genomic studies - in 
order to address mechanistic questions. Most positive signals in the genome-wide association 
studies come from non-protein-coding inter-genic regions, suggesting effects at the transcriptional 
or translational level of regulation of gene expression40. Other key variants involve coding regions 
that are widely thought to regulate appetite and food intake. Functional analysis suggests indeed 
that obesity SNPs within coding regions involve most often neuronal pathways and, marginally, 
cellular metabolism (Speliotes et al. 2010).  
The key example of the latter insight is indeed the already mentioned FTO gene. FTO - loss of 
function models have proved that FTO is crucial in energy metabolism, with deficient mice 
showing growth retardation, reduction in adipose tissues and lean body mass (Fischer et al. 2009). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In oligogenic traits, variants in few genetic regions are relevant. 
38 Candidate-genes approaches consist in the formulation of biological hypotheses on the basis of available 
mechanistic insights. This is to be contrasted with unbiased approaches, which screen for genomic-wide 
differences correlated with the condition of interests without specific assumptions (in this case, without a 
presumption regarding which genes might be involved in the condition). 
39 Thanks to high-throughput genotyping techniques. 
40 The astonishing complexity of multicellular organisms is a result of several layers of control on the 
genome, which allow for differential expression of the same underlying genetic program in different tissues 
and times.  
12	  
	  
Church et al. (2010) have shown instead a dose-dependent increase in body mass in FTO-over 
expressing mice. The gene is highly transcribed in the hypothalamus, which is known to be an 
appetitive-control region, confirming in mice what was suspected in functional gene analyses. 
The predictive power of results from genome-wide studies is low, despite the gap between 
heritability estimations and variability explained by known genetic variants may suggest some 
margin for improvement (Fall and Ingesson 2012). Together with further genome-wide studies, 
investigations in non genetic factors and environmental effects may help the solution of the 
biological riddle of obesity. 
 
Epigenetics 
 
The evidence from longitudinal studies of famine-ridden populations firstly suggested that 
biological programming in early life might be involved with metabolic dysfunctions in adulthood41. 
This has been linked mechanistically to epigenetic phenomena, i.e. relatively stable (inter and intra-
generationally) regulations of cellular pathways that do not depend on underlying genetic 
variability42. Epigenetics is a key example of both how biological traits can be non-innate and how 
non-genetic traits can be heritable, thus illustrating the general lesson of the innate-acquired 
genetic-environmental entanglement that was sketched above.  
Epigenetics has been also linked to phenotypic plasticity, which provides adaptability for 
individuals coping with changing environments (West-Heberard 2003). Epigenetic programming 
would be in this respect a tool that provides high flexibility to an otherwise rigid “wired” genetic 
program, given both its stability and sensitivity to environmental clues (Jablonka and Lamb 2005). 
In the case of famine-associated metabolic disorders, this has lead to a speculative explanatory 
model that is a paradigmatic example of the so-called “evolutionary medicine” approach: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  E.g. as studied in the Dutch famine case: see Ravelli et al. (1999).	  
42 Epigenetic phenomena include DNA methylation at CpG dinuclotides, histone modifications, levels of 
RNA expression, etc. 
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“thrifty phenotype” hypothesis firstly developed in diabetes studies (Hales and Barker 2001). The 
idea is that famine and/or a poor material diet would trigger a reaction in the foetus that leads to a 
more efficient usage of energy in adulthood. As it were, the body is somehow “predicting” future 
scarcity. In case the scarcity does not appear, the metabolic pathway will be mis-programmed and 
could lead to health conditions as obesity. The thrifty phenotype hypothesis provides elegant details 
for the - somehow vague - hypothesis that our evolutionary wired traits and our environment do not 
match from which we started above. How much of this hypothesis is corroborated by evidence? 
From epidemiological studies we know that peri-natal nutrition has long lasting effects on 
metabolic regulation. Both maternal hyper-nutrition and under-nutrition are associated with 
noticeable effects in children. The research program on the “Developmental Origin of Diseases” 
has uncovered these relations, giving some support to the thrifty phenotype hypothesis. Animal 
models of peri-natal food deprivation have confirmed these results, showing hyper-insulemia, 
hyper-fagia and adult-onset obesity in animals exposed to inadequate diet at birth (Sullivan et al. 
2010). Similar effects are observed in the case of maternal and/or peri-natal hyper-nutrition, which 
is obviously not predicted by the thrifty phenotype hypothesis, but might explain part of the high 
heritability of the condition already mentioned above. In brief, there seems to be a nutritional 
optimum of diet during pregnancy that does not increase the risk of adulthood metabolic 
conditions. Both hyper-nutrition and hypo-nutrition are instead harmful, and the latter pathway 
lends itself to be a candidate example of the “mismatch theory” of diseases. Also, it hints at some 
biological mechanisms that may underpin the “double burden” of diseases typical of populations 
where two flanked generations experienced very different nutritional environments. 
  
Environment 
 
The last driver of obesity is clearly the most important in the present context, given the aims of this 
thesis. Since the ultimate objective is a discussion of issues pertaining personal choices and public 
preventive policy, it is crucial to argue that indeed diet related diseases are due to environmental 
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insults and, particularly, to expositions to risk factors due to personal choices. The distinction 
between personal choices and “endogenous” biological factors is alas not sharp: we have seen 
already above that genetic factors associated with obesity are arguably interfering with choices 
(e.g. appetite regulation pathways). What counts for the moment is however providing evidence 
that indeed obesity and the associated diseases are related to eating habits. 
The simplest model of environmental determination of obesity is simply the equation between 
energetic input and energetic requirements: unbalances in the equation explain health problems. 
Excess of energetic consumption leads to over-usage of body reservoirs and, eventually, to 
stunting. Excess of energetic intake leads to accumulation and obesity. For the purposes of this 
section, it must be shown that both sides of the equation depend on lifestyles and personal habits. 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, following urbanization and, later, a switch of the workforce 
in the service sector, the energy requirements of human populations in high-income countries have 
decreased. It is something of a puzzle that the prevalence of obesity did not increase till the ‘70s. 
The explanation must somehow come from the intake side of the equation: data from the US shows 
that energy available in the food supply decreased till the 1960s, keeping up with the parallel 
decrease in consumption (Swinburn et al. 2011). From the ‘70s onward, there was instead a sharp 
increase in the quantity of highly caloric refined carbohydrates and fats – which associated with the 
occurrence of the epidemic and with technological innovation in the agricultural sectors. Swinburn 
et al. (2011) have also theorized on these bases that transitions in the energy balance happen in two 
phases: the “move less, stay lean phase” and the “eat more, gain weight phase”.  
While in the next chapters I will review at length some particular mechanisms of environmental 
determination of habits that impinge both on the intake and the consumption side of the energy 
balance, it is already clear from this evidence that diet related diseases are crucially determined by 
the environment and personal choices. There was indeed no time for a genetic change to have taken 
place in the two generations that separate contemporary humans to the obesity-free human 
populations of our grand-grandfathers. As it is often the case, genetic traits that have been there and 
silent since thousands of years interacted with new environmental exposures – perhaps in some 
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cases in the most intriguing way suggested by the “thrifty phenotype hypothesis” – to shift the 
distribution of individual weights and BMI upward.  
We have mentioned above the consequences of the epidemic of obesity in the prevalence of key 
non-communicable diseases. In detail, there is strong evidence that obesity is associated with type 
II diabetes and cardiovascular conditions, and laboratory works have reliable replicated these 
results.  
Here I limit myself to a brief review of most recent developments in epidemiology and clinical 
evidence regarding cancers, which is a more debated issue with lesser firm certainties. Results from 
large prospective cohort studies (i.e. longitudinal diachronic studies on whole human groups) have 
shown that, aside from some specific cancers, only a fraction of malignancies can be attributed to 
specific unhealthy food items, namely some colorectal, prostate and breast cancers. This does not 
show as such that diet is unimportant in the occurrence of cancers, it seems indeed that particular 
dietary patterns rather than single foods (or molecules) are the significant drivers of cancer risk 
and/or protection from cancers (Trichopoulou et al. 2003). Let us follow the most important steps 
of these developments in the epidemiology of nutrition and cancer. 
An early review of Doll and Peto (1981) estimated that up to 35% of cancers might be due to 
dietary factors. However, the ground of this first figure remains mysterious and was probably based 
on biases-prone case-control studies43 (World Cancer Research Fund 2007). Subsequent large 
cohort studies provided small support to the idea that specific dietary factors are associated with 
very frequent colorectal, prostate and breast cancer – with a more robust claim as for the effect of 
high consumption of red meat on the risk of colorectal cancer. Similar results have been obtained 
when studying the protective effects of fruit and vegetables, that were thought on the bases of 
mechanistic insights to be promising protective agents44. 
While single dietary factors did not turn out to be as relevant in epidemiological studies as 
predicted by Doll and Peto (1981), there were instead some stronger results on the link between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In a case-control study the causes of a condition are sought a posteriori in the personal history of a patient: 
this is prone to selection biases since researchers might tend to ignore negative results and overestimate 
positive ones. 
44 See infra next section. 
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obesity and overweight and malignancies, especially adenocarcinoma of the esophagus, kidney 
cancer, colorectal cancer (in men), breast and endometrial cancer (in post-menopausal women). 
This is in line with the general hypothesis that overall diet quality rather than particular 
carcinogenic food stuffs are involved in the determination of cancer risk. The confirmation of this 
hypothesis requires further epidemiological work and a move to more mechanistic molecular 
inquiries. 
 
1.1.4 Protective food 
 
Along with the epidemiology of negatively-impacting risk factors, some dietary items might 
instead protect from chronic conditions and/or their re-occurrence. The first speculation on this 
possibility came from puzzling epidemiological observations, chiefly the so-called “French-
paradox”: the French have a remarkably low rate of mortality due to coronary heart diseases 
despite their intake of saturated fats is traditionally very high. Researchers hypothesized that this 
might be due to the high consumption of red wine among Frenchmen. While a first hypothesis 
connected the effect with the alcoholic content of wine (Renaud and de Loregeil 1992), it was later 
discovered that the effect might be due to a class of compounds that naturally occur in plants: 
phenols and polyphenols (notably resveratrol in the case of grape). In the last two decades, studies 
on the protective effects of these chemical compounds have flourished and we may illustrate briefly 
some results focusing on anthocyanins, pigments of red-blue plants that humans consume in 
relevant amounts (depending on dietary patterns.) 
There is evidence that anthocyanins protect against age-related degenerative diseases, 
cardiovascular conditions and some cancers. Also, they might protect from obesity and diabetes 
(Tsuda et al. 2003). There is debate as for the exact mechanistic pathway that mediates these 
effects, however there is evidence that anthocyanins have a free-radical scavenging and antioxidant 
effect and they might also affect directly cancer-related pathways (De-Xing et al. 2004). While the 
consumption of anthocyanins might have increased due to the availability of extracts of red and 
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blue fruits, the availability of these compounds in fruits can be enhanced by genetic engineering 
(Butelli et al. 2008), thus providing a proof-of-principle for genetically modified plants – based 
nutraceutics. While the wider significance for public health of these discoveries requires further 
investigations, the protective effects of some foods should be clearly added to the complexities of 
the relation between diets and the outset of chronic conditions.  
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1.2 The social history of diet related diseases 
 
This section explores the broader social significance of diet related diseases. Bad health is always 
much more than a mere medical emergency and involves the loss of personal opportunities and 
substantial social costs. The first part is dedicated to the social stratification of diet related 
conditions and relies on the literature on the social determinants of health, while the second part 
reviews some data regarding health costs and the effects on employment and productivity of 
nutrition associated conditions. 
 
1.2.1 Social inequalities in health 
 
In poor countries where the prevalence of obesity is overall low, the condition is limited to richer 
segments of the populations, as in the traditional picture of obesity as a “disease of affluence” 
(Ulijaszek 2007). This however rapidly changes in economically developed country. Poorer people 
are systematically over-represented among over-weight and obese people in all but the poorest 
countries, especially among women and the younger. In the case of men, the stratification is less 
significant or not present, since in men poorer socio-economic conditions might associate with 
labor in more physically demanding occupations. 
If we take education as a proxy for socio-economic condition, we come to know that in Milan 24% 
of the population without any educational attainment is obese, while only 5% of those who hold a 
university degree suffer from the problem. Percentages are 13% and 8% respectively for those who 
completed the middle school and those who completed the high school45. 
Data are skewed in Italy even geographically, as it is known from other countries (Marmot and Bell 
2012). A recent research, “Okkio alla salute”, has pointed out that in poor regions of the south (e.g. 
Calabria and Campania) the prevalence of obesity and overweight in children is as high as 45%, 
while in richer regions of the north, it can be as low as 15% (Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Data from the surveillance system “PASSI”, already mentioned supra. 
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Bozen). The prevalence of the condition correlates better46 with poverty rates than with GDP pro-
capita or the Gini index of inequality47, suggesting mechanisms associated with the kind of 
deprivation and constraints that are typical of absolute poverty rather than those that are due to 
differences in status48. 
Lifestyles are one of the several factors that explain the sharp social differentials in life expectancy, 
incidence of and mortality from diseases that are characteristic of all countries where 
epidemiologists have collected data, including those that are relatively more egalitarian from the 
socio-economic standpoint (e.g. Scandinavian countries). There is an open debate on the impact of 
lifestyles on the size of social health inequalities (Pampel et al. 2010), however everybody agrees 
that the underlying drivers of these inequalities must be several and include lifestyles.  
For example, poorer people live in less healthy environments and face conditions at work and in 
their social surroundings that are more stressful. There are known biological pathways that link 
stress response with long-term adverse health outcomes (Brunner and Marmot, in Marmot and 
Wilkinson 2006), and indeed life-long exposition to environmental risk factors, stress and 
unhealthy lifestyle are the key drivers of inequalities in health according to the main models of 
“life-course epidemiology” (Blane, in Marmot and Wilkinson 2006).  
“Life-course” models are explanatory tools that describe differential outcomes in health in different 
socio-economic strata of the population highlighting the persistent feed-backs that link health and 
socio-economic status.  Since there is no single driver that can explain alone differentials in health 
outcome that can be as wide as 28 years of loss of life-expectancy between top and bottom earner 
neighborhoods in the city of Glasgow (U.K.), researchers hypothesize that risk factors must 
somehow cluster together via the adverse health curricula that characterize poorer people from the 
infancy. While expositions to dangerous substances and lifestyles were something that could be 
easily associated with more disadvantaged people, it came as a surprise the discovery that there is a 
clear gradient of health outcomes even between relatively well-off workers in clerical offices, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Personal calculations. 
47 The Gini index is a common measure of economic inequality. It usually describes the dispersion of 
incomes – tough it can be used to measure the dispersion of whatever quantity across a population. The index 
takes the value 1 if one person gains the whole income, while it is 0 when the distribution is perfectly flat. 
48 See Marmot (2004) for an explanation of the difference between the two issues. 
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revealed in the analyses of the famous Whitehall II large cohort study of the English civil servants 
(Marmot 2005). This was the main clue that led researchers to propose more refined explanatory 
models, chiefly that of stress-based response and, later, models that contemplate multiple factors in 
a diachronic manner. Epigenetic scars due to in utero bad nutrition or even to unhealthy behaviors 
of parents and grandparents (Pembrey et al. 2006) might generate worse health in poorer children, 
which lead to worse education outcomes. Together with independent channel of inheritance of 
social disadvantage, this may lead to worse career, exposed to stress and/or to environmental risk 
factors and, eventually, to chronic conditions in adulthood, perhaps mediated by unhealthy 
lifestyles. 
Social epidemiologists may tend to downplay the role of lifestyles in the determination of social 
health inequalities because they favor distal interventions and fear a public response that may 
“blame the poor” for their own predicament. While this attitude may be strategically justifiable in 
the public arena, here there is no need of avoiding the issue. One of the results of this thesis will be 
- I hope - to dispel these justified worries of politically engaged social epidemiologists. The policy 
consequences of a reasoned discussion regarding the impact of lifestyles on health need not be a 
moralistic condemnation of smokers and bad eaters, quite the contrary indeed. Choices - I will 
argue - are less morally significant than it is normally thought, and so lifestyles can be considered 
one among the other of the several environmental risk factors from the point of view of public 
health officials. The question of whether we should tackle individual behaviors or more distal 
determinants of health is a lot one of efficacy, i.e. which policies serve better our social and 
medical objectives. 
 
1.2.2 Effects on economic activity and costs 
 
We can employ three instruments to answer the question - pertaining economic studies - whether 
better health leads to greater wealth, either for an individual or a society. We may want to study the 
health care costs associated with chronic diseases, study the micro and macro-economic costs 
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associated with these epidemics and, finally, study quite directly welfare issues by measuring the 
value that people attribute to better health. Let us have a look to these three instruments in the case 
of obesity and diet related diseases.   
The effects of diets on diseases suggest that major economic effects of unhealthy food choices will 
regard health costs. This has been studied in several countries, focusing on the expenditure in 
health-care. Sassi (2010) reports data which estimate within a range of 1% to 3% the impact of 
diets on total health expenditures. The figure can be much higher for the United States, in line with 
the data regarding the higher prevalence of obesity there: some studies even estimate that 10% of 
health expenses in that country are due to bad diets. Individuals who are obese will spend on 
average 25% more in health than normal-weight people. There is obviously an issue of time-lag in 
these results: since the epidemic is quite recent and health effects will ensue mostly from the 
middle to the long term, it is likely that future figures will be amended upwards.  
The issue is however quite complicated because the figures are gross and do not include possible 
reductions in costs due to lower life expectancy of the obese. While most studies show that obese 
people will have higher lifetime costs, there is evidence that after the age of 80, when life 
expectancies of obese and non-obese diverge, the latter will be more expensive than the former 
(Sassi 2010). 
Further social consequences are to be found among the effects of diet related diseases on individual 
life courses, which might affect households and society at large. The link between socio-economic 
status and health discussed in the previous section can indeed run in the other direction as well, as 
anticipated in the life-course feed-backs based model. Let us look at some pathways that illustrate 
the effect of obesity on employment, wages, productivity, and education. 
There are conflicting results regarding employment and obesity, with some studies hinting to a 
negative effect, especially in women. This can be due to discrimination, either founded on mere 
prejudices against obese people or statistical discrimination49. Also, effects on employment might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Statistical discrimination is the selection of individuals (e.g. for hiring) on the bases of irrelevant features 
(e.g. gender, ethnicity) that might however be correlated with some features that are relevant for productivity, 
sometimes for unjust causes. 
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be due to personal restraint from job search, perhaps mediated by the well-studied effect of obesity 
on self-esteem (Averett and Korenman 1996). 
In the case of the impact on wages, several studies have shown an obesity penalty - in one case as 
large as 18% (Lundborg et al. 2010), and larger effects in higher occupational positions. The effect 
seems to be limited - or anyway bigger - to women. Sassi (2010) proposes that the effect on wages 
can be mediate by the difficulties in finding employment, with obese people settling for lesser 
salaries, as in standard models of the effects of unemployment on salaries. 
As for the consequences on productivity – that may be at the bases of statistical discrimination 
against the obese, there are several studies that record the effects of obesity on absenteeism or sick-
leaves. Early studies in the US indicate that obese men and women are twice more likely to go into 
sick leave and these results have been replicated in European countries (Sassi 2010). Obviously this 
does not justify discrimination, but it is obviously a reason of concern – especially because wage 
and employment disadvantages may add up to further disadvantages independently due to lower 
social status, which we have seen above being associated with a higher prevalence of the condition.  
As for the measure of the social welfare based on actual judgments of people, Suhrcke et al. (2006) 
proposes to look at the monetary value that people attribute to gains in life expectancy between 
1970 and 2003 in high-income countries, which is largely attributable to ameliorations in the 
management of chronic diseases. If we could apportion the causal contribution of diets, we could 
measure the potential gain (and the actual loss) in welfare that is due to dietary conditions. The 
aggregate results show that, in the US, the value attributed to better health – as measured in trade-
off questionnaires50 - in monetary terms far outweighs health expenditures (29% to 38% of US 
gross domestic product). These results can be extrapolated to try an estimate of the value of the 
health lost to dietary conditions.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Trade-off questionnaires are common devices in econometrics studies that are employed to assign a 
monetary value to the utility of certain events for the sake of comparison between outcomes of different 
nature. See Hausman and McPherson (2006), esp. ch. 8, for a critical analysis of monetary-based measures of 
welfare. 
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1.3 Policy response: what has been done? 
 
In this section I will mention some prototypical health policy that can be implemented against 
dietary conditions. As we have seen above, any modification of the food system will have 
downstream consequences regarding dietary regimes of entire populations: it is thus difficult to 
single out “health policies” from the mare magnum of public policies regarding prices, agriculture, 
transportation, value added taxes, retailers, urban planning, the health system, etc. However, I will 
be mainly interested in two kinds of interventions: (1) public health preventive policy that is 
justified on the bases of dietary diseases; (2) amendment of existing health systems adopted with 
the specific purpose of coping with diet related diseases. They correspond to the two section of this 
brief subchapter. 
 
1.3.1 Public health policies and food 
 
There are several policies that have been evaluated, even in controlled trials, and can boast a good 
degree of evidence as for their effectiveness in ameliorating the epidemic of obesity. Some of them 
are indeed even quite simple and cost-effective, other are instead invasive and/or require substantial 
investments. In any case, no measure is going to be effective alone, as it may have been the case in 
other cases of public health emergencies, and a “systemic approach” is recommended by all 
professionals (Gortmaker et al. 2011). Here we simply list some of the measures that have been 
reviewed in this latter work, adding a brief comment on their nature and their effectiveness. 
(1) Food and beverage taxes. Fiscal measures have been introduced in several countries (e.g. 
Denmark, US), most often on foods high in fat content or on sugary beverages. The measure is 
obviously cost-effective for the public sector (i.e. losses in revenues due to decreased consumptions 
aside), though there is not as yet conclusive evidence that the measure is effective. 
(2) Bans (i.e. trans-hydrogenated fats). Some products can be simply forbidden, as it is done in 
the case of some chemicals on safety grounds. It has been argued (Lustig et al. 2012) that sugary 
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products should be treated equally to poisons, given their impact on health – but as yet the bans 
have been applied, with substantial debate, only to trans-hydrogenated fats in the US. Bans of 
excessive size portions rather than foods have been also implemented. 
(3) Traffic-light-labeling. Several countries have introduced consumer-friendly labels that 
signal in a visually obvious way whether the purchase will be healthy (and thus can be made on a 
regular bases) or not (and thus should be made only rarely). There is not enough evidence as for its 
effectiveness. 
(4) School-based programs. These are a group of interventions aimed at reducing television 
viewing, increasing physical activity, eliminating sugary drinks and educating children at good 
diet. They can be targeted at specific groups or at-risk individuals. They are mostly cheap programs 
and they deserve attention because they have proven effective in controlled trials. 
(5) Gastric-banding. This is a medical procedure which does work (best level of evidence in 
Gortmaker et al. 2011), but it is obviously invasive – so it can be considered only for severe cases 
rather than for the common problem that we are considering. 
(6) Dietary guidelines administered by doctors. General practitioners are at the forefront of the 
fight against the epidemic. The problem of guidelines is obviously compliance, although a wide 
dispersal of medical information, perhaps backed by the authority of medical staff, will have major 
impact on the epidemic. 
 
1.3.2 Health systems reforms and diet related diseases 
 
Along with preventive public health policies targeting the population, an important topic of policy 
discussion stemming from diet related diseases depends on issue of sustainability of the health 
systems in the face of growing costs of chronic diseases.  
Strain on the organizations of the health systems might have different origins, from the technology-
intensity of medical services against chronic diseases, to the aging of most populations. Lifestyle 
dietary factors, however, are also a key driver of the epidemic of NCD, and as such some re-
calibration of health systems might be implemented as a consequence of them. This belongs to a 
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general tendency of amendment of social services in the face of “new risks” due to personal 
choices that will be the object of critical scrutiny in chapter 4.  
In particular, amendments to the universal regime which is typical of several European health 
systems (e.g. the Italian “Sistema Sanitario Nazionale”) might be conducted in the name of 
sustainability. They might consist in increases in fees for services, the exclusion of some piece of 
health care from public provision and even a move toward privatized forms of insurances. While 
none of these large-scale reforms will be obviously based on single issues as lifestyle risk-factors, a 
treatment of the latter subject would not be complete without a thorough normative discussion of 
these measures, given that they are those of most impact: this is conducted in chapter 3 and 4. 
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2.  Paternalism.  
When choice is bad 
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Liberals are engaged in a struggle against paternalism at least since Locke (2003 [1690]) and the 
charge of paternalism is a common critique of health promotion campaigns, policy and laws. In this 
chapter, I explain what paternalism is, why liberals dislike it and which forms of liberal 
antipaternalism apply to the case of public policy against diseases related to nutrition. There are 
three logical steps of the argument. Firstly I distinguish two broad families of antipaternalist 
arguments: deontological and welfarist, centered respectively on the intrinsic value of personal 
liberty and its instrumental value for personal well being. Secondly I claim that liberty based 
antipaternalism is implausible both generally and more specifically in public (health) policy. 
Thirdly I argue that welfarist antipaternalism can be abandoned in favor of intervention whenever 
there is evidence that personal decisions tend to be poor. This is the case in dietary choices, where 
most people are bad deliberators, or so I will argue. 
This material is divided in three subchapters. While 2.1 is an introduction that prepares the main 
conceptual tools for the following discussion, 2.2 is the pars destruens that contains a critique of 
the deontological liberty based tradition of antipaternalism. The discussion in 2.1 and 2.2 is focused 
on public policy in general and public health in particular rather than specifically on food policy: 
the purpose is indeed to reconstruct two approaches to the issue of paternalism, deontological and 
welfarist, and defend quite generally my preference for the latter. 2.3 is instead the pars construens: 
I explain why welfarist antipaternalism is worrisome in public health and what kind of things can 
be said on behalf of restrictive food policies starting from specific empirical evidence regarding 
nutritional choices. There I will focus more in detail on food in order to explain the practical 
relevance of the approach that I defend. 
The consequence of the argument presented in these chapters is the following: while the allegation 
of paternalism is hardly a conclusive critique against a public health policy, law or campaign, the 
latter should be designed as to avoid self-defeating harmful consequences for their intended 
beneficiaries, those that are highlighted by the welfarist antipaternalists. In the case of bans or 
costly disincentives against unhealthy foods, particular attention should be paid to avoiding harms 
to good deliberators. This allows for a wider space for paternalist policy than it is usually assumed. 
I explain why this proposal is not unacceptable for antiperfectionists that insist on pluralism 
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regarding preferences and values and how we could address some forms of inefficiencies due to the 
heterogeneity of human populations as for decision making capabilities - heterogeneity that might 
jeopardize population-wide policies. 
Throughout the chapters, I will touch upon several wider topics of political philosophy such as the 
interpretation of anti-perfectionism, the value of personal sovereignty and the theory of well being. 
While the purpose of the chapter is not to intervene in these debates, their discussion in a narrower 
field may contribute to the broader theoretical discussion. On the other hand, several principles will 
be taken for granted, especially the relation between political authorization and consent in section 
2.1.1 and the skeptical interpretation of anti-perfectionism in section 2.3.1. The only possible 
argument that I can present on their behalf is their analytic fruitfulness in the current discussion.  
 
2.1 The varieties of antipaternalism and public health policy 
 
In this introductory section, I will explain what paternalism is (2.1.1), assess whether health policy 
against diet related diseases can be considered paternalist (2.1.2), tell apart carefully two general 
concerns regarding paternalist actions (2.1.3) and review previous treatments of the subject in 
prescriptive discussions regarding health policy (2.1.4). The main piece of the general argument 
that I discuss here regards the distinction between liberty based and welfare based antipaternalism, 
which I will treat respectively in 2.2 and 2.3 afterward. I also argue here that at least some pieces of 
health policy must be considered paternalist and that several previous proposals did not pay enough 
attention to the different varieties of antipaternalism, i.e. the different sort of values and principles 
that can be employed against paternalistic actions, focusing too often on one or the other version. 
From that point of view I will then try an evaluation of paternalism in food policy. 
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2.1.1 The definition of paternalism and its relevance in the case of food policy 
 
Gerald Dworkin (1972, 2010) has provided the definition of paternalism that is commonly 
employed in contemporary normative theorizing. I will simply assume its adequacy: that is, 
Dworkin’s definition captures most of the cases that are identified pre-theoretically as instances of 
paternalism and highlights the normative features of paternalism that are most frequently addressed 
in moral inquiry, i.e. Dworkin’s definition is a satisfying explication of paternalism. All and only 
those things that fit the following conditions count as paternalistic:  
 
(1) interferences with the liberty and\or autonomy of an individual x 
(2) without the consent of x 
(3) for the sake of x’s interests, good, welfare, etc. 
 
Some alternative definitions employ the notion of “interference with choices” in the first condition, 
but they are all roughly equivalent: we can safely ignore them and let for the moment the first 
condition somehow vague51. Under Dworkin’s conditions, rescuing a passerby on a bridge from his 
own suicidal effort, prohibiting a drunken friend to drive its bicycle by locking it to a fence and 
enacting laws that disincentive smoking for the sake of smokers’ health are all paternalistic actions. 
By itself, Dworkin’s explication does not entail any prescriptive conclusion, as it may be clear if 
your moral assessments of these three cases are different: if an act is paternalist in the Dworkinian 
sense, it is not as such neither ethically proscribed nor recommended.  
Dworkin’s definition singles out two sources of prescriptive attrition, the liberty/autonomy that gets 
interfered in a paternalistic act and the beneficent intention of paternalists. Also, it names a process 
that would render non-paternalistic a beneficent interference: consent to the interference.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Feinberg (1974) and Gert and Culver (1976) for other definitions. 
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While the key conditions are (1) and (3) regarding beneficence and autonomy,  an independent 
condition for lack of consent (i.e. condition 2) is needed because there might be cases where, 
despite the presence of consent to interference, the latter still counts as violation of autonomy 
and/or liberty but it is not an act of paternalism. These are most likely to be situations where there 
is a delay in time between the act of consent and the consented interference52. Consider the 
following two different cases. If I consent to my dentist to operate on my teeth, this counts as 
harmless violation of physical integrity but scarcely as violation of liberty/or autonomy: an 
independent condition for lack of consent appears not to be needed because lack of consent seems 
to entail definitionally an assault to autonomy here. Yet if a friend asks me to prevent him from 
driving his bike if he gets drunk, when I lock up his bicycle at the end of the evening I do have his 
consent but I am still violating his liberty/autonomy if he complains - yet this should not count as 
paternalism. Violation of autonomy and lack of consent are two different phenomena. Some might 
want to say that, if the friend complains, I no longer have his consent for locking up his bike. Yet 
the correct description of the case seems to me that I still retain his consent despite his alcohol-
driven second-thoughts (perhaps because alcohol-driven retrievals of consent are void). If this is so, 
my act does not count as paternalistic given the condition (2). Other cases that we may want not to 
call paternalist are cases of gift-giving. Though in certain respect gift giving may interfere with 
liberty and autonomy for beneficent purpose, what makes them uncontroversial is the fact that 
receiving a gift is to be consented to count as such. Adequacy of the definition requires that it is not 
too broad: a good definition of paternalism restricts the extension of the concept to cases that are at 
least prima-facie problematic, and so contain the clause (2) in order to narrow the focus to issues 
that are prescriptively puzzling. In this context, however, nothing hinges upon this particular issue 
and I retain the independent condition for consent for instrumental reasons: it is very useful in the 
context of discussion of paternalism in public policy. While inter-personal consent is relatively easy 
to spell out, the relation between the individuals that are targeted by a policy and their consent to 
that policy is mediated by institutions as voting polls, representative and legislatures, and deserves 
independent attention53.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Husak (2009) for complete treatment of the subject. 
53 See infra section 2.1.2. 
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Dworkin mentions both liberty and autonomy in the explication of paternalism: the two concepts 
should be interpreted in their most ordinary sense in moral philosophy. Liberty is liberal negative 
freedom: I am not free in this sense if I am constrained, physically or otherwise. There are other 
understandings of liberty in moral theory but they need not enter the debate on paternalism. For 
instance, Berlin (1969) has contrasted the negative freedom from physical and legal constraints and 
the positive freedom to pursue meaningful aims within that space: “substantial liberty”. More 
recently, republicans have developed an account of liberty as non-domination, according to which 
someone is free in the republican sense if and only if he is not threatened by arbitrary interference 
(Petitt 1997). While republicans might construct an argument against paternalism insofar some 
paternalistic actions could count as arbitrary in the republican sense54, both understandings of 
liberty are not pertinent in the analysis of paternalism, which deals straightforwardly with cases of 
interference (that is, constraints). Also, positive freedom in the sense of Berlin is akin to autonomy, 
and so it is included at the end of the day in the definition we are employing.  
Indeed, over and above interference, another feature of paternalism that Dworkin brings to light is 
the substitution of personal preferences and plans with aims imposed by beneficent third parties: 
violation of autonomy. The most common idea of an autonomous choice is that of authorship: x 
has chosen autonomously to do y if doing y is connected in the appropriate way with x plans, 
preferences, desires, perhaps personality. This is valuable and gets violated in some instances of 
paternalist acts: this is why Dworkin mentions autonomy along with liberty in the condition (1).  
The assessment of the moral appropriateness of paternalism is often conducted by induction from 
intuitively acceptable cases: the moral casuistry of paternalism allows the extraction of the 
fundamental features of paternalist actions that make them morally required, acceptable or 
prohibited. This is why sub-categories of paternalism based on these features are so important in 
the literature (Feinberg 1974, Dworkin 2010). I will proceed in a different way, tracking the general 
philosophical motivations of antipaternalism55, and discussing their relevance for the case I am 
discussing. This strategy is partly due to my skepticism with some conceptual distinctions that 
sustain the strategy from casuistry, which I explain next.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See infra section 2.1.4. 
55 See infra section 2.1.3.	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To begin with, different forms of paternalism can be distinguished from the point of view of the 
agent acting paternalistically, e.g. we may want to tell apart paternalism in inter-personal 
relationships and paternalism in public policy. Among the latter cases, Feinberg (1974) has 
distinguished paternalistic criminalization and paternalistic non-criminal regulations, as fiscal 
policy (e.g. when employed as disincentive against dangerous consumptions). These distinctions 
are obviously important in the normative discussion: paternalism can be a recommendable sign of 
friendship in inter-personal relationships while being an intolerable violation of personal integrity if 
it originates from public authorities. This is because the aims and appropriate limits of actions in 
inter-personal relationships and public policy are, in general, different. For instance, among public 
policies, some instruments can be employed only for very specific purposes, e.g. the criminal law, 
thus being unsuitable for paternalistic intervention. In this chapter on public health and nutrition, all 
relevant cases fall in the category of non-criminal public regulations: bans, taxes, perhaps certain 
form of aggressive health campaigns56 are non-criminal regulations enacted or implemented by 
public authorities. We can forget for the purpose of this thesis the other categories. 
A distinction that is thought to make most prescriptive work is that between hard and soft 
paternalism, which again has been firstly described by Feinberg (1974). In cases of hard 
paternalism, the action that is prevented for beneficent reasons is a voluntary choice that an agent 
has taken with reference to his desires and a roughly adequate factual knowledge about his 
surroundings. Soft paternalism is instead interference with actions that should be considered less 
than voluntary and/or mistakenly taken against a background of major factual ignorance57. Feinberg 
(1974) argues that the second form of paternalism is morally appropriate and perhaps 
recommendable (though not in the criminal law): this is because non voluntary choices are 
regarded as improper expressions of personal autonomy. The verdict depends on extrapolations 
from cases that count intuitively as acceptable paternalistic interferences: beneficent guidance in 
the case of parental upbringing or interference in cases of temporary (e.g. drugs) or permanent 
deliberative deficits. In both cases, choices lack the appropriate voluntaristic dimension that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See infra section 2.1.2 
57 The proviso regarding factual knowledge is necessary to account for cases of choices that are voluntary but 
nonetheless grossly inadequate: if a friend picks up for eating a poisonous berry while thinking it is edible, 
the interference has a very different nature of cases as the rescue of a suicide who deliberated at length about 
his choice. 
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connects one’s choice with one’s personal individuality and therefore paternalism is allegedly 
admissible.  
In section 2.2.1, I will argue that the Feinbergian assessment of the two cases does not depend on 
voluntariness or lack thereof as such. Rather, it depends on considerations about personal well 
being and the ways in which what he calls “voluntary” choices are associated with the pursuit of 
personal interests and plans. For the moment, I sketch an argument against the usefulness of this 
famous distinction in the cases that we are dealing with. Indeed, the distinction between voluntary 
and non-voluntary actions, and hence that between hard and soft paternalism, cannot make here - as 
in the case of certain attributions of responsibility58 - any important normative work. It is 
metaphysically weak and too disputable to be convincing in moral reasoning regarding lifestyle 
choices. 
The distinction between hard and soft paternalism depends conceptually on the notions of “will”, 
“choice” and “autonomy”. While the meaning of the three concepts is reasonably clear in several 
cases, the boundaries of their application pose important philosophical challenges. To take the 
cases above: how much impaired should my cognitive abilities be in order to fail a test of 
voluntariness? How old should a small child be in order to count as a proper deliberator? Is an 
impulsive decision non-autonomous in an otherwise reflective person and autonomous in someone 
who tends to bravery? I do not deny that for practical purposes these distinctions should be made 
(e.g. in legal contexts), yet any choice will be philosophically contentious. Continuous 
philosophical disagreement might be due to errors, prejudices or epistemic failures, yet we cannot 
deny that perhaps there is no fact of the matter that might decide the issue: in border cases, whether 
something is an act of will or properly autonomous might be simply underdetermined by reality.  
Scheffler (2005) has argued that compatibilist metaphysics proves exactly the latter point: 
autonomous free choices are just a segment in the continuous line connecting relatively free and 
relatively constrained choices, rather than metaphysically sui generis phenomena. Compatibilism is 
a metaphysical theory about free-will that preserves the notion of free choices59 while denying that 
choices are an independent category of causal forces (Dennett 1984). In any single instance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See infra section 3.2, especially 3.2.3. 
59 In other words: it is non-eliminativist about free-will within a naturalistic world-view. 
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choice, there will be some factors that determined its occurrence. These factors will be more or less 
related with personal plans and aims and this is relevant for deciding whether they are free. For 
instance, perhaps we should not call autonomous decisions that are taken without long deliberation 
because they cannot be sufficiently linked with individual arrangements and plans. Yet distinctions 
between free autonomous and constrained non-autonomous choices are not nearly as 
metaphysically fundamental as we thought – at least if compatibilism is correct, as we have all 
reasons to believe if we embrace a naturalistic worldview. While Scheffler’s further observation 
against basing a fundamental prescriptive distinction on shaky metaphysical foundations is 
disputable (e.g. it seems a sort of naturalistic fallacy), I will make a simpler point regarding moral 
theory, the following. 
I argued that in some cases there might be no independent and conclusive descriptive standards to 
assess whether one choice is autonomous or not. At any rate, we expect that there are such 
problematic cases if we are compatibilists: after all there is no sui generis causal power of the will 
that labels them as “free and autonomous” choices. This means also that distinctions will be 
possibly made for prescriptive reasons: partly on the bases of general moral standards, partly on the 
bases of relevant descriptive facts, partly on the bases of crude intuitions about the case at stake. 
This is not a case where via reflective equilibrium60 we can reach a stable standard that can be 
applied neatly to new cases depending on whether they are cases of voluntary choices or not. 
Perhaps this is possible where cases are clear (e.g. infants), but it is not a viable strategy for 
dubious cases: the distinction between hard and soft paternalism is prescriptively void in a very 
large grey area encompassing most decisions of (adult) cognitively normal human beings, simply 
because these cases lie along a continuum. These are however exactly the cases that we are dealing 
with here, and so the distinction soft-hard paternalism cannot make any substantial work in this 
context. 
The take-home message so far is the following: there is no particular reason to approach the 
prescriptive problems of paternalism by casuistry and complex taxonomies because controversial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The “methodology” of reflective equilibrium is typical of certain moral thought: moral “intuitions” are 
simultaneously used as data and revised in light of moral theory. The aim is the achievement of coherence 
between moral data and theories that reconstruct our moral life – see also Rawls (1971) for a famous 
description of the method. 
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cases will remain controversial within that framework. This (tentative) conclusion suggests 
approaching the debate on paternalism from another perspective, that of the general political and 
moral motivations underlying antipaternalism. Why are philosophers concerned with paternalism in 
the first place? An answer to these questions will permit to assess whether their moral worries are 
pertinent to the case of food policy. Before going into that, we should however answer a 
preliminary question: do public health measures against nutrition-related diseases count as 
paternalistic policy in the Dworkinian sense? This is the topic of the next section.   
 
2.1.2 What is a paternalist policy?  
 
The three conditions of paternalism according to Dworkin are: (1) interference with liberty and 
autonomy, (2) lack of consent, (3) welfarist intention. Let us look for each of them whether they are 
satisfied in public health policy in general and food policy in particular. 
 
Interference with liberty and autonomy 
 
The first condition is relatively uncontroversial in the case of health prevention. Some public health 
measures count as interference with liberty straightforwardly: bans are a paradigmatic case and 
taxes are also leverages that aim at modifying choices, which counts as interference by any 
definition of interference. The case of informational campaign is more complicated: apparently, 
more information cannot count as interference, and in fact could promote autonomy. Indeed, people 
can construe their actions more coherently with their interests if they possess the kind of 
information that is necessary to connect different alternative choices with the pursuit of their aims. 
In this case, if people knew how risky certain behaviors were, they would adapt their lifestyles 
more effectively to their preferred level of risk. In other words, more information must be at least 
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loosely good for people: if they use it, their welfare will increase, if they do not, nothing will 
change. 
Yet some health campaigns are more than a simple delivery of neutral information (under any 
definition of neutrality). For instance, gruesome depictions of the consequences of smoking for 
lungs exploit common psychological mechanisms to make a certain choice more costly from the 
psychological standpoint. A picture of a lung cancer is much less informative and hence less 
autonomy-promoting than epidemiological data, yet it can be more effective as disincentive. This is 
very close to fiscal measures that make a product more costly in monetary terms, if we compare the 
degree of interference involved in the measure. So we can conclude that many policies, included 
policies that apparently do not interfere with liberty, meet the first Dworkinian criterion. 
 
Welfarist aims 
 
The third Dworkinian condition is puzzling if we try to evaluate its application in cases of public 
policy. To begin with, the idea of a beneficent intention, aim, or objective is clear in cases of inter-
personal relationships but is much less so in public actions. In inter-personal cases, the mental 
states of the beneficent are the place where to look for intentions and purposes: I am behaving 
paternalistically if I interfere with the choice of somebody with specific beneficent aims in mind. 
Whose mental states should be looked at in cases of publicly enacted regulations? Those of each 
participant to the political body that approves a ban on trans-fats? Those of the members of the 
technical committee who proposed the measure? Those of the public who authorized some 
legislators to make public health laws? All of them? None?  
The issue may be not as complicated as it seems. Since every public decision is normally 
accompanied by a thorough body of justifications, for instance in the proceedings of the legislature 
that approved a law or in the papers and reports that are attached to the history of a piece of policy, 
we may try to look into that material. There is however a major obstacle to that strategy: for each 
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policy there can be several justifications and rationales, and indeed it is ordinarily positive when 
this is so.  
For instance, taxes on sugary drinks can be introduced to fight obesity, to decrease health costs, to 
collect revenues, etc.: do sugar taxes still count as paternalistic if the good of the would-be drinkers 
was mentioned among other powerful arguments? If paternalism is inappropriate, does this count 
against sugar taxes and should be weighed against the implementation of the policy? The latter 
question certainly goes too far, for it would be amusing to argue that a well-motivated non-
paternalist policy should not be implemented because it has the drawback of preventing self-harm 
as a side-effect. Yet it is at this point mysterious why this is puzzling: if antipaternalism is correct, 
this strong intuition must be retained.  
A proposal to address this riddle that we can easily dismiss is the following: the intended aim of a 
policy is the objective that is supported by the best argument in its favor. This proposition has an 
unintended consequence: nothing counts as paternalist if antipaternalism turns out to be correct (i.e. 
if paternalistic intentions never count as justification for actions), for there could not be any good 
paternalist argument as a consequence and - a fortiori - there could not be paternalist arguments 
that were better than other arguments, except perhaps in cases of purely paternalist policy. In brief, 
this approach would be clearly analytically useless in discussions about paternalism: if accepted, 
there would not be any paternalistic policies in case antipaternalism turns is the correct view. This 
is as close to a contradiction as it can go in moral philosophy. 
Grill (2012) has proposed an answer to this puzzle that is clearly superior to previous strategies: 
antipaternalism is just the prohibition of employing paternalistic arguments in favor of a policy, not 
a ban on paternalist policies as such. He argues that antipaternalism is a constraint on reasons, 
rather than a ban on certain activities and policies. From this proposition follows that every policy 
that has paternalistic effects is still recommendable if there are independent moral arguments (i.e. 
non-paternalist arguments) in its favor. Preventing self-harm is certainly not problematic as such, 
but becomes so when it is the only reason for implementing a liberty-limiting policy. This principle 
is after all literally the harm principle in Mill (1991 [1859]), which set the foundations for the 
contemporary discussion on paternalism: the famous principle speaks about acceptable reasons for 
40	  
	  
interference rather than about acceptable interferences. In this reading, paternalism is thus a kind of 
moral and political justification rather than a form of action. This seems to me entirely satisfactory 
and many public policies are paternalistically justified in this sense. 
A further objection against the application of the third Dworkinian condition (beneficent intent) is 
related to the identity of the beneficiary: paternalism is interference with x for his own benefit, but 
in case of public health, x’s benefits might occur so far in the future that perhaps x’s future self can 
be reasonably considered a different person61. If future selves are indeed different selves, public 
health interferences cannot be considered any longer paternalistic: they are simple cases of 
prevention of harm to others. Even assuming that the revisionary theory of inter-temporal personal 
identity that underlies the objection is correct, the objection simply moves the normative friction 
between respect for autonomy and beneficence to the clashing interests of different people: current 
selves have interests in not being interfered, while future selves have (future) interests (in the case 
of food choice) in not being at higher risks of chronic disease. As such, the existence of a clash of 
interests between parties does not show that harm is done by one of the party (a fortiori, wrongful 
harm): hence the objection rephrases the core normative issue of paternalism in different terms with 
no prima-facie theoretical gains, e.g. in terms of clarity. I conclude that we ought to reject the 
objection: it does not add anything to the resolution of the debate while paying the high price of 
committing to an unorthodox view of personal identity.   
 
Lack of consent 
 
The condition regarding lack of consent poses further difficulties. Again, inter-personal consent is 
relatively straightforward62 and at least there are cases in which it is reasonable to describe 
interference as consensual, for instance in the relationship between surgeons and conscious patients 
undergoing surgery. Yet the case of public policy is more complicated: if there is consent on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Giovanni Boniolo (personal communication). 
62 More precisely: there are clear-cut cases of consent or lack thereof in the inter-personal case. There are of 
course hard boundary cases even in inter-personal situations.	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part of the public to a policy p, either it must be assumed counterfactually (i.e. x would have 
consented to p upon explicit request), or it is implicit in some procedure of political authorization 
that connects each member of the public with the policy in question. Both horns of the dilemma are 
problematic and I will argue that therefore public policy is generally non-consensual in the sense 
required by the condition (2) of Dworkinian paternalism.   
Counterfactual consent is not alien to political theory63 but, whatever the general merits of this 
delicate notion, it does not fit the case at stake. To assume that x would have consented to a 
specific policy, we should at least claim that there are good reasons to implement that policy and 
that x would agree that they are good reasons. It is obvious that this notion of consent cannot play 
any role in discussions about the soundness of policy justification, for it would be question-
begging. This is the same kind of problem that was posed by the “best argument view” of the 
objectives of policy vis-à-vis antipaternalism. Here, if paternalist considerations are viable 
justifications for public actions, then we should assume consent: therefore, under the Dworkinian 
definition, nothing counts as paternalism since condition (2) cannot possibly be met. From this I 
conclude that either we should not employ the counterfactual consent interpretation when trying to 
apply Dworkinian paternalism to public policy or we should suspend the judgment on whether 
paternalism is appropriate and assume that condition (2) is not met in cases of liberty-limiting 
beneficent actions against self-harm, for the sake of discussion. In short, the counterfactual 
interpretation of consent might be coherent but it is analytically useless for the current debate. 
The alternative proposal was the idea that political authorization entails some form of consent to 
political decisions. We cannot obviously enter the debate for the purposes of this section: for each 
form of political authorization relevant to public health, we would have to assess whether or not it 
entails consent. Prevention against nutrition-related disease has been implemented by governmental 
acts, legislatures, referenda, etc. and for each of these institutions we would have to assess whether 
they transmit the relevant form of consent from the citizenship to the policy output in the light of 
theories of political representation and democracy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Typically in liberal contractualism, where contracting parties do not express explicitly their consent - for 
obvious reasons.	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Yet we can analyze here for the sake of completeness a specific case that might arise in discussion 
about paternalism: a majority that want to bind itself to a self-constraining measure. This is also 
useful to highlight the obstacles that anybody supporting the “consent from political authorization” 
view would face64. 
Consider a population in which a majority of people is in favor of regulations that prevent self-
harms. The members of the majority want to bind themselves because they are aware of their 
weaknesses, as Ulysses approaching the land of the sirens: the binding policy is a consensual pre-
commitment against the dangers that could ensue from their own free choices. The intent is 
beneficent but self-directed, hence it is not paternalistic because the condition (2) about lack of 
consent is not met: they are rationally endorsing a self-limiting measure. Yet the policy would 
apply to a minority that dislikes any form of binding and is not ready to consent, hence the policy is 
paternalistic because condition (2) is met for the member of the minority, but of course the policy 
cannot be both paternalist and not paternalist. What is the correct interpretation of this predicament 
in terms of satisfaction of condition (2) about lack of consent? 
I argue that the condition (2) must be met in this case: the policy lacks the appropriate form of 
consent and therefore counts as paternalist. In fact, to claim the contrary, we would have to recur to 
a group-level version of consent, in which majoritarian forms of political authorization extend to 
the whole group the consent actually given by the majority of individuals only.  
This is however a far-fetched conception of what political authorization can do: it interprets the 
very participation to the process of authorization as a transfer to the group of the individual 
capacity to consent. This is implausible: the whole point of consent is individual authorization, my 
consent transforms the nature of acts that are done upon me.  Granted, some acts that are done upon 
me without my consent are legitimate, perhaps because they descend from an appropriate form of 
collective political authorization on the part of the public or perhaps for other reasons, yet it would 
be misleading to claim that I am actually consenting, as if the group-level consent overrode my 
own judgment. Legitimacy, in general, is not consent: I do not consent to be put in jail simply 
because public authority has legitimately condemned me to a prison-term after burglary. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 A similar case is discussed in Grill (2009). 
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Hobbesian alternative maintains that political authorization in the form of participation to the 
political processes equates to giving up the capacity (not) to consent. Notice that this claim is also 
poorly suitable in discussions about paternalism. If Hobbesianism (so to say) is correct, liberty-
limiting beneficent policies are not a sui generis category of action that requires justification, but 
simply a measure that must be evaluated from the point of view of the purely procedural legitimacy 
of its enactment. I conclude that public health policy meet the condition (2), lack of consent, at 
least whenever it is less than unanimously accepted. After all, these are also the cases that deserve 
attention. 
In this section, I argued that preventive health policy in general can meet the three conditions that 
were fleshed out by Dworkin (1974) to describe paternalism: interference with liberty is quite 
uncontroversial and is met even in cases of aggressive informational campaigns, the beneficent 
intention is to be identified among the several justifications for public health policy (and expunged 
if antipaternalism is sound), and lack of consent is instantiated whenever a policy is not accepted 
truly unanimously in the target population. In the next section, I will discuss what is wrong with 
paternalism in general and how these worries apply to the case of public health. 
 
2.1.3 Two kinds of liberal antipaternalism  
 
There are two different, distinctly liberal, concerns about paternalism, one is welfarist and 
consequentialist, the other is deontological and pertains to the intrinsic (i.e. welfare-independent) 
value of personal liberty. Welfare consequentialist antipaternalism is associated with the name of 
Mill (1991 [1859]) and it is a widespread working assumption of welfare economists. 
Deontological antipaternalism has been defended by libertarian authors in the Lockean tradition 
(e.g. Nozick 1974) and by Feinberg (1974). Authors that are not explicitly antipaternalist also 
signal the essential tension between the protection of liberty/autonomy and beneficence, especially 
in medical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2001).  
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The consequentialist critique of paternalism is that paternalism is self-defeating or potentially self-
defeating. The deontological critique of paternalism is that paternalism amounts to a violation of 
the personal sphere of liberty for reasons that are not serious enough to justify such a vulnus. The 
crucial premise of the consequentialist critique is that people are for the most part the best arbiters 
of their own interests, a descriptive claim. The crucial premise of the deontological critique is that 
interference is a bad as such and that only extremely serious reasons (e.g. harm to others) might 
override the prohibition of interference, a normative claim. Let us consider the two families of 
antipaternalism in turn: while in this section I will describe the overall philosophical inspiration of 
the two traditions, in the next two chapters I will be more analytic and comment their theoretical 
merits and their application to public health. 
 
Deontology and the sphere of personal liberty 
 
The concern with the protection of an inviolable sphere of personal liberty characterizes most 
liberal thought: liberal negative rights, those that protect negative freedom of individuals, are 
inviolable protection of individuals that trump other considerations for interference (Dworkin 
1977). In particular, the protection of the personal sphere from the power of public authority is a 
central tenet of liberalism and therefore involves the case of public health policies quite 
straightforwardly. Extreme versions of liberalism (i.e. libertarianism) limit the appropriate role of 
public authority to the mere protection of individual negative rights and deny that beneficence is a 
proper aim of any legitimate political action. The problem of paternalism is no less that it 
exemplifies the kind of political action that is foremost prohibited by these theories: interference 
with liberty for beneficent purposes. Interference with liberty is allowed only to protect third 
parties, that is, third parties’ rights. The case of avoiding self-
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the possibility of self-harming belongs to a truly inviolable sphere of personal sovereignty 
(Feinberg 1974)65: it is a right whose violation is unjust.  
A striking feature of this version of antipaternalism is its extreme non-consequentialism: perhaps 
everybody is extremely worse off as a consequence of the prohibition to interference, but this 
simply does not count as a reason for violating personal rights. I call this family of antipaternalism 
“deontological” because it relies on liberty-protecting principles and disregards welfare-affecting 
consequences. The moral foundation of deontological antipaternalism is a disputed topic: it broadly 
descends from a suspicious attitude toward public powers and an enormous weight given to rights 
and the value of individual self-ownership, especially in libertarianism (Nozick 1974). This is 
explicitly the foundation provided by Feinberg for its brand of antipaternalism:   
 
The life that a person threatens by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else. 
For that reason alone, he must be the one to decide—for better or worse—what is to be done with it in that 
private realm where the interests of others are not directly involved” (Feinberg 1974, pg. 59 - italics mine).  
 
Starting from self-ownership, any interference with the personal sphere of sovereignty is bad and 
only seldom these bads could be legitimately done, namely when other rights are at stake and 
certainly not in cases of self-harm. 
Given its rather abstract nature, it is not common to encounter the deontological form of 
antipaternalism in public debates about specific public health policy, if not in the rough form “my 
health choices are none of your business”. Yet the deontological argument is the backbone of 
broader conceptions of the role of the state that aim at reducing it to a minimum, included public 
health66. While it is unclear what would be left of public health in a truly minimal state - some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The case of Feinberg poses some interpretative issues. Since his analysis of paternalism is conducted in the 
context of the normative limit of the criminal law, the intended scope of some of his concerns does not cover 
policies as mere fiscal disincentives. Indeed, he explicitly mentions tax on cigarettes among legitimate forms 
of paternalism. Yet the arguments for this restriction – to my knowledge – cannot be found in his work so we 
could use his considerations wherever they seem to work. 
66 See infra subchapters 4.3, where I discuss distributive theories that are historically associated with 
libertarianism.  
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justifications for prevention that I will discuss in the next chapters67 could be endorsed by some 
moderate libertarians - still beneficent public health that tackles self-harming lifestyles would not 
be accepted. Here the punctual discussion of specific policy loses ground if it is not carried out in 
the broader context of political theory: the moral discussion is not so much on specific pieces of 
policy, but rather on their role in broader conceptions of what the health system and public 
authorities is doing and should do. 
 
Welfarism and epistemic quandaries of personal well being 
 
There are several versions of the consequentialist welfarist critique to paternalism, and they are all 
based on the idea that paternalism might harm its intended beneficiaries. In this sense, it is 
consequentialist and welfarist: it assesses the appropriateness of a policy from the point of view of 
its consequences and the latter in term of human well being (Sen 1979).  
The simpler case is that of self-defeating prohibitionism: forbidden options are alluring as such (i.e. 
as forbidden) and therefore the consumption of the proscribed items will increase despite the 
opposite intention. This possibility must of course be monitored, and it is a very strong critique of 
any policy if it is correct: there is no point in implementing measures that do not work or indeed 
worsen the consumption habits. To my knowledge, however, there has never been a record of self-
defeating prohibitionism-like effects of food policy, so we will ignore the issue for the rest of the 
work.  
Another worry is related with unintended non-health related consequences: in the case of 
prevention against unhealthy lifestyle, a candidate could be stigmatization. That is, if a behavior is 
targeted for intervention, people might start attaching a negative connotation to that habit. The 
negative judgment might transfer from the behavior to the people entertaining it and perhaps the 
latter will start being considered unworthy, unreliable or in any other way defective: this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See infra especially chapter 3, where the arguments in favor of intervention from efficiency can be 
accepted by some liberals - see Anomaly (2011) for an approach of that kind and the idea that public health 
must limit its actions to the provision of “public goods” that cannot be provided by markets.  
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stigmatization. These mechanisms that sustain the formation of social habits can be in some cases 
advantageous for policy makers. For instance, stigma against people who do not pay public 
transportation tickets will be in some cases an effective incentive for compliance. Yet if stigma gets 
attached to innocent habits, such as those that are targeted by paternalist policy, the damage might 
be quite substantial. Stigma is not simply psychologically damaging, but might have broader 
consequences, for instance leading to decreased chances of being hired, which is even more serious 
in socially disadvantaged people who start from an already poorer baseline. The case of food policy 
does pose similar concerns, because the effects of unhealthy diets and eating habits as such are 
often visible, so they can be targeted by stigmatization. In most societies, overweight is not 
considered esthetically ideal and there is indeed an income-premium to people closer to the esthetic 
ideal (section 1.2.2). A thorough consideration of costs and benefits of potentially stigmatizing 
policies is therefore necessary: paternalism can indeed be self-defective when the damage of 
stigmatization outweighs the gains in health. 
For some welfarist, autonomy as such is an important piece of what make life worthy: it is part of 
personal well being, i.e. the unconstrained exercise of autonomy makes human beings better-off as 
such68. This idea is very different from the deontological claim, which singles out autonomous 
choices as an independent object of moral concern that cannot be traded-off with gains in other 
dimensions, e.g. well being. Here, violation of liberty and autonomy are costs among the others, 
which ought to be taken into account in welfarist computations. The question here - that we will 
take up later on in section 2.2.4 - is how much food agency matters to agents. 
However, the main form of the consequentialist critique to paternalism is fully general and depends 
on an epistemic concern. On the one hand, third parties as public authorities cannot make reliable 
judgments regarding interests, good, well being, etc. of beneficiaries (I will call this thesis: 
“ignorance of third parties”). On the other hand, individuals make these judgments very reliably 
and act consequentially most of the times (I will call this: “wisdom of individuals”). Given this 
epistemic asymmetry, non intervention is the best policy for pursuing a maximum level of well 
being for individuals. In the case of self-harming activities and unhealthy choices, self-harm might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See Sen (1999) and more generally his approach centered on capabilities, which includes in welfarist 
normative exercises considerations about autonomy. 
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be only apparent and reflect instead a personal ranking of preferences that assigns a much higher 
value to hedonistic enjoyment in comparison to life-expectancy.  
Epistemic antipaternalism is a very natural way of thinking if we abandon the idea that it is 
possible and/or simple to flesh out a unique theory of what makes a life valuable, for a mix of 
descriptive and normative reasons. This skepticism is the ultimate motivation of the ignorance of 
third parties thesis and takes the name of “anti-perfectionism”. There are several versions of anti-
perfectionism69, which is another recurrent topic of liberal thought. Liberals uphold individual 
subjectivism, rejecting any suggestion that one true self might be hidden behind contingent 
personal preferences (Waldron 1987). The epistemic virtues of individual choices and their 
aggregate results when left unfettered, in particular their sensitivity to real needs and wants of 
individuals, is instead a key theme of liberal economists and is well-entrenched in contemporary 
economic thinking, included models of food purchasing behavior. Agents make decision rationally 
in the sense that they choose so as to maximize the chance of satisfying their own personal set of 
preferences and interests70. The asymmetry thesis is also the source of another strand of 
libertarianism, which blends welfarist themes about the epistemic superiority of individual agents 
and a deep-seated suspicion against the power of the state (von Hayek 1944). In this version, the 
epistemic asymmetry is mainly a source of inefficiency for authorities implementing paternalist 
policies, which are taken to be in a predicament - that of the central planner - where it is impossible 
to make any good. 
Notice that the key premise of the consequentialist welfarist critique is descriptive. The thesis of 
epistemic asymmetry contains two propositions, ignorance of third parties and wisdom of the 
individual, which describe what certain agents can and cannot do and know. This is important to 
understand for part 2.3.2, when I will mobilize descriptive results in cognitive psychology and 
other sciences to claim that the idea of wisdom of the individual fails very often in the case of food 
choices. Also, the descriptive assumption of this form of antipaternalism exemplifies the logic of 
any consequentialist concerns: given what we know (in this case, the asymmetry thesis), the action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  See infra section 2.3.1 on a systematic analysis of anti-perfectionism.	  
70 See infra 2.3.2 for a description of what is meant by “rationality” in these contexts. 
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x will result in bad consequences, and therefore ought not to be carried out. If empirical knowledge 
evolves, our moral verdict might change as a consequence71. 
The consequentialist critique seems to be more common in specific discussions about health related 
lifestyles and prevention, especially in the form of its characteristic antiperfectionistic and 
individualistic assumptions about the subjective nature of the good life. People do gain pleasure 
from unhealthy activities, and while the risk of falling prey of serious diseases that nobody desires 
increases, the risk might be sufficiently small to be outweighed by the pleasure of a life of 
excesses. After all small increases in risk that can be noticed by epidemiologists working with big 
numbers can be rather unimportant for individuals, no matter if for some of them the risk will be at 
the end fatal. Also, people have different attitudes toward risks: some accept higher risks and 
indeed enjoy it, while others are by nature more precautionary. Under the antiperfectionist 
assumption, preventive campaigns against unhealthy lifestyles are experienced as unduly moralistic 
rather than beneficent – and indeed harmful. 
The common critiques against the medicalization of healthy life (Verweij 1999) depend in turn on 
similar assumptions, in particular the idea that health is just one among the several goods that make 
life valuable rather than its chief purpose. There are of course other drawbacks of medicalization, 
e.g. critical theorists might stress the issue of undue control on personal conduct, but the 
perfectionistic assumption that health is an overarching value that underlies medicalization is 
another obvious concern. Health is uncontroversially important for all, but this does not tell us 
much about the kind of trade-offs that people might be ready to make for their own good. I do not 
give space to the issue of medicalization here because it can be entirely reduced to the epistemic 
critique to paternalism: nothing is lost when treated so. 
In this section, I told apart two families of antipaternalism, the consequentialist and the 
deontological, and I explained their normative sources in liberal thought, respectively anti-
perfectionism and the epistemic virtues of free choices, and the protection of a sphere of personal 
sovereignty. Before discussing their strengths, their flaws and their application to the prevention of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See supra in the methodological introduction. 
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nutrition related-diseases72, I will discuss previous attempts to reply to the challenges of the 
antipaternalists on behalf of beneficent public-health. 
 
2.1.4 Stewardship, libertarian paternalism, and non liberal public health 
 
The incompatibility between some key liberal values and paternalistic public policy has been at the 
centre of the debate on the ethics of public health in the last decades (Jennings 2009). This reflects 
in part some peculiarities of the normative debate that have been translated from medical ethics, in 
particular the inappropriateness of paternalism in the contexts of care and the doctor-patient 
relationship73, and in part the widespread societal concerns regarding medicalization that I 
mentioned above.  
To rescue from the antipaternalist challenge those actions that are perceived by public health 
officials as reasonable and good policies, several authors have set out on constructing frameworks 
and guidelines for a liberal public health ethics. The most discussed proposals are the stewardship 
model of public health developed by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCB 2007, Dawson and 
Verweij 2008) and the libertarian paternalism framework of Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008). 
Both models have opened up important avenues for the discussion of the purposes and limits of 
public health. In this section, I will describe their fundamental features and argue that the 
stewardship model sheds bad light on deontological antipaternalism without defeating its main 
tenets, while libertarian paternalism addresses and solves important questions raised by the 
consequentialist objections to paternalism but perhaps does not take into adequate account the other 
form of antipaternalism, being at the end less than literally “libertarian”. Together, the two 
frameworks provide valuable guidelines for public health policy: my further discussion below 
should be considered a particular development of some topics touched by the two models. As I said 
in the introduction, the main difference is one of focus: here I try to take all the various brands of 
antipaternalism very seriously and provide the best argument that I know against them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Respectively in section 2.2 and in section 2.3.  
73 But see Wilson (2011) on the translation of this concern in cases of public policy.	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Stewardship model 
 
In the stewardship model, the basic contention against deontological liberals who insist on the 
value of personal liberty is one of abstractness. Deontological liberals (and indeed quite explicitly 
in the case of libertarians) imagine a world of individuals making unconstrained free choices and a 
potentially oppressive state intervening by setting limits and prohibitions. The flaw of this picture 
according to the stewardship model is that real people make choices that are much constrained by 
their specific contexts: ethnic background, gender, social class, asymmetric relations of powers. 
Leftist thought has often insisted on the point that the idea of free choice employed by liberals is 
too coarse-grained and does not distinguish morally relevant difference: e.g. accepting a low-paid 
job out of need or poor bargaining power vs. accepting a low-paid job as a mean to pursue 
particular plans. The socialist focus on the behavior of members of social classes and on their 
relations of power – alternative to the focus of liberals on rational, isolated and socio-economically 
uncharacterized individuals - is also motivated by these considerations (Brancaccio 2010). The 
stewardship model employs this very same leftist point to mount an accusation of unfairness 
against neutral antipaternalist non-intervention: without active paternalist policies, those who make 
bad choices because of their poor background and options will continue to do so, while advantaged 
people will continue to drift upward while gathering the fruit of their skills of good deliberators. 
Antipaternalist non-intervention is not neutral as its alleged neutrality amounts at the end to full 
protection of good deliberators and harm to weaker individuals74. The correct understanding of the 
role of a liberal state in public health, given the constrained conditions of choice of real human 
beings, is thus stewardship: 
 
The concept of stewardship means that liberal states have responsibilities to look after important needs of 
people both individually and collectively. Therefore, they are stewards both to individual people, taking 
account of different needs arising from factors such as age, gender, ethnic background or socio-economic 
status, and to the population as whole […]. In our view, the notion of stewardship gives expression to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Arneson (2005) – whose position is discussed below in section 2.2.1 - puts forward similar concerns. 
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obligation on states to seek to provide conditions that allow people to be healthy, especially in relation to 
reducing health inequalities. (NCB 2007, pg. 25) 
 
Stewardship may require interference with liberty and/or autonomy, yet this is justified because the 
deontological insistence on the value of liberty and autonomy is unfair according to the supporter 
of the stewardship model. At the same times, the worries of liberals are not denied, but rather 
subsumed under the principle of the “least intrusive mean”, which recommends making use of the 
least liberty-limiting tools to pursue the objectives of stewardship. The principle of least intrusive 
means can be also justified on broader utilitarian bases, especially if we take into account that 
intrusion as such can be reason of discomfort and diminished well being75.  
Radoilska (2012) has accused the stewardship model of falling short of liberal standards, despite 
the proviso about the least intrusive means. She insists on the moral superiority of the traditional 
liberal public health centered on non interference: 
 
It is unclear as to how the state’s actively tracking citizens’ avowable interests can be prevented from 
forcefully redefining what is avowable by them. In contrast, interference based on the harm principle is free 
from self-defeating consequences. It focuses on sustaining the conditions for autonomous agency rather than 
trying to make people autonomous. Only in extreme circumstances is one’s authority in implementing one’s 
interests questioned. (Radoilska 2012, pg. 142) 
 
However, it is unclear to me whether the two proposals are practically different, in the light of the 
endorsement of the “least intrusive measure” principle in the stewardship model and the rather 
broad notion of harm that Radoilska is employing: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See supra section 2.1.3 
53	  
	  
Epidemiological evidence can be helpfully integrated in a valid argument for governmental initiatives 
provided that it identifies genuinely harmful social arrangements. The defining feature of such arrangements 
is that they affect non-consenting parties and pre-empt their prospects of retaining or gaining control over 
relevant aspects of their lives, one of which is caring for one’s health. This plausible notion of harm avoids a 
common misconception, according to which harming somebody necessarily involves making them worse off 
than they have been beforehand. However, one can also harm another by denying them what is due to them 
or preventing them from improving their own condition (Radoilska 2012, pg. 141, italics mine). 
 
The focus on harms to people due to third parties “gaining control over relevant aspects of their 
lives” and “preventing them from improving their condition” shows that Radoilska shares with the 
Nuffield Council the worries about real individual choices being constrained by external factors, 
explicitly attributed to “social arrangements” that are suitable to epidemiological inquiry. Also, if 
harms due to injustices broadly conceived (e.g. “denying them what is due to them”) are the 
intended target of the harm principle, some overly demanding theory of justice will certainly betray 
the minimalist spirit of the harm principle. The harm principle is about violation of integrity in a 
quite physical sense (i.e. frustration of explicit interests), otherwise it would be equal to the simple 
requirement of respecting any duties of justice that are owed to people. 
In short, it is unclear that there could be measures that would recommended by the stewardship 
model and rejected by the broad version of the harm principle that is employed by Radoilska. She 
mentions tax and bans as policy that would be rejected under her approach, which favors upstream 
interventions on social arrangements. Yet the stewardship model does recommend a similar 
priority-setting, and could even be more restrictive in case upstream policy turns out to be very 
intrusive. 
On the other hand, none of the two approaches have nailed down the question whether neutrality is 
really unfair to bad deliberators: neutrality as such cannot be morally worrisome. Respecting the 
autonomy of bad deliberators is only problematic if that prohibits giving them what is due to them. 
In chapter 4 I will extensively address this issue while dealing with the moral significance of health 
inequalities - where the topic will reappear. For the moment, the stewardship model has raised 
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reasons of suspicion toward liberal non-intervention, rather than signaling a fundamental unfairness 
that must be compensated: not all inequalities as such are morally worrisome. It is, so to say, a 
deconstructive argument that shows what can lies beyond apparently neutral political principles. 
However, the flight from negative freedom is a very common ad contentious strategy of 
progressive thought and here, as in other cases, must be substantiated with a thorough discussion of 
what is really at stake insisting on one or the other forms of liberty. 
  
 
Libertarian paternalism 
 
Libertarian paternalists make a similar move against the fascination with free choices that is typical 
of antipaternalists but they employ very different materials for the same purpose, chiefly the work 
of experimental psychologists and economists on weakness and biases of the human capabilities of 
decision making (Thaler and Sunstein 2008)76.  
In several empirically substantiated models, the relevant variables that describe human choices are 
preferences, options, and contexts. While traditional paternalists either try to modify preferences 
relying on suspicious perfectionistic benchmarks or aim at limiting options in intrusive ways, 
Sunstein and Thaler propose to tinker with the context of choice for improving human decision 
making. Their suggestive term for this approach to policy making is “architecture of choice”. The 
job of the architect of choice is nothing new: it is normally employed by marketing experts that are 
trying to induce consumers to particular purchasing routes. Yet Sunstein and Thaler propose to 
extend the same approach to policy making. In their famous book “Nudge”, their introductory 
example deals with food, in particular the effect of its visual display in a canteen on the behaviors 
of consumers. According to the authors, healthy choices can be induced without costly constraints 
simply re-shuffling the position of the various servings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See supra in the introduction for a description of the intellectual milieu of their proposal. 
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They employ also a moral argument on behalf of the idea of architecture of choice: public policy 
and regulations mold the environment of choice of human beings whether or not this is sought 
explicitly. Therefore, it would be unwise and perhaps harmful not to take into account the effects of 
environments on human decision making. It is not that the choice is between interference and non-
interference: it is between mindless interference and potentially beneficent interference. It is clear 
that we should go for the latter whenever possible – at least ceteris paribus.   
Although architects of choice must anyway refer to a benchmark of goods that they want to achieve 
when designing environments for better choices, Thaler and Sunstein address welfarist epistemic 
objections requiring very low or zero prices for opting out the path that is being recommended or 
induced. This feature of their proposal is a direct reply to the critiques that are pointed out by the 
antipaternalists that are concerned with the potential self-defective consequences of paternalism. 
Recall that, given the epistemic asymmetry between individuals and third parties regarding the 
good and the interests of the former, paternalism enacted by the latter can be harmful because it 
increases the costs of (or makes utterly impossible) some options that would augment the well 
being of the former. Intervening on the context of choice rather than on the available options allows 
rational choosers to opt out without difficulties (or with small difficulties) from the program and 
therefore minimizes one of the potential harms that the consequentialist objection has delineated.  
In conclusion, to the deontological objection that beneficence is not an appropriate reason for 
interference, libertarian paternalists reply that interference is often unavoidable. To the 
consequentialist objection that paternalism is self-defeating, the libertarian paternalists reply that 
there is none or little cost for non-compliers in the kind of measures that they are proposing. For 
these reasons, they propose the label “libertarian paternalism” for their framework: it retains the 
beneficent purposes of paternalism while avoiding its main limitations highlighted by liberals and, 
paradigmatically, by libertarians. 
In one sense, the label “libertarian” is however an overstatement: libertarian paternalist did not take 
care of rebutting systematically the allegations that are put forward by liberty based 
antipaternalists. Before that is done, libertarian paternalism is still unacceptable under strict liberal 
standards. 
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Non-liberal proposals 
 
While the stewardship model, Radoilska’s (2011) extension of the harm principle and libertarian 
paternalism are explicitly presented as forms of liberal public health, other authors have tried to 
address the incompatibility between certain liberal values and paternalist public health by 
abandoning these liberal values or weighing them against principles that are untypical of 
mainstream liberalism. The strategy is ambitious: it is not enough to show that public health can be 
embedded in non liberal political theories. Since the purpose of the inquiry is justification rather 
than mere rational reconstruction, one has furthermore to argue that those political theories are 
superior to liberalism (Nielsen 2011). Although one might be overall sympathetic or enthusiastic 
with that effort, it remains important to show how alternative frameworks can address the 
objections raised by liberals. After all, the antipaternalist objections are important because they are 
sound, not because they belong to the mainstream liberal tradition.  
With this proviso in mind, let us consider the main contender in the field, republican public health. 
The case is interesting because, while the relation between liberalism and republicanism are a 
disputed topic, there has been an extensive effort in recent years to explain how republicans in 
general can address some key liberal concerns: not surprisingly this tendency has leaked into public 
health ethics as well. 
 
Republicanism 
 
The main reconstruction of public health in republican terms is Jenning’s (2009), who has 
recommended embedding public health within the neo-republican tradition as it is fleshed in a 
famous contribution of Philip Petitt (1997)77. Republicans argue that several political values are 
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previous “communitarian” versions of Rousseauian republicanism while being accused by neo-Roman or 
neo-Florentine thinkers of misinterpreting that diverse tradition, which has both elitist and democratic strands 
that ought not to be conflated (McCormick 2003). 
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best reconstructed if we shift away from the liberal insistence on freedom as non-interference and 
we consider instead the ancient idea of liberty as non-domination as the chief normative foundation 
of political action. What makes liberty valuable is not being wholly unfettered by the actions of 
other individuals - an ideal that is anyway unattainable - but rather being protected from arbitrary 
interference, interference which is not authorized, endorsed, accepted. Individuals live in political 
community where reciprocal interference is the norm: republican freedom protects citizens from 
those actual and potential interferences that are arbitrary, interferences that do not make sense at 
the eyes of the interfered parties. Even though republicanism relaxes the demand of deontological 
antipaternalism shifting the focus from interferences to their justification, it is utterly unclear 
whether it replaces it with constraints that are more sympathetic with paternalism, as argued by 
Jennings (2009) and strongly disputed by Nielsen (2011): 
 
Those who enthusiastically embrace the idea that republicanism should be adopted as a basis (wholly or 
partially) for public health ethics on the ground that this will create a larger scope for public health 
interventions should reminds themselves that freedom as non-dominance might, at the end of the day, justify 
the complete opposite: being the subject of potentially intrusive and interfering health policies is indeed a 
form of domination, and hence at odds with the intention to secure freedom as non-domination (Nielsen 
2011, pg.49). 
 
The ideal of non-domination fits quite naturally the attitude of suspicion toward the power of 
public authorities that we have singled out as an important source of the deontological critique of 
paternalism. Although liberals are often single-minded about the state being the worse source of 
domination, as epitomized in the Hayekian classic “The Road to Serfdom” (1944), the main 
difference with republicans seems to be that the latter do not shy away in saying that even the civil 
society or “the market” can arbitrarily interfere with personal liberty. Non-domination is one of the 
many common topics of two overlapping traditions (Nielsen 2011): republicans simply look for 
domination where liberals would not expect to find it.  
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This different emphasis does not create as such a broader scope for public health, quite the 
contrary. It might extend liberal worries about paternalism from public authorities to every kind of 
actor that might implement population health campaigns, e.g. advocacy groups. Powerful private 
institutions - e.g. hospitals, foundations, etc. - might be able to mount effective public health 
campaigns: they might for instance deliver health related information, even in the forms that we 
have deemed to count as intrusive. The natural liberal reaction consists in highlighting that these 
institutions cannot enact - let alone enforce - laws and regulations: the Weberian “monopoly of the 
force” (1972 [1919]) explains why liberals are ultimately concerned with public institutions and 
un-impressed by private powers. Yet there are several kinds of policy and regulations, and some 
need not traditional power to be enforced: in our case, powerful institution might set exemplary 
lifestyles that later spread to society at large and get enforced as any other social habit, by 
conformism and stigmatization of defeaters. Informal rules can be as influential as bona-fide laws 
indeed. Republicans cast their theoretical nets onto society at large when looking for sources of 
domination: this cannot possibly be friendlier with paternalism and indeed it suggests a natural 
extension of the traditional antipaternalist focus on public measures to every kind of action. 
There is however another way to rescue the paternalism of public authorities in food policy within 
a republican framework, which is indeed very different from that suggested by Jennings (2009)78 
and starts with the observation that food companies are a very powerful actor and, as such, might 
threaten individual freedoms. The budget of major food retailers for advertising is indeed a 
powerful force in contemporary societies, a force that might be incompatible with republican 
ideals. Let us see an example. In 2013, McDonald’s Italy was able to mount a campaign that 
resonated nation-wide, by recruiting the famous movie-director Gabriele Salvatores for a TV-spot. 
In the midst of the Italian economic recession, the advertising notably focused on McDonald’s plan 
to expand activity in the country and create 3.000 jobs rather than on the quality of the products. 
The management of the company was able to advocate for “structural reforms” and labor-market 
flexibility in public debates. No advocacy group, not to speak of private citizens, can challenge 
such powerful public relations departments and indeed in this specific case only the biggest Italian 
trade union – the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (ca. 5.5 million members), was able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 I elaborate here an idea which is due to James Wilson (personal communication). 
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mount some kind of response. The mobilization against food advertisement is obviously weaker 
and the asymmetry in power between different voices is thus huge: there is no syndicate for healthy 
food, as it were. Perhaps this is worrisome for republicans who are striving for liberty from 
disproportionate means of interference. Since republicans would typically advocate appropriate 
check-and-balances against the potential mis-use of massive capacity to spend, the public health 
sector could be conceived as an appropriate counter-balance against the power of huge companies. 
The spread of adequate health information and even the enforcement of limitations on 
advertisements and selling practices can perhaps be justified on the ground that these companies 
are too powerful and – as such – they are a threat to republican liberty. 
  
In conclusion, the liberal objections to paternalism must be addressed as such in every single case, 
rather than watered down in broader theories or replaced with suitable different values and views. 
Perhaps these values and views are superior to the non-interference paradigm, but they certainly 
must prove their superiority in any single case - as I sketched above discussing the power of food 
companies. The mere substitution of Republican liberty to liberty as non-interference in the focus 
of moral discussion is clearly a weak ad-hoc solution. 
After the chart of previous proposals regarding how paternalistic policy can be rescued from the 
antipaternalists, let us move to the specific approach that is advocated here. In the next chapter I 
debunk liberty based antipaternalism and especially its application to food policy, while I later 
move to the discussion of welfare based antipaternalism in food policy. 
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2.2 Against liberty based antipaternalism in public health 
 
In this section I criticize liberty based antipaternalism. My contention is not so much that this 
version of antipaternalism is unsound. Rather, I will argue that it is overstated and the same 
important worries can be reconstructed differently, namely from the point of view of the welfarist 
version of antipaternalism. I argue that the deontological argument against paternalism is not 
entirely independent from welfarist concerns in 2.2.1, that it does not apply neatly to the case of 
public health policy in 2.2.2 and that it is disputable in the case of food choices because of their 
particular socio-economic stratification (2.2.3) and their debatable significance for liberty (2.2.4). 
The relation of these four points with previous scholarly contributions is the following. 2.2.1 takes 
up some topics from Arneson’s critique (2005) to Feinberg’s deontological version of 
antipaternalism. 2.2.2 strengthens and extends Wilson’s (2011) observation about the endemic 
nature of interference in public policy. 2.2.3 translates the critique to antipaternalism that has been 
presented by defenders of the stewardship model into the case of food-policy. 2.2.4 is a reply to a 
paper by Resnik (2010) that defends liberty based antipaternalism with a “slippery-slope” 
argument. What I achieve in this chapter is a general assessment of the relative importance of 
liberty based and welfare based antipaternalism in public health. I argue that the latter but not the 
former is the real important concern in most cases, and specifically so in the case of food policy. 
 
2.2.1 Antipaternalist deontology explained  
 
Arneson (2005) has proposed an argument against the “absolute and doctrinaire” antipaternalism 
that accuses paternalists to “subordinate the right to the good” (i.e. deontological antipaternalism) 
and in favor of the “broadly utilitarian79 liberalism of John Stuart Mill”. His general tenets will be 
the point of departure for the next chapter, dedicated to welfarist antipaternalism: in his words, “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 I will call “welfarist” what Arneson calls “utilitarianism”, without any significant difference. 
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conclusion we should reach is not that the welfarist consequentialist should find paternalism a 
generally desirable policy, but that it can be morally acceptable and even required”. 
The deontological antipaternalist must rely on the distinction between soft and hard paternalism to 
account for cases in which there is overt agreement that liberty-limiting non-consensual 
interference for avoiding self-harm is acceptable or even required. These are most typically cases 
regarding the relationship between parents and children or the care of persons with acute or chronic 
cognitive impairments. Since the deontological antipaternalist cannot say that in those cases 
welfare interests override autonomy – that is by definition what deontological antipaternalism 
cannot do – they must point out to the defective nature of autonomy in these cases to argue that it 
does not deserve protection in these circumstances. This is where the necessity of the distinction 
between hard and soft paternalism comes from: choices deserve protection when they are 
voluntary, otherwise liberty can be infringed for beneficent reasons. Why does the distinction 
between voluntary rational agency and “defective” agency bear such an important moral weight? 
Arneson observes that the reason must be, at least partially, welfarist: 
 
Our reverence for rational agency capacity is to a large degree reverence for the potential that rational agency 
capacity gives the bearer in most normal circumstances of human life. This is potential to develop one’s 
individuality in particular ways, to make something worthwhile of one’s life for oneself and others, to 
achieve any of an enormously wide range of great goods according to our choices and the luck of 
circumstances (Arneson 2005, pg. 14) 
 
That is, even for the deontologist, the moral distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous 
choices must be informed by considerations based on interests and human welfare. Arneson 
explains that this is the case even in the case of Feinberg, which is the paradigmatic defender of 
liberty based antipaternalism: 
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 Feinberg’s incorporation of a voluntariness standard into the ideal of personal sovereignty goes some way 
toward acceptance of an informed desire conception of personal good. Feinberg allows that a gross mistake 
of fact that is material to a decision one takes automatically renders the decision substantially non-voluntary” 
(Arneson 2005, pg. 9).  
 
This move however proves the point that Arneson wanted to make: deontological antipaternalists 
denies that the rights of x can be violated in the name of his good, yet they are forced to admit that 
interference is permissible and even required if x is cognitive impaired or when the decision is 
based on gross factual mistakes. They would argue that the right that protects the sphere of 
personal sovereignty does not cover cases of deficient autonomy such as these. Yet it is unclear 
why this should be the case if what matters is autonomy as such rather than its instrumental 
relationship with well being. Arneson argues that the suspension of the protection over autonomous 
choices in cases where they are defective makes no sense whatsoever if one does not start from 
reasons that are welfarist. More specifically, these reasons must be ultimately due to the 
instrumental value of autonomous choices for the pursuit of personal interests and goods. Though 
bad voluntary choices are not a conceptual or empirical impossibility, autonomy is overall reliable: 
this explains why the distinction between hard and soft paternalism is morally relevant.  
In other words, one cannot simultaneously support pure liberty based antipaternalism and accept 
“soft” interferences. This would require projecting an enormous weight onto the distinction 
between choices where autonomy is fully exercised and choices that are less than perfectly 
autonomous. We argued before in section 2.1.2 that the distinction is less than clear in many cases. 
Arneson argues further that the only plausible ground for its moral weight is welfarist. Whether a 
choice is perfectly autonomous matters since when it is so, it most likely pursues the agent good. 
Yet this admission brings the liberty based antipaternalist a long way down the road toward 
welfarism: he must admit that our “reverence” for autonomy is not libertarianly pure but due to 
utilitarian concerns. 
Notice what this argument does not do: it does not exclude that there is a residual non-instrumental 
value to autonomy. Luckily, welfarism is able to explain even this residuum: the residual non-
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welfarist value could be a welfarist residual non-consequentialist value, as suggested in section 
2.1.3. Intrusion is intrinsically bad simply because the capacity of making independent decisions is 
part of what makes a good life welfare-wise. Liberty and autonomy are not a sui generis 
phenomenon that characterizes particular beings that are for some mysterious reasons worth of our 
moral attention: they are a natural feature of human beings. Any further insistence on the 
foundational role in moral theory of those two concepts seems at this point unnecessary. If Arneson 
is right, the protection of liberty is not a different value from the pursuit of an agent good but rather 
a substantial part of the latter. If one works with a complex conception of welfare – that which is 
typical of the Millian tradition – there is no need of assuming that beneficence and the protection of 
liberty are incommensurable80.  
 
2.2.2 Interference is endemic and unavoidable 
 
Wilson (2011) has argued that interference with liberty without consent cannot be the moral 
problem as such of paternalist policy, since by its nature public authority acts non-consensually and 
coercively, two features of public policy that I have analyzed in section 2.1.2. 
  
Given that non-paternalistic policies may be coercive and infringe liberty to exactly the same extent as 
paternalistic policies, it follows that those who want to defend the wrongness of justifying policies 
paternalistically need to show that there is something wrong about the paternalistically justified policy over 
and above its infringement of liberty (Wilson 2011, pg. 4). 
 
This is compatible with the claim that coercion and the infringement of liberty are so severe 
injustices that only non-paternalist policies are appropriate, i.e. with deontological antipaternalism. 
However, Wilson’s observation invites us to pay closer attention to the paternalist aim: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This is one of the arguments where the overall utilitarian bending of this work is explicit (see infra the 
methodological introduction). For a discussion of the liberal nature of this particular conclusion, see Gray 
(1998), who harshly rejects any such commensurability thesis.  
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beneficent intention. What is so wrong with aiming at the good of people who would potentially 
harm themselves? Either it is the danger of unintended consequences, as in the consequentialist 
welfare based critique, or something else. But what can it be this something else if it is not a 
welfarist concern? To repeat that beneficence is not a pertinent reason to interfere with liberty – at 
this point – does not succeed: public authority interferes with our lives for several reasons all the 
time, why is beneficence in particular morally inappropriate?  
Perhaps in paternalist interventions there is an implicit denial of the quality of a person as 
deliberator: public authorities are treating target populations as if they were composed of defective 
deliberators. Yet what could possibly be the problem if this were true? The worry must be again 
due to a mixture of epistemic skepticism - i.e. public authorities might mistake good deliberators 
for bad deliberators, and concerns for the welfarist interest of not being considered incapable of 
adult choices. 
Wilson’s argument can be strengthened by the typical observation of libertarian paternalists that 
interference is unavoidable. Unavoidability and endemism are two different concepts: if public 
policy in general is coercive, perhaps this is always very problematic and – implausible as it is – 
this cannot count as a justification of a paternalist policy or in favor of relaxation of the burden of 
justification. Yet public regulation is not only endemically coercive, it is unavoidably so: without 
the layer of restrictions, bans, taxes, etc. the very choices that the antipaternalist would like to 
protect would not be possible. The picture of individual agents making unfettered choice upon 
which public authorities put restrictions is descriptively naïve. Food choices in urban settings are in 
this sense paradigmatic. The price, availability and nature of the options displayed in supermarkets 
are not simply the outset of a gigantic set of private exchanges between unfettered producers and 
consumers, but depends for its smooth functioning on restrictions and regulations enforced by 
public authorities that make the whole system viable, from agricultural policy to safety standards81. 
Any change in the latter variables results in modification of prices, sometimes in the disappearance 
of certain products: why is this less worrisome than bans or taxes introduced for paternalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See for instance the observation of Popkin (2008) on the subtle influences of agricultural policies on diets, 
which illustrates the point I make here. For quite different purposes, I develop extensively this topic in 
section 4.1.2, where I argue that there is no point in distinguishing areas of free economic exchanges from 
authoritative decisions and interventions of public authorities. 
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purposes? Again, it is not that since interference is widespread then the burden of justification 
becomes lighter. Rather, since interference is unavoidable, antipaternalist must explain why it is so 
worrisome in the case of paternalism. The benchmark of free choice that is sought by deontological 
antipaternalism is very elusive: this brings again to welfarist antipaternalism, at least if 
antipaternalism can be rescued at all.  
Notice indeed that even private organizations and actors in the food system can bring about the 
very same interferences that public authorities may want to enact (e.g. modification of prices, 
unavoidability of certain products). The only reason to draw a line between the two cases must at 
the end depend on the epistemic thesis that the welfarist antipaternalist advocates. We can thus 
repeat the point of Wilson even starting from a different premise: we do interfere privately with 
other individuals so it must be interference with good intentions rather than interference as such 
that is particularly worrisome.  
  
2.2.3 The ideology of good deliberators 
 
The dependency of health lifestyle on social structure, especially socio-economic status, will be 
discussed at length in chapter 4. Here my aim is to discuss whether evidence of social 
determination of unhealthy choices is relevant for the debunking of that variety of antipaternalism 
that is based on the value of personal liberty. I show that this social dependency casts important 
doubts on the deontological critique while letting untouched and perhaps strengthened the welfarist 
argument. The backbone of this thread of thought has been already presented while discussing the 
stewardship model of public health: single-minded insistence on non-interference is at least 
suspicious because it favors from the welfare point of view good deliberators. As Arneson (2005) 
puts it – as he says -“aggressively”: 
 
Antipaternalism, most especially hard antipaternalism but definitely Feinberg’s soft paternalist compromise 
variety [i.e. deontological antipaternalism], looks to be an ideology of the good choosers, a doctrine that 
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would operate to the advantage of the already better off at the expense of the worse off, the needy and 
vulnerable (Arneson 2005, pg. 12, text within brackets mine). 
 
This will not convince as such the deontologist for which freedom is valuable whatever people 
make out of it. A deontologist will point out that a right is not suspended if it does not get used for 
the best (welfare enhancing) purposes. Although this may be correct, if bad and good deliberators 
are not a random sample in the population but disproportionately represents, respectively, 
disadvantaged and advantaged people, non-intervention might prohibit measures that could 
potentially address important social issues, included perhaps remedying some injustices. This is the 
point that was raised by Radoilska (2011) and commented above. While this is not as yet 
conclusive and must be strengthened by a full-blown moral assessment of health inequalities, it 
already counts as a counter-argument against deontological antipaternalism. For the moment, 
deontological paternalism applied to food choices appears, in light of social epidemiology, an 
“ideology of the good deliberators” that may prevent the fight of some injustices. 
It is very suggestive that the same critique does not apply to the welfarist critique: quite the 
contrary indeed. Remember that paternalism might be self-defeating, among other things, because 
it could damage the allegedly bad deliberators that it purports to protect. From this standpoint, if 
bad deliberators are more common among disadvantaged people, interference is suspicious because 
it might damage disproportionately these worse-off groups. The verdict is turned upside down here: 
paternalism rather than antipaternalism looks like an ideology of the “good deliberators” here. 
Alas, this is more than a theoretical possibility. Consider a situation in which there is no 
perspective of ameliorating the condition of a group of people who is taking up unhealthy lifestyles 
to cope with their poor predicament: any interference will simply result in worsened well being, 
since the choice was not irrational in the first place82. We have thus a further reason – though not 
conclusive alone – to opt for the welfarist version of antipaternalism: it survives untouched the 
“ideology of good deliberators” objection. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See infra section 1.3.2 
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2.2.4 Liberties that are not worth protecting 
 
A very natural reaction to the employment of the deontological argument against paternalism 
pertaining food choices is to deny that food choices rank very high among the spheres of action that 
the liberal right based protection of autonomy is supposed to cover. In Arneson’s words: 
 
Moral rights protect important human interests. But for any right, upholding it can affect the protected 
interest to a larger or smaller degree […]. Even if a right is deemed important, given that infringements of it 
vary by degree, and the interests that are counterposed to the right in particular circumstances can vary 
enormously in their moral weight, it is implausible to uphold the absolutist insistence that any right must be 
respected whatever the consequences (Arneson 2005, pg. 4)83. 
 
Arneson is saying two things: (1) sometimes those interests that are protected by infringing liberty 
have an enormous moral weight; (2) sometimes those liberties that are infringed by pursuing some 
important moral interest are scarcely significant. Measuring the importance of different kinds of 
interests and liberties is obviously complicated, if not forbidden by the kind of antiperfectionistic 
arguments that we will study in the next subchapter. Nevertheless it appears a gross exaggeration to 
extend this prohibition to every kind of ranking among values and simply suspend the judgment: 
public health ethics in particular is concerned with cases where pursuit of the most urgent moral 
weight (e.g. fighting deadly epidemics) may trump individual rights. This is of course what right-
based theories would forbid, but here we may want to illustrate with the case of food choices why 
this is so implausible. The conclusion of this section will be the following: it is in general 
complicated to make universal judgments about which liberties are valuable and worth protecting, 
but this is due to the reasons that are highlighted by welfarist antipaternalists rather than to the 
value of the personal sphere of liberty. At the end, the objection against liberty based 
antipaternalism that we are dealing with here fails, yet this failure ultimately vindicates welfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The “interest-right” view of rights is not the only one available, see Gosseries 2008 for a discussion (in a 
different context) – yet it is the most pertinent in our discussion. 
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based antipaternalism: the difficulty of ranking different liberties is actually a difficulty about 
ranking goods, the very same difficulty that welfarist antiperfectionists are highlighting. 
Let us however unfold the objection from the beginning.  How could we defend the idea that food 
liberty is unimportant or less important than others? Here is a first proposal: dietary choices 
concern a central physiologic need of our species, and as such does not seem to represent a feature 
of individual persons that characterizes their personality too centrally, hence interference is not a 
serious violation of liberty here. The hidden assumption of this argument is that the protection of 
liberty makes sense in light of the value of personal features, especially those that are unique, i.e. 
those that are not shared with wider communities, humankind at large and perhaps other beings as 
well. This assumption does not survive a closer scrutiny. First: although the protection of the 
personal sphere might protect those features of individuals that distinguish them from others, its 
objective is hardly exhausted with that. Individual rights erect a series of powerful barriers against 
physical assault in the first place. Now, either this protection is only instrumentally valuable and 
serves the further objective of protecting individuality, or it protects physical integrity as such. If 
the latter, the point is proved because physical integrity is all but a unique feature of any single 
individual. If the former, we may want to ask why exactly the features that are “uniquely 
individual” are so important. How shall we proceed in the evaluation of the relative importance of 
unique, socialized, species-specific, etc. interests and features of human beings?  
Let us make this exercise briefly for nutrition. Food choices are highly constrained by our specific 
biological needs and limitations. We cannot digest cellulose so we cannot survive just on leaves. 
We need ca. 2000 calories per day if we are adult males so we cannot go on with much less for 
several days. And so on. Furthermore, the intake of food means much more to humans than other 
metabolic needs, like respiration or excretion: human groups have highly ritualized ways of 
preparing and serving edible material, complicated taboos and odd preferences. Moreover, 
individuals have idiosyncratic habits, and food preferences could be sometimes very central to their 
personality, as in the case of some vegans. How do we decide which preferences deserve special 
protection? At the end, individual interests and wants stem from a unique ontogenesis that 
encompasses species-specific, social and individual processes: their origin, even if it could be 
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clearly tracked, does not seem to impinge on their value for persons. The opposite view over-values 
originality and diminishes highly socialized forms of life, when it does not entirely mistake 
reflectivity with originality: perhaps there are good reasons to give more weight to rationally 
endorsed behaviors, but there is no reason to exclude that socially dependent or biologically 
determined behaviors can be reflectively endorsed.  
On the other hand, the deontological antipaternalist wins this small battle only to lose the war. The 
chief argument to exclude that only those features of personality that are unique are worth 
protecting is antiperfectionist, and the rescue of the importance of social and biological interests is 
based on welfarist considerations. So, we should indeed be agnostic about whether food liberty is 
important, but the main reason for this conclusion is not based on the value of personal liberty in 
general, but it is rather based on the suspicion that food liberty can indeed be an important part of 
personal well being. 
The last defense of deontological antipaternalism that I would like to debunk has been proposed by 
Resnik (2010) for the specific case of food and anti-obesity campaigns. It refines the idea that 
liberties are worth protecting no matter how much they seem to matter - and so I treat it here. In 
brief, Resnik argues that although interventions on the “menu” as they are currently proposed 
would not infringe important liberties as such, minor infringements may pave the way to more 
robust and intolerable interventions of public authorities in our lives, both in menus and other 
dimensions of life. Though important, diets are hardly the only feature of our behavior that is 
relevant for health: perhaps after the menu the state will try to intrude in our sexual life, or control 
the degree of stress that we allow to ourselves. These serious intrusions, according to Resnik, will 
not be opposed because people will have gotten used to infringements thanks to the precedence of 
state intrusions on food choices.  
This pattern of argumentation is very common in moral thought and indeed it is so common that it 
deserves a name: “slippery slope”. The idea is simple: a morally insignificant action that facilitates 
further actions that are instead unacceptable is indirectly morally proscribed. Slippery slopes are 
generally considered unsound, either because their dreaded conclusion does not follow from the 
premises, or because the consequences are too vaguely depicted to be morally interesting. I 
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disagree with both critiques. First, slippery slopes normally employ empirical premises about 
human beings getting used to bads as soon as they become common. This hidden premise might be 
false in any single application of the argument, however this does not show that the slippery slope 
has formal flaws, i.e. that it is “unsound”. Also, even if the dreaded consequences are poorly 
depicted, sometimes precautionary conservatism gives reasons to resist whatever change, at least if 
the status quo is decent enough or worthy as such (Cohen 2004). The problem with Resnik’s 
objection to paternalism is that none of these two defenses of slippery slopes are convincing in the 
case of food. First - as noted above - interference is already widespread in public policy and it is 
unclear why it should become more acceptable to people upon introduction of paternalist food 
restrictions. Paternalistic restrictions did not become acceptable so far even though they are very 
common (e.g. compulsory seat-belts), why should the next step change our attitudes so abruptly? 
Second, although the scenario of an intrusive state depicted by Resnik is truly worrisome, the status 
quo pertaining food choices has several drawbacks, indeed those that occupied us for the whole 
chapter 1: the conservative rescue of the slippery slope is therefore not viable here. 
 
In this section, I attacked deontological antipaternalism both generally and specifically for the case 
of public health and food choices. There is a common pattern in at least three of the four 
arguments: the claim was again and again that antipaternalism must ultimately be about welfare. 
This is explicitly the proposition defended in the first section, which was inspired by Arneson’s 
paper: the reverence toward autonomy is explained by its instrumental value in the pursuit of well 
being. Also, if interference is widespread and unavoidable in public policy, it is the beneficent 
intention of paternalism that is under moral scrutiny. Finally, we cannot decide whether food 
liberty deserves protection without reference to the interests that are thus protected. 
Powers, Faden and Shagai (2012) have argued that a proper understanding of the relevance of the 
Millian tradition in public health would focus much less on the harm principle and much more on 
the skeptic utilitarianism that characterizes Mill’s broader contributions. Liberty is honored by Mill 
because of the “essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well being”. The 
next section is dedicated to this tradition of antipaternalism and to its consequence for the public 
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health fight against diet associated diseases. There I will argue that a welfarist understanding of 
antipaternalism is more appropriate for the context of public health. Moreover, I will show that the 
very same reasons that justify precaution against interference might in very specific cases even 
recommend intervention, as it was anticipated above by Arneson.  
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2.3 The Very Idea of Bad Food Choices  
 
In this subchapter, I explain why welfare based antipaternalism remains worrisome in public health 
ethics and why evidence regarding how food choices are actually made could override even this 
robust version of antipaternalism - and indeed call for intervention. I show that the normative 
assumptions that I make do not violate the antiperfectionistic concerns of liberals by fleshing out a 
distinction between thin and thick theories of well being: antiperfectionists should be worried about 
the latter but not about the former. The purpose of this conclusive section about paternalism is thus 
two-fold: on one hand, I will describe and discuss a version of antipaternalism which I think is the 
most stable and relevant for public health. On the other hand, I will show that even this version 
does not exclude intervention in the case of food policy. 
 
2.3.1 Bad choices: thin vs. thick theories of well being 
 
While in the last subchapter I presented critically some previous contributions to the literature on 
paternalism, in this chapter I would like to discuss how a particular strand of antipaternalism – the 
skeptic welfarism that highlights the instrumental welfare goods attached to the exercise of 
personal autonomy – should be understood in the context of food policy. The particular view that I 
reconstruct here is particularly suitable to our discussion - or so I will argue - because it shows how 
the make use of the wealth of empirical material that is being collected about food-choice in 
various empirical sciences. 
In section 2.1.3, I argued that welfarist antipaternalism stems from the epistemic asymmetry theses. 
Third parties and paradigmatically the public authority are ignorant about personal interests and so 
cannot pursue efficiently the good of individuals by interfering with their choices (ignorance of 
third parties), while the latter know reasonably well the nature of their wants and needs so they can 
more easily maximize their welfare (wisdom of the individual). That is why paternalist interference 
ought to be avoided. In this section, I will carefully analyze this argument in order to apply it to the 
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case of food in the next section: the analysis will suggest some important modifications to the 
original theses, modifications that open up a broader space to paternalist interventions. More 
specifically, I will replace the asymmetry theses with the rejection of what I will call thick theory of 
well being, i.e. full-fledged description of the good life. This rejection - I will argue -is the core 
tenet of the liberal epistemic antipaternalism attributed before to John Stuart Mill. 
What can be the justification of the asymmetry theses? The ignorance of third parties and the 
wisdom of individuals are clearly epistemic theses: regarding x’s well being, they say respectively 
that third parties will generally describe unreliably x’s interests and that x’s conception of good is 
an accurate representation of his own interests. Presumably, this must be due to the particular 
nature of welfare and the specific epistemic position of, respectively, third parties and x in relation 
to x’s welfare. Hence, the asymmetry theses must depend on the nature of welfare and some facts 
regarding x’s epistemic powers. Let us start with the first aspect and assess, under different 
understandings of the nature of welfare, what can justify the asymmetry theses. 
Theories of welfare can be grouped in three sets (Parfit 1984, Keller 2010): objective list theories, 
experientialist theories and desires satisfaction theories: let us have a look to each of them. 
 
Objective list theories  
 
Objective list theories of welfare name a series of goods that would make anybody better off, 
independently of his actual wants and desires. Goods as the satisfaction of basic needs, rich 
personal relationships, an interesting job, etc. are obvious candidates for any objective list. The list 
includes basic human interests that allegedly characterize individual welfare quite independently 
from his actual desires.  
An argument that was employed by Sen (1979) against welfarism but it is best considered as 
targeting a particular theory of welfare – desire satisfaction theory - is the best argument in favor of 
objective lists. Consider a person who grew up in dire conditions and whose desires and 
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preferences adapted to his unfortunate surrounding: it could be somebody living in abject poverty 
or somebody that has been systematically dominated and enslaved. The satisfaction of his desires 
and preferences is really a small thing, but hardly anybody would argue that his own conception of 
well being is all there is to his welfare: if all his desires where satisfied, he would still be very bad-
off. However, in order to make this latter claim, there must be an external benchmark (e.g. a list) of 
goods for the sake of comparison. 
Notice that each particular objective list can be challenged by means of counterexamples showing 
either that that the list does not contain very important human goods, or that some interests that the 
list contains are less than universal. It can also be accused of partiality, e.g. ethnocentrism, a-
historicism, etc. Notice however that seldom objective list theories have been proposed as full-
fledged depictions of a good life: they are instead a reaction to the excesses of more subjectivist 
theories, which might miss important moral objectives while striving for neutrality. In this modest 
form, they signal important goods and possible loci of failure of personal judgment about personal 
interests: if people do not seek the satisfaction of basic needs, at least in some cases they could be 
mistaken. Objective lists are also employed by sufficientarians that strive to establish a “decent 
minimum” list of human interests that must be satisfied in every case as a matter of justice, things 
that are often characterized as “needs”84: this is also compatible with less than complete theories of 
welfare. 
Health is a good that figures - to my knowledge - in all objective list theories of welfare. Health is 
indeed also employed as a chief variable in welfarist metrics of countries’ performances, as the 
Human Development Index (e.g. UNDP 2013). Gostin (2007) has argued on this ground that the 
health of populations is as uncontroversial as any good could ever be, and that so the beneficent 
aim of public health policy cannot be challenged by the antiperfectionistic version of 
antipaternalism. This particular claim seems however too strong a conclusion, since the fact that 
health is an uncontroversial good does not show its relative importance in comparison with other 
kinds of goods. In other words, that being in good health is universally considered valuable does 
not show that health is an overarching value.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Powers and Faden (2006) - discussed infra in section 4.2.1- for an application in public health of 
sufficientarian theories. 
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Regarding the asymmetry theses of antiperfectionists, the objective list need not being utterly 
inimical to their main claim: objective list could indeed include items that are more easily 
accessible for individuals, namely mental states. Furthermore, I will argue below that some form or 
other of an objective list theory must at the end be adopted even by the antiperfectionist - while 
retaining his main intuitions about subjectivism. 
 
Experientialism 
 
A subjectivist theory of welfare is experientialism: welfare is ultimately about mental states. 
Hedonism, the thesis that what matter is ultimately experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain, is 
such a theory. This is a position often attributed to Jeremy Bentham (1996 [1823]), the founding 
father of utilitarianism. X is better off than y if and only if x’s amount of experienced pleasure net 
of x’s experienced pain is greater than y’s.  
Notice that experientialism, despite its subjectivism, is not an outright vindication of the 
asymmetry thesis. Take hedonism: in one sense, people are well situated to judge about their 
welfare, at least because it is contingently true that people are more reliable than any other 
instrument to judge about their own level of pleasure or pain. On the other hand, non-experiential 
personal conceptions of the good are simply false if hedonism is correct: if you think that your 
welfare is something else from pleasure minus pains, you are simply mistaken. 
We can explain the point above distinguishing two senses of objectivity and subjectivity. On the 
one hand, we use objectivity1 to speak of theories, propositions, opinions, etc. if their standard of 
correctness (truth-makers, etc.) is independent from the perspective of the theorist, speaker, 
opinion-holder and we have reliable ways of accessing to these facts to achieve certainty in 
judgment. We speak in this sense of the objectivity of the natural sciences. Subjectivity1 is just the 
opposite: there is no independent standard, truth-maker, etc. and/or methods of access to these 
standards are very unreliable: a better word for subjectivity1 is non-objectivity1. On the other hand, 
objectivity2 is a metaphysical notion and refers to things and properties belonging to the objective 
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realm in contrast to the realm of “subjects”, e.g. mental states of human (and other) beings. The 
latter form the set of subjective2 entities and properties85.  
Given these distinction, we can say that the objective list theory is objective1 and possibly 
subjective2, objective2, or both, depending on whether mental states feature in the list. Instead, 
experientialist theories are objective1 and definitely subjective2. The asymmetry thesis is thus only 
partially vindicated by experientialism, because it does not attribute to subjects the ultimate 
judgment on their welfare, given its objectivity1. 
 
Interest satisfaction 
 
The theory that seems to explain better the rationale of the asymmetry theses is interest 
satisfaction86. This theory tries to exclude individual mistakes about personal welfare simply 
equating the satisfaction of one’s conception of well being - e.g. actual desires and wants - with 
one’s well being. Welfare is all about the satisfaction of actual wants (i.e. desires) and wishes. 
Different individuals have different beliefs about their interests and their ranking: these are the only 
benchmarks for the evaluation of their welfare in each case.  
This theory seems superior from the point of view of the vindication of the epistemic theses. Notice 
that there is a tension between searching for a theory of welfare that applies onto everybody (that 
is, an objective1 theory - as the last two proposals) and a theory that entails that each individual is 
best situated to judge about his own welfare (the epistemic theses). To do both things, a theory 
should exclude that there are bona-fide conceptions of personal welfare that deny the truth of that 
theory. This seems prima facie impossible but actually the interest satisfaction theory does 
brilliantly in this respect: it distinguishes the general theory that describes the abstract features of 
welfare (its “nature”) and personal conceptions regarding the full specification of welfare (its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See Searle (1995) for a similar couple of distinctions. 
86 I speak of interests, which is a generic term for desires and preferences: while I do not need to give an 
analysis of the first concept, we may want to state that preferences are just ranked desires. These subtleties 
are largely unimportant here – though of course are foundational for several other normative exercises.	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“content”). The nature of welfare is interest satisfaction, while its content in each case is specified 
by personal desires and wants. So interest satisfaction theory is a fully objective1 theory that 
anyway gives the maximum possible space to personal conceptions of well being and minimizes 
the possibility that individuals might be mistaken about their own welfare. 
 
While the latter theory looks like the most promising approach to the asymmetry theses, I would 
like to argue that the interest satisfaction theory vindicates those theses paying a price that is 
ultimately too high: the equation between personal actual conceptions of welfare and personal real 
interests is not defensible and does not make sense of antiperfectionism. This is because the thesis 
of the wisdom of individuals is only acceptable as an empirical thesis: given that welfare, among 
other things, is about mental states (desires, perhaps pleasure), then for what we know about 
accessing these states, people have some epistemic advantages in comparison to others when 
judging about their own welfare. Yet in the interest satisfaction theory the wisdom of individuals 
becomes definitional: mistakes about personal welfare are a conceptual impossibility. There are at 
least two problems with this. First, as conceptual thesis, the equation “conception of well being = 
well being” is challengeable by the kind of argument employed by Sen (1979), e.g. there are clear 
counterexamples where the better description of the case seems to be that individual might be 
mistaken about their interests. Second, from the point of view of our discussion, it is critical that an 
overall skeptical theory as welfare antipaternalism would be compelled to attribute so powerful 
epistemic powers individuals. This seems an implausible reconstruction of the Millian motivations, 
which are ultimately gnoseologically skeptical. While it is better practically speaking to let people 
judge about their own interests, this does not entail that people cannot be mistaken about their 
nature: certainly this is not a conceptual impossibility. 
 
Starting from the latter result, I propose a different view altogether to reconstruct the approach 
inspired to the Millian tradition. The asymmetry thesis must take the form of the following idea: 
general theories of welfare are often unreliable and individual are roughly good in describing their 
own interests. This is because they are in a favorable epistemic position to judge about some 
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aspects of their own welfare: nobody denies (or could plausibly deny) that, among other things, the 
satisfaction of desires makes life better and that desires are most easily accessible by individuals. 
This explains welfare antipaternalism. Alas, people are not infallible: they might ignore facts about 
the world and about themselves or have sub-optimal preferences, as in the cases that Sen describes. 
This is why we need an objective benchmark of the kind proposed by the objectivists.  
Skeptical antiperfectionists are not advocating metaphysical subjectivism2, nor denying that 
welfare theories cannot be objective1. They rather stress those reasonable differences between 
individual conceptions of welfare that speak against those who try to flesh out full-fledged theories 
of the good life: i.e. thick theories of well being. Their worries relate with the oppressive nature of 
these theories, which exclude originality and the relevance of personal judgments in the name of 
conformity. Antiperfectionists do not need to deny that thin theories of well being are instead 
possible and indeed important. Thin theories will contain general propositions about the nature of 
welfare (e.g. “the satisfaction of their desires makes people better-off”), a list of clear goods (e.g. 
health) or at least a list of clear bads (e.g. diseases), and some other abstract constraints (e.g. 
coherence).  
Thin theories are the antiperfectionist benchmark for judging personal choices: antipaternalists 
need not worry about paternalism when choices are deemed to be poor from the point of view of 
thin benchmarks. The development of the thin theory – respecting the anti-theoretical impulse that 
initiated it – will be necessarily a sort of casuistry. The theory will analyze the welfare optimality 
of specific behaviors starting from expressed preferences, empirical studies and theoretical 
considerations. That is what I will try to do in the next section for the case of food: I hope to have 
convinced the antiperfectionist that this does not need to offend his most deep-seated concerns 
about the risks of conformity and the value of diversity in desires and preferences. 
 
2.3.2 Bad food choices 
 
Dietary choices are influenced by cognitive biases, poor environments and lack of information. 
Soft paternalists would argue in a deontological spirit that interference is admissible because 
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cognitive biases, poor environments and lack of information subtract to the autonomous character 
of choices. In reply to Resnik’s (2010) observation that in the case of public health restrictions on 
diet “at stake is a freedom that most of us exercise every day but often take for granted: the 
freedom to choose what we eat”, Boddington (2010) writes that “it is quite right that we should not 
take this for granted: this is because many of us are not in fact straightforwardly free to choose our 
diets” and that environmental, social and cognitive factors are “curtailing our autonomy”. Skipper 
(2013, pg. 182), endorsing libertarian paternalist strategies to tackle the obesity epidemic, has 
argued that “anthropologists, evolutionary biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, sociologists 
and others have provided considerable empirical evidence that our capacity to choose and maintain 
a healthy diet is severely limited”. I explained why this is morally irrelevant for the assessment of 
paternalist public health policies and I sketched a preliminary argument as for why this is cannot be 
true under any plausible conceptions of liberty and autonomy (section 2.1.1). The real moral 
problem is that such dietary choices - because they are so constrained - are bad in the sense of the 
thin theory of welfare above: they are very poor means for pursuing sensitive personal interests.  
Behavioral psychologists and empirical economists have provided extensive evidence that real 
human behavior is poorly modeled by the assumptions of rationality of traditional economic 
models: this is the point of departure of libertarian paternalists (Thaler and Sunstein 2003). The 
idea of rationality here is very simple. Agents are endowed with a set of coherent and complete 
preferences over certain states, i.e. they assign to each state an ordinal utility. This is a comparative 
judgment about how much utility they expect to gain from each state. Completeness requires that 
agents are always able to tell if a state A is superior, inferior, or equal to the state A in term of 
expected utility. Coherence requires transitivity, e.g. if A is superior (equal) to B, and B superior 
(equal) to C, then A is superior (equal) to C. Also, agents are endowed with the relevant 
information that permits connecting decision and states, e.g. “if you do g, then A will ensue with 
probability p”. That is, they have a roughly reliable picture of the causal structure of the world. 
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Given these assumptions, behavior is modeled as if it was a systematic effort to maximize expected 
utilities: rational agents are trying87 to gain as much welfare as possible.  
In the case of food choices as in other fields, a more realistic depiction of the working cognitive 
machinery underlying decision making highlights its potential dependency on factors that seem 
irrelevant from the point of view of rationality. For instance, if an agent makes two different 
choices depending on whether his blood sugar level is above or under a certain threshold, this must 
be rationally irrelevant88. Assume that preferences are complete and coherent, than at least in one 
case the agent is behaving irrationally. Plus, in both cases he is acting on the basis of a factor that 
he cannot know in ordinary circumstances, blood glucose level: obviously there cannot be any 
explicit rule he is following, and any implicit welfare maximizing rule is even hard to imagine. If 
instead preferences are volatile from one case to the next, then they are not inter-temporally 
complete and coherent. The information that we gain from this kind of evidence is morally 
important because they are cases in which the agent autonomy is not instrumentally effective in the 
pursuit of well being. In other words, the agent is not being wise, i.e. there is no way to interpret his 
behavior as if he was rational. The worries of epistemic antipaternalists should be smoothened by 
this kind of evidence, whose normative evaluations are based on very thin consideration about well 
being (in this case: coherence) that even an antiperfectionist could accept. 
In the rest of this section, I will review several cases of failure of the wisdom of the agent in dietary 
choices. In some cases, I will however argue that there is no failure: I analyze those instances only 
because they have been discussed in the literature. At the end, it should be clear how empirical 
evidence could be used - and how it cannot - to strengthen the case for action despite welfarist 
antipaternalism.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 They also should try to do so according to the theory, which is indeed an analysis of an intrinsically 
normative concept: rationality. 
88 A popular introduction to these topics is Kahneman (2011). 
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The obesogenic environment 
 
In the last decade, there has been an extensive attention to the notion of “obesogenic environment” 
(White 2006). The details of urban planning are thought to influence food choices and patterns of 
physical activity. Absence of cycle lanes and pedestrian areas, high prevalence of car use and the 
presence of retailers of cheap high-calories low-nutrients food are recognized risk-factors for 
obesity. Let us focus for illustration on the latter: the geography of retailers. This is not as such an 
irrelevant factor for rational agency: driving one hour to the next fresh vegetables market because 
only fast-food is available at the back door can substantially decrease welfare. In this case, if there 
is a problem with the geography of food shops is not one of unwise personal behavior that might be 
addressed with paternalist restrictions, indeed restrictions could even damage the purported 
beneficiaries, as it is warned by the welfarist antipaternalist. The real issue concerns the geography 
of retailers as such, not the resulting individual decisions about food.  
In the context of paternalism, the relevant question about the obesogenic environment is whether 
the geography of food retailers can be considered rationally irrelevant, perhaps because it underlies 
a gross “framing effect” not dissimilar to the case of the display of food in canteens that we 
discussed in section 2.1.4. Notice however that the case of food canteen functions for the purposes 
of libertarian paternalists because switching from one to the other menu (e.g. from vegetables to 
fatty foods) is costless, so the framing-dependent choice cannot have any rational explanation. In 
large scale contexts as those pertaining urban geography it is hard to imagine fully costless 
alternatives. Scarcity of healthy food (i.e. “food deserts”) is a rationally relevant factor of choice 
because transportation is expensive. Abundance of fast-foods is a rationally relevant factor because 
it is less time-consuming to get in there rather than looking for the sparse vegetarian restaurants. 
And so on. Despite their relevance for policy making, these factors are not reasons as such to drop 
the epistemic antipaternalist veto to interference: behaviors that are dependent on obesogenic 
environments can be rational.  Here our verdict is sharply different from the liberty based approach 
of Skipper (2013): he would have rather argued that obesogenic environments are limiting liberty 
and thus that interference is at the end unproblematic. 
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Suboptimal opportunity set 
 
Anand and Gray (2009) have constructed a more complex model to explain what can be suboptimal 
in terms of welfare in the case of environments. They start by observing that the relative abundance 
of ready-to-eat unhealthy foods might be sometimes optimal for the reasons depicted above, i.e. 
time sparing and cost. Then they argue that the evolution of the “opportunity set” guided by 
demand, i.e. the evolution of market offer of food, can be nonetheless suboptimal because 
individuals have second order preferences about opportunity sets in addition to punctual 
preferences about consumption. For instance, I might be delighted by the discovery that I can eat a 
sandwich at the bar because I have a meeting in ten minutes and yet regret the fact that sandwiches 
are always available because of my gluttony that I would prefer to keep at bay. In this case, the 
environment (e.g. opportunity set) might indeed be a factor that renders unwise the choice of food: 
this allows for paternalist intervention, as recommended by the two authors.  
Before discussing other cases, notice that the distinction between first and second order preferences 
is also the kind of content that I was promising for a thin theory of well being. The distinction is a 
very abstract proposition that does not exclude that individuals might have hugely different 
conceptions of well being. In other words, the distinction has nothing to do with a perfectionistic 
full-fledged description of welfare, and yet it is a potentially universal feature of personal welfare 
that we ought to take into account in policy making. 
 
The next four cases of determinants of diets are taken from Skipper (2013), who discusses them 
from reasons that are similar to mine but within a deontological framework. He points out the 
morally irrelevant fact that these factors are determinants of food choices, while I will claim (when 
possible) that they are rationally irrelevant. That choices are constrained and determined by some 
external factors cannot be morally interesting, the alternative is too metaphysically odd. Yet that 
determinant factors are irrelevant for welfare can be very important for policy makers. 
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Neural correlates of feeding behavior 
 
Skipper (2013) reports the behavioral and neurological studies conducted by Page et al. (2011), 
which show impaired inhibition of the desire of food after lunch in obese people. The level of 
blood sugar regulates appetite through a stress response mechanism that is repressed when sugar 
level is normal and it is instead triggered by hypoglycemia. Page and colleagues manipulated sugar 
levels and evaluated the appetite in obese and normal BMI subjects, screening their pattern of 
neuronal activation. They discovered that the repression of appetite seems to depend on the pre-
frontal cortex, which is - in independent studies - associated with the repression of impulses. The 
key result of their study is the observation of a poor activation of the pre-frontal cortex in obese 
subjects with normal blood sugar levels and their increased appetite (as evaluated by personal 
rating) in comparison with healthy subjects. It is obviously not surprising that sugar level 
influences food choices with the mediation of appetite response, yet it is surprising that the 
mechanism is impaired in obese subjects. This however cannot be morally relevant because it 
shows determination: in this respect healthy and obese subject do not differ at all (how can they if 
compatibilism about free will is true?). Instead, the crucial fact is that the impairment of the 
appetite-regulation pathway is an irrelevant factor for the decision on whether or not consuming fat 
and sugary foods. Moreover, it is associated with obesity, a condition that would require even 
higher restraints on diet: as a consequence, the food choices of obese subjects are very likely to be 
bad, indeed very bad. This is perhaps the best illustration of my approach: it is obvious that 
ultimately every choice depends on mechanistic pathways in the brain. Yet we have reasons to 
intervene only when we can show that these pathways will reliably lead to bad outcomes. 
 
Mindless eating 
 
In the same piece, Skipper describes Wansink’s (2007) studies about framing effects on the 
evaluation of the size of portions and consumption. In a series of experiments, Wansink has shown 
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that visual clues as the tidiness of dining tables and the size of serving plates influence the quantity 
of ingested food. Tidy tables and bigger serving plates determine significant increases of 
consumption, especially among men. Skipper argues that “what is important here is not so much 
the explanation of how the cues influenced the subjects, but rather that the cues had influence at all 
[…] managing our consumption of food is not firmly in our control (pg. 184)”. Although in this 
case it is indeed surprising that visual clues modify the amount of food intake, the problem again is 
that “we are not good at judging portion sizes or tracking our consumption in distracting 
environments” rather than an issue of poor control. What would count as full control? Perhaps 
ignoring visual clues will improve control because the size of the serving plate and the tidiness of 
the tables are obviously irrelevant as for whether the next piece of sandwich will be good for me 
health-wise, but again this is a case where “our reverence” for control is instrumental and related 
with the role of control in personal well being. 
 
Obesity is contagious 
 
A study by Christakis and Fowler (2007) about obesity and social relationships has explored 
whether being related biologically (e.g. siblings) or socially (e.g. friendship) with obese people 
increases the chance of obesity. The answer seems to be positive. These correlations are difficult to 
interpret. Biological correlation can be due to factors that do not act at social level, e.g. genetics. In 
case of social groups, the effects can go from obesity to social ties as well, since people might 
select for peers with similar body mass index. However, even if causation runs from social ties with 
obese people to obesity, we ought to discard the hypothesis that food choices are bad simply as a 
result of this contagion. Perhaps there are habits regarding foods that are specific to certain groups 
such that individuals are adapting their behaviors to join the advantages of membership. This is not 
irrational if indeed adaptation is a condition of membership and ensuing advantages are big 
enough. The evidence that would prove irrationality must consist in showing that living in a group 
of obese people renders obesity unwisely acceptable, i.e. by masking the information about the 
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adverse effects of unhealthy diets. This however would count as lack of information rather than 
poor control, an issue that I discuss below. 
 
The evolution of obesity 
 
As a final example, Skipper presents the theory of the mismatch between our evolutionary wired 
eating habits and the food plentitude of modern society. Let us explain his point with an analogy 
from zoology. When a carnivore (e.g. the wolf) enters a fenced pasture or farm where domesticated 
animals are collected for the night, it faces a highly unusual environment: an endless amount of 
easily reachable food. After all wolves are hunting in the wild since half million years, whereas 
domesticated animals and their crowded human-made shelters are at most ten thousand years old: 
some animals might not have adapted to the new circumstances so rapidly. The consequences are 
often dire: over-killing and waste of prey. The mismatch theory of obesity maintains that 
something similar applies to human beings quite as well: our “pleistocenic” mind of hunter-
gatherers is not able to limit properly food intake in sedentary conditions where food is ready 
available and physical exercise scarce. It is interesting that in this case even Skipper must present 
his point in a welfarist form: given the evolutionary mismatch, food choices are very likely to be 
bad. It would be indeed amusing to argue differently: any capability of decision making ultimately 
relies on cognitive machineries that have been molded by our evolution, but that cannot detract 
from their autonomous nature, if not to argue that compatibilism is false and that autonomy cannot 
exist, hardly an attractive option from the point of view of the deontologist and his passion for 
autonomy. Again: yes, antipaternalism is overstated if the mismatch theory is correct; and no, the 
mismatch theory does not show that human being are “simply without the sort of decision making 
autonomy that advocates of paternalism are accused of violating”. Human are simply very bad 
choosers since human techno-sociological developments have outstripped the process of adaptation 
of human capability of decision making to the environment. 
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Contradictory inter-temporal discounts 
 
Skipper’s treatment of the factors that explain (bad) food choices is incomplete. Experimental 
economists have elaborated models of decision making in case of addiction and poor investment 
that might be applied to the case of food as well (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). The idea is to 
put at test different heuristics of decision making that can explain phenomena that are puzzling in 
the standard rationalist models. These heuristics – in some cases – can be easily described as “bad” 
pieces of reasoning. 
In general, addictions might be modeled as clashes between short term rewards (costs) and long 
term costs (benefits). Individuals are often faced with the option of forgoing an immediate benefit 
for the sake of a future (bigger) reward or with the option of gathering a present benefit by risking 
future losses. For instance, I might decide to work for a paper this week-end instead of going to the 
mountains: despite the painful consequences of my decision for the week-end, the investment 
might contribute to an important achievement of mine in the long term. In the case of reckless 
health behaviors, I may decide to drink another glass of bier because it tastes great despite it is 
recommended to avoid drinking more than a unit of alcohol a day to avoid some chronic diseases. 
An important feature of these inter-temporal choices is that it is generally rational to discount 
future benefits and losses, and the more they are distant in time, the more it is rational to discount 
their value. The idea is simply that the chance of gathering (paying for) future benefits (losses) 
grows smaller and smaller as benefits are more distant in time. If not for anything else, the 
probability of death is always greater than zero and sums up as time passes. More generally, 
uncertainty increases with time for epistemic reasons, i.e. more variables will influence later 
outcomes. It is however experimentally demonstrated that several people do not discount future 
utilities in a coherent manner (i.e. exponential discounting): they rather discount future benefits 
more heavily the closer they are in time. In other words, they prefer to wait for one day in one 
month than in one week (i.e. hyperbolic discounting). This present biased discount accounts for 
addiction and procrastination because immediate rewards are given a very high value in hyperbolic 
models.  
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Hyperbolic discounting is considered irrational because it is dynamically inconsistent. Take the 
decision of indulging in wine-drinking instead of jogging at time T. Now consider two earlier time 
points, T1 and T2, respectively farther and closer in time with T. In exponential discounting, it does 
not matter whether I am at T1 or at T2: I will always discount the benefits of jogging with a fixed 
rate. Instead, in hyperbolic models, I will discount at T2 with a rate r greater of the rate q at which I 
would discount at T1. In general, the closer to T, the more I would discount. These differences 
might give inconsistent instructions as for how I should maximize my well being: perhaps from the 
perspective of T1 I should go jogging whilst from the perspective of T2 I should drink wine, hence 
the inconsistency. The instruction that is held at the point of decision will win, but that will be 
wrong from the point of view of an earlier (and future) self. Again, this is a reason to drop the 
antipaternalist worry and favor one solution over the other. In particular, there is at least one reason 
to favor the verdict of the selves that are farther away in time: their verdict is temporally prevalent. 
That is, more often than not, and indeed always if not in the time immediately surrounding the 
decision, the alternative that is actually chosen is considered inferior by the agent. The underlying 
normative judgment might be less than universal in application, but still it is reliable enough to be 
included in the thin theory of welfare that is recommended by the antiperfectionist antipaternalist. 
 
Poor information 
 
Food choices depend on a balancing between immediate pleasures and ensuing risks of 
cardiovascular diseases and cancer. Depending on risk aversion, two individuals might make 
opposite choices: this is unproblematic. Yet they might make opposite choices even because one of 
them lack relevant information, e.g. underestimate risks. For instance, a UCL study (Sanderson 
2009) has shown good awareness in a sample of UK population of the links between obesity and 
cardiovascular conditions, yet the more recent evidence that some kinds of cancer are associated to 
diet was ignored: this leads to substantial underestimation of risks. In the case of lack of 
knowledge, individuals might make bad choices simply because they cannot connect appropriately 
their actions with the expected outcomes. These cases suggest intervening by means of 
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informational campaign, yet if these were to fail or to be too expensive, policy makers should be 
unimpressed by epistemic antipaternalism: the general assumption that equates free choices with 
good choices must be rejected if the relevant causal information is not complete. The data about 
awareness suggest furthermore caution on the rhetoric of “health education”: while perhaps 
educational campaigns are intrinsically worthy (e.g. because it is good for people to know more), 
their effect on behaviors will not necessarily be important. 
 
Bad preferences 
 
As explained in section 2.3.1, Sen (1979) discussed cases where preferences and their ranking are 
suboptimal, for instance in the case of an individual who has adapted to dire circumstances and is 
content with very poor options. Here, his behavior is not optimal not so much because it is 
irrational in the sense defined above, but because it is very implausible to accept that his 
preferences are correct. This shows the need of at least a clear list of bads in the thin theory. 
However, this is not going to be decisive in cases of food choices: assume that chronic diseases 
belong to the list of uncontroversial bads. Still the link between food choices and the outset of 
chronic disease is too tenuous to justify interventions on this basis. Although the aggregate effect of 
unhealthy diets is vast in terms of incidence of disease and although the risk is substantially 
augmented by unhealthy lifestyles, the individual risk due to these lifestyles is too low to be 
uncontroversially considered an irrational pursuit of a clear bad. That is, these considerations do 
not suit the general inspiration of an antiperfectionist thin theory of well being. 
 
Socio-economic determination 
 
A well-know determinant of unhealthy food consumption is ability to pay: unhealthy food is 
generally cheaper and people mastering less economic resources will opt for it. Individuals 
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purchasing behavior is dependent on price: people look at their budgets when deliberating about 
their food choices. Also, this is an important factor underlying socio-economic differences in 
healthy behaviors (Pampel 2009). It would be however wrong to argue that choices are bad as a 
consequence of this kind of determination. The comparative and absolute prices of healthy and 
unhealthy foods are obviously worrisome. However, selecting cheaper foods when the personal 
budget is limited is as rational as a choice could be: with restricted budgets, opting for unhealthy 
cheap items is more rational than doing the same with a stronger ability to pay. This is a just 
consequence of the empirical generalization of diminishing returns of income on welfare. For 
people with smaller budgets, sparing on food is more important because the alternative utilization 
of money is in general more useful than in the case of richer people. I hasten to notice that this does 
not show that there is no problem with economic determination of food behaviors: perhaps the 
underlying income and wealth distribution is independently bad, maybe because - among other 
things - it does not allow some individuals to purchase healthy items. Yet it will be wrong to argue 
that the moral problem of economic determination is that choices are constrained or even rationally 
bad as a result of differential in budgets: they are neither.  
Notice that in this case, the welfarist and the deontological approach have very different 
consequences: if the problem of food choices is determination as such, there is really no difference 
between economic determination and - say, mindless eating. Yet if the problem of determination is 
that sometimes it leads to bad choices, we are able to discriminate between cases that are morally 
interesting for the antipaternalist and cases that are not - as the latter. 
 
In this section, I listed and discussed several cases for suspending the otherwise sensitive welfarist 
antipaternalism that I described in section 2.3.1. For each case, I have shown that the problem is 
not so much that people are not autonomous: rather, the problem is that constrained choices are 
very likely to be poor. These are all cases where the optimism on individual behaviors that ultimate 
motivates epistemic antipaternalism is not convincing. On the other hand, I also highlighted how 
the kind of considerations that underlies these normative judgments (i.e. bad choices) is very thin, 
and ought to be accepted even if we believe that antiperfectionism is an important and prudent 
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political principle. Overall, I have so far explained which varieties of antipaternalism are 
meaningful and which are not and why in the case of public health and nutrition even the best 
antipaternalist arguments do not forbid intervention.  
Next sections will be dedicated to two issues that are somehow orthogonal to this conclusion but 
must be addressed in every complete treatment of the topic: (1) whether paternalism can be 
acceptable if populations are stratified in bad and good deliberators and (2) whether there are 
specific problems with restrictions imposed on children from the point of view of the liberty of 
their parents. In both cases, the solution is inspired by the kind of utilitarian antipaternalism that 
was unfolded and qualified in the chapter. 
 
2.3.4 One size fits all? 
 
The last section has provided some evidence as for why individuals behave as bad deliberators in 
dietary choices. Paternalist measures that can address this problem include population-wide 
disincentives in the form of taxation, bans and other form of restrictions (i.e. on ingredients 
composition and proportion, and/or size of servings). Yet population-wide policy overshoots: for 
certainly along bad deliberators there will be good deliberators who will be equally restricted by 
these measures and indeed harmed by them. The harm will not be in general very serious and 
perhaps it will be as little as the necessity to order two portions instead of one to get sated after a 
long fasting. Nevertheless, good deliberators have reasons to complain, since paternalism seems an 
“ideology of bad deliberators” that put them at disadvantage. Can the paternalist reply to this 
challenge? 
To begin with, notice that heterogeneous population composed by both bad and good deliberators 
will in generally exists. Some but not all will have second order preferences on restricted 
opportunity sets, for instance those who acknowledge their gluttony and would like to self-
constrain themselves. Some but not all will have a dysfunctional appetite regulation pathway: this 
is after all the other side of the study by Page (2009). Individuals might belong to groups of 
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contagious overweight people, but equally they might not. Somebody will be disturbed by 
informational noise when evaluating portion size, whereas other will be responsive to internal clues 
only. The evolutionary argument applies equally to each human being, but certainly some will be 
able to overcome their eating impulses. As for contradictory time discount, experimental evidence 
shows that some people do discount exponentially. For each of the factors of bad choice presented 
above, it is logically possible, intuitively plausible and/or empirically demonstrated that it does not 
apply universally.  
There are three general responses to this hurdle: (1) there are positive externalities of restriction 
and they affect good deliberators as well; (2) good deliberators can get direct compensation for 
their losses; (3) good deliberators might undergo some sacrifices if the gain of bad deliberators is 
great. I argue that the first argument is perhaps sound and that the second argument suggests an 
interesting practical solution based on voting. However, it is the third strategy that ultimately will 
decide on the acceptability of paternalistic restrictions. 
(1) The next chapter will be dedicated to the social goods attached to population health, i.e. 
decreased health expenses and increased productivity. For the moment, the argument is only 
conditional: if there are substantial gains for society that can be achieved only with some limited 
restrictions that harm good deliberators, the latter should perhaps undergo some losses for the sake 
of higher gains. Notice that, in general, these cost-benefit analyses should not be applied so 
simplistically onto the aggregate population: they hide distributive concerns and might recommend 
inflicting intolerable losses onto few people. This strategy is only viable if societal gains are so 
elevated that they might roughly compensate good deliberators: in these cases, they could undergo 
losses for selfish reasons. 
(2) Some welfare economists have proposed to compensate literally the good deliberators: this 
should be feasible for restrictions as taxations, which provide public revenues, and if bad 
deliberators are sufficiently many (or equally, if good deliberators are few). The idea is that the 
gain in welfare of bad deliberators that is ensuing from taxation will sum up to tax revenues that 
can be used to compensate good deliberators (O’Donoghue & Rabin 2006). The result is 
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distributively neutral: nobody is worse off for the sake of somebody else and welfare is overall 
increased because bad deliberators are rescued from their own choices.  
The proposal as such is perhaps unfeasible, at least because we ought not to sodminister tests of 
deliberative capabilities to check for compensation eligibility. It is more likely that revenues will be 
channeled for other worth social purposes, thus reinforcing the argument above about social gains. 
This is not distributively neutral - as required by welfare economists89 - yet the basic idea can be 
saved if we allow people to deliberate and vote on the destination of revenues. In this case, both 
good and bad deliberators will decide how to use public money, but at least good deliberators will 
obtain a partial Ersatz-compensation: partial deliberation on the use of revenues. This has been 
done in California, Richmond, through a referendum deciding for taxation policy on unhealthy 
food and public deliberation about the employment of revenues. The only possible rationale for 
this method is indeed compensation to good deliberators: otherwise normal institutions for deciding 
upon public expenses (i.e. city council administration) would have been sufficient, provided that 
they are so for other budgetary decisions. 
(3) Buyx and Prainsack (2007) claim that the notion of solidarity should be put back in the political 
discussion about health policy. This is important here because, among other things, a focus on 
solidarity would be capable of taking into account the fact that people might sometimes act 
selflessly and support at their expenses institutions that do not provide any benefit to them. In this 
case, good deliberators could accept selflessly minor harms for the sake of benefiting bad 
deliberators. There are perhaps other cases in which this actually happens: public institutions do not 
simply re-address gross injustice or provide public goods, they are sometimes thoroughly 
beneficent. Solidarity based considerations are in one sense very weak: there will certainly be 
objectors that do not want to act selflessly and complain rightly about forced beneficence. Yet 
sometimes forced beneficence is only efficient90 and this seems to be the case even in our small 
example: anything short of universal application of taxation is unfeasible.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See infra section 3.2.4 
90 See Waldron (1986) for an application of the idea of legitimate coerced beneficence to social policy in 
general.	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On the other hand, the idea of solidarity clarifies that the complaints of the selfish or the right-
based complaints of the libertarian on his behalf are not trumps to beneficent policy: at least not 
always and everywhere. Political principles are not free-standing constraints on the political life, 
but they are propositions that motivate political action, ground political objections, and vivify 
political discussion: in societies that have internalized the duty of beneficence (or solidarity) and 
even lack narrative resources to insist on the liberal right-talk, forced beneficence is perhaps 
politically objectionable but hardly illegitimate. This idea threatens a fundamental motivation of 
political liberalism regarding the protection of minorities (in this case, the libertarian and the 
selfish) and obviously needs more extensive attention, which I cannot give properly in this context. 
Yet I wanted at least to signal that it seems implausible to maintain that the weight of different 
considerations about political justice are utterly independent from the actual conception of justices 
that are upheld by the members of one community, at least because living in a society which fits 
one’s conception of justice is a very serious interest of everybody. Policies that command selfless 
behavior are not utterly inappropriate in every circumstance: sometimes forced beneficence can be 
legitimately implemented. 
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2.4 Appendix: indirect paternalism and parental autonomy 
 
In chapter 1, I presented data about the epidemic of overweight and obesity in children and their 
consequences for adult and earlier health conditions. Population health policy has often targeted 
children and adolescents, given the clinical significance of diet at young age and the relevance of 
early imprinting for later food behaviors. There might be stricter regulations on ingredients 
specifically designed for children, restrictions on advertisements targeting the young and even bans 
on certain foods in vending machines and school canteens. The latter measures may be contested 
by parents claiming that they are a threat for their freedom to choose and cook what they prefer via 
the conditioning of their children. In the spirit of the chapter, I will argue that we should address 
this issue dropping principled concerns about the sphere of parental liberty or the lack of autonomy 
of children and focusing instead on the welfarist reasons that we have to favor parental freedom of 
choice.  
The political status of children is complex (Archard and MacLeod 2002): they are independent 
persons holding some individual rights (e.g. negative rights) but not others (e.g. some political 
rights), they are subject to parental authority (that is, parents can decide on their behalf in a series 
of cases) and they are societal goods as future citizens (i.e. future productive taxpayers and future 
citizens entitled to welfare compensation). Those who complain about food policy targeted at 
children normally argue that there are neither violations of children rights nor serious societal bads 
to be avoided that justify overriding parental autonomy in the case of food choices. Replies consist 
in pointing out either negative rights that are allegedly violated in the case of children eating 
inadequate food or serious societal harms that can be prevented by health policy. 
Rights of children can be violated in two ways: either they are straightforwardly harmed, for 
instance if their physical integrity is threatened, or their condition is such that some requirements of 
justice toward them cannot be fulfilled in the future, included the violation of further negative 
rights. In general, this is because they have – as anybody else – present and future interests: the 
latter are just more obvious in the case of children. 
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For the moment, I start by noticing that it would be far-fetched to argue that negative rights are 
systematically violated in standard cases of unhealthy diet in children: overweight and obese 
children and worse off than others, both physically and psychologically, yet they are not threatened 
by abuse or abandonment. Different parental styles might lead to dietary problems: parental 
absenteeism is associated with longer TV-watching, which is a determinant of obesity (Blacksher 
2008). Yet these parental styles are not considered right-violating and parents de facto do not forgo 
their authority adopting them. While this is not yet a normative argument, it suggests that we ought 
to balance with accuracy harms and benefits of both parental autonomy and the intrusion of public 
authorities in the life of families, rather than speaking of rights of the ones against the others. That 
is, instead of starting with parental sovereignty (or even property rights on children - see Nozick 
1974), we should look for some broadly welfarist justification of the protection of the private 
sphere of the family and discuss whether this justification is convincing in the case of food. 
One solution comes – not surprisingly – from Mill (1991 [1859]). Millian “experiments in living” 
argument for toleration suggests a prudent antipaternalist attitude toward intrusions of public 
authorities into parental styles. In general, Mill claims that toleration of different forms of human 
life (i.e. religions, sexual orientation, etc.) is recommendable because of the epistemic value of 
these experiments. Perhaps some ways of life are indeed inferior for those who are living them, but 
figuring out how a good life should be is a hard task - the skeptic antiperfectionist says – and 
having different people simply trying their way will be overall better than prohibiting activities that 
might be beneficial and/or recommending habits that can be harmful. This deduction of toleration 
extends to that subsection of conduct that is one’s parenting style. Third parties (i.e. children) are 
indeed involved in one’s parenting style, but until the rights of children are grossly violated, the 
Millian argument suggests caution and protection onto families. 
Public health policy is a long-standing battlefield for the potential clash between parental decisions 
and the recommendation and/or compulsion of public officials, from vaccines to dietary guidelines. 
The nurture of children is indeed a traditional target of hygiene campaigns (Porter 1999), given the 
special effectiveness of early interventions for life-long health outcomes. The campaign against 
medicalization has been also fought on this terrain, and yet debate has seldom been lead on the 
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ground of political principles protecting autonomy. The worry is that public health officials might 
be mistaken when recommending certain practices, rather than specific concerns about the 
violation of parental rights. Risks can outset benefits in the case of vaccines; particular guidelines, 
e.g. avoiding certain foods, might turn out to be useless or harmful. The precautionary skepticism 
that characterizes utilitarian antipaternalism urges to consider accurately whether uniformity in 
parental styles is really needed. 
This does not prohibit intervention – only caution. I have argued in section 2.3.2 that human food 
choices are often quite poor, and there is no reason to believe that they are substantially better when 
individuals act or cook on behalf of their children. Indeed, there is evidence of the contrary: obesity 
runs in family and although this is partially due to biological inheritance, it is familiar habits that 
make for most of the correlation. Also, there are no known risks of the familiar guidelines for 
healthy diets: if children eat more vegetables and less red meat, this is hardly risky (compare the 
case of vaccine for contrast).  
Caution is however recommended for further reasons. Unhealthy familiar choices might be due to 
budget or time constraints rather than failures in decision making: perhaps overworked poor 
parents cannot cook time-consuming healthy dishes starting from raw vegetables and must go for 
the ready-made foods. Perhaps they are fetching cheaper products because the priority is using a 
restricted budget for educational investments, etc. In these cases, unhealthy food choices are not 
suboptimal but fully rational, and the problem cannot be addressed by paternalist policy but rather 
tackling the underlying social determinants. In general, the protection of parental autonomy does 
not give sufficient reasons to avoid restrictions in schools, etc. However, the antipaternalist critique 
shows that regulators should pay attention on whether familiar food choices are really bad (i.e. 
irrational) or they are rational adaptation to circumstances that are independently problematic. 
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2.5 When we should worry about paternalism in public health 
 
In this chapter, I reconstructed and defended the morality of the traditional beneficent model of 
public health from the allegations of paternalism. I analyzed antipaternalism and rejected its 
deontological version with its single-minded attention to the sphere of personal liberty. I argued 
that a philosophically superior form of antipaternalism is welfarist, skeptic, and antiperfectionist. 
This version of antipaternalism suggests caution in public health (as in other beneficent sectors of 
public policy) because personal interests are very diverse, sometimes unusual, and people are 
roughly good most of the times in judging about their own. For the case of food, I have shown that 
also this particular worry is overstated: food choices depend on biases, wrong judgments, and poor 
information. I argued that determination of choices as such cannot be problematic within a 
naturalistic conception of choice and autonomy. The evidence provided by empirical economists, 
psychologists and sociologists suggest however an interventionist attitude. Policies must be always 
carried out with particular attention to unintended effects on good deliberators and people who are 
indirectly targeted. This form of welfarist and antiperfectionist rationale for public health 
intervention is the first piece of my reconstruction of the aims of preventive medicine that I offer in 
the thesis. 
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3.  Responsibility for Personal Health. 
 Between justice and efficiency 
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The antipaternalist harm principle bans only intrusions with personal choices that do not affect the 
interests of others. Hence, non-paternalist arguments in favor of nutritional prevention can be 
perhaps constructed pointing out the various ways in which the health consequences of personal 
unhealthy lifestyles matter to others. Personal health is valuable for society at large insofar healthy 
people are productive and can participate fruitfully to social cooperation and, in countries where 
health care is publicly funded, healthy people cost less to other citizens, who can employ resources 
in other morally recommendable ways91. Yet the social value of health does not show as such that 
public authorities must promote health by interfering with people’s lives or that persons have 
special responsibility for their own health: only choices that affect others unrightfully must be 
prevented under the harm principle. That is, only choices that harm others are a legitimate target of 
public intervention. This chapter is dedicated to this topic: whether there is any harm to others 
involved in unhealthy lifestyles and whether there are other reasons for interference, weaker than 
harm, based on the interest of third parties on personal choices for health. 
The answer to the former question will be sharply negative. Persons do not harm others by being 
less productive that they can be (section 3.1). Also, they do not harm others by being more costly to 
social welfare services (section from 3.2). In the first case, the argument is based on a distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate ways to promote productivity (i.e. increase human capital). In 
the second case, the argument rejects responsibility based theories of distributive justice that deny 
compensation to those whose lesser welfare is due to their choices. Remember that people can be 
harmed if they are not given what is due to them (section 2.1.4): in responsibility based theories, 
people are harmed if they are forced to pay (e.g. through the fiscal system) for welfare 
compensations to other people who caused (i.e. are responsible for) their own diseases. I show why 
we ought to reject these theories, at least in the case of food and perhaps more generally. 
Although I argue that unhealthy lifestyles are not harmful to others, such habits might anyway be 
targeted by public policy whenever they render welfare services grossly inefficient, e.g. if the 
presence of welfare services is among the reasons that explain the existence of bad choices (i.e. 
moral hazard). As in the last chapter, intervention under this brand would be justified by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 See below in section 3.2.1 for important restrictions on this claim. 
102	  
	  
thoroughly beneficent purposes. This non-justice based welfarist rationale for intervention is 
discussed in section 3.2.4: despite its moral soundness, it does not fit too well the case of food 
choices for contingent (i.e. factual) reasons. In particular, it is debatable that people eat unhealthy 
foods because health costs will not be entirely born by them in case of onset of a nutrition-related 
disease. It seems there are neither moral hazards nor negative externalities associated with food 
choices - or anyway evidence to that effect is scarce. 
The conclusion of this chapter will be the following: while inefficiencies due to externalities and 
moral hazard are legitimate targets for public authorities reinforcing the viability of health systems, 
public health policies cannot be based on allocations of responsibility and responsibility-sensitive 
prescriptive theories of just distributions.  
Before discussing the effects of unhealthy food choices on productivity and health costs, I will 
reject – in guise of appendix - a possible claim of direct harm to others of unhealthy behaviors. 
According to the literature on “contagious obesity” that we already encountered in section 2.3.2 
(esp. Christakis and Fowler 2007), unhealthy habits might spread in ways that are similar to 
infective diseases: by direct contagion. In this case, unhealthy habits would be a direct threat to 
other people and, since these habits are avoidable, there should be a direct duty not to engage in 
unhealthy habits stemming from the general principle of avoiding harms to others (Harris and 
Holm 1995)92. However, there is a crucial difference between infective diseases and unhealthy 
habits. Although unhealthy habits might indeed spread across populations in ways that can be 
modeled similarly to infective diseases, picking up an unhealthy habit involves a step of individual 
decision making which is entirely absent in the case of infection. I have argued at length in section 
2.3.2 that the tendency of human beings to imitate others does not subtract from their autonomy: 
full control on individual choices is a chimera and countervailing impulses (or failing to) is a 
crucial part of what autonomy amounts to. So - for example - while there is a duty not to cross 
roads while the traffic light is red if children are nearby, there is no comparable duty in case only 
adults are present, even if adults would tend to cross with the red more often when others did. In 
case these adults crossed the road - no matter how strongly they are influenced by others - they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See also chapter 7 in Holland (2008), discussing a similar issue in the case of the ethics of immunization. 
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would put their life at risk. Claiming otherwise would be far too demanding: there is no duty of 
avoiding extreme sports on the ground that somebody else might be tempted to start those activities 
too. This can be easily translated in the case of unhealthy habits. 
   
3.1 Is there a duty to be productive? 
 
The health consequences of unhealthy diets, e.g. obesity or cardiovascular conditions, cause early 
retirement, absenteeism and smaller lifetime incomes93. Each of these effects affects social 
productivity, broadly understood. In general, productivity measures the societal efficiency of 
employing resources: productivity in this sense increases as the amount of resources that is needed 
to produce the same outcome decreases (Buchanan 2011).  
In this section, I will explain in which sense health economists speak of the effects of lifestyle 
diseases on productivity (Sassi 2010) and assess (1) if there is any harm to others in being less 
productive than possible and (2) if there is any reason different from harm to intervene against 
unhealthy lifestyles on the basis of productivity considerations. My answers are, respectively, 
negative and positive, in line with the overall thesis of the chapter and indeed the whole thesis. 
There is no duty to be healthy (nor a fortiori legitimate enforcement of this duty) on the basis that 
productivity associated with personal health is socially beneficial. Yet since the personal cost of 
disease is lower than its social cost, interventions may result in increased welfare because they may 
remedy to certain inefficiencies. 
 
3.1.1 The goods of productivity 
 
Increases in efficiency are social goods under some particular conditions: resources thus liberated 
can be employed for alternative morally recommendable purposes and/or potential losses are more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See infra section 1.2.2. 
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than compensated by gains. Notice in fact that even gains in productivity could be detrimental, as 
in the case of detrimental decreases in expenses. Obvious cases that come to mind regard the 
employment of resources generated by gains in productivity in morally objectionable manners: we 
would not say that gains in productivity as such are good in - say, aggressive military regimes. In 
brief, productivity is only instrumentally good (Buchanan 2011). Assuming that the conditions 
above are met in the society that we are studying, let us look whether there is any particular duty 
emerging from the goodness of productivity and whom they may fall upon. 
 
3.1.2 Unlashing human potentials vs. conscription 
 
To anticipate the conclusion: there is no personal duty to be as productive as possible, at least in 
normal circumstances. The argument develops the following intuition: while it is a legitimate aim 
of public authorities to invest in human capital (i.e. productivity), it is illegitimate to constrain 
people’s life in order to approximate their productive optimum. In totalitarian regimes, human 
beings were molded for the sake of the productive necessities of society: this is illegitimate 
conscription. Non-totalitarian societies must strive to increase their human capital by unlashing 
unexpressed human potentials while respecting the differences among individual life-plans. The 
only legitimate ways of increasing productivity in these societies is thus the removal of constraints 
on personal freedom that impede personal flourishing. Public schooling, for instance, allows the 
development of productive potentials of individuals who otherwise would not have access to 
education, yet the effect on productivity is just a side-effect of a liberating policy, rather than an 
explicit effort to produce individuals who fit the productive expectations of society94.  
The attention to physical appearance and bodily strength in past totalitarian regimes is no surprising 
in this light: totalitarian regimes submit individuals to allegedly higher needs of society and 
stigmatize those who do not comply with the collective efforts toward betterment. My argument 
makes explicit one kind of objection that we could use against totalitarian propaganda about perfect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Notice that market-friendly views are utterly extraneous to this specific idea as well – contrary to what one 
might prima-facie believe. Market friendly theorists expect central planners (i.e. in the case of education) to 
be very inefficient in the provision of adequate offer of manpower. 
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bodies: it is not simply racist and/or sexist, i.e. discriminatory toward certain groups, but it also 
restricts personal opportunities for the sake of a societal rationale that could be extraneous to 
personal life plans. This is – in brief – the liberal argument against constraining lives for the sake of 
investments in human capital. While we may take the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate ways of investing in human capital to be a self-standing political principle, the values 
of personal autonomy and the role of “leading a life of your own” in human well being underpin its 
moral significance.  
To discuss the issue of duties regarding personal productivity, we may note that although liberal 
philosophers often describe general requirements of distributive justice, they seldom tackle the 
issue of justice in production. This shyness depends partly on the normative consideration that I 
sketched above against illiberal conscription, partly on empirical assumptions about the efficiency 
of free markets (i.e. unconstrained market-allocation of jobs) in the production of a sufficient 
economic output. Duties of distributive justice, in this picture, would always start downstream of 
the efficient unconstrained production of wealth: justice would be always re-distributive. Hsieh 
(2008), however, pointed out that there might be personal duties of contribution to the productive 
enterprise, in particular when the contribution can make a substantial difference and there are no 
available alternatives.  
For instance, in very poor societies afflicted by a high burden of disease, it is at least conceivable 
that a young brilliant doctor who can intervene ought to do so, and for reasons of justice rather than 
beneficence. That is, if he spends his days sipping gin-tonics in a hotel lobby, he is not simply 
avoiding a supererogatory duty, but committing injustice: after all his working time would rescue 
other people from extremely harmful conditions and there are no reasonable alternatives to his 
contribution. Notably, this is more than a theoretical possibility in countries where there are serious 
geographical inequalities and lack of skilled workers in poorer areas. For instance, recent health 
reforms in Turkey include a compulsory period of practice in the east or rural areas (where poverty 
is endemic) for all neo-physician (Guarducci 2013). This is indeed quite restrictive, but societies 
may want to claim some returns from their investments in physicians’ talents and their guarantee of 
the medical profession. 
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Let us assume for the sake of discussion that the latter verdict is morally correct. Can we repeat a 
similar point for the duty to be healthy and productive in societies where lifestyle diseases are 
prevalent? I believe that the answer is negative: in general, it is not true that individuals can make a 
substantial difference by making healthy choices, nor that there are no available alternative. Hence, 
there is no personal duty to be fulfilled. Let us see why. 
First, although several requirements of justice are yet to be met, in richer society where lifestyle 
diseases are widespread the cost of any further improvement is generally higher than in the dire 
situation described above: no single person is likely to be able to improve its society alone justice-
wise. The idea is simply that of a diminishing return of the use of resources on social results: 
perhaps in very dire conditions (e.g. a war) any investment will be wasted like water down a strain, 
but as soon as resources can be used for the good, it will in general less costly to do good where 
conditions are poorer than in richer societies, since simple ameliorations will make for large 
improvements in efficiency and larger goods. Consider the case of health: simple ameliorations in 
sanitation make for big differences in poorer countries, while each advance in life expectancy in 
richer society will cost a lot of resources as long as it may require broader change or technological 
breakthroughs. It is implausible that the gain in productivity due to better health ensuing from 
healthy individual choices will generate enough resources to address issues of justice in richer 
societies - at most they will benefit marginally some individuals. 
If one is utilitarian through and through, he may want to recommend the pursuit of these lesser 
gains as well. However, utilitarians need not endorse the further claim that we should – as a matter 
of public policy – coerce people into benefiting others as much as it is possible. There is a fully 
utilitarian explanation of this distinction between personal duties and enforceable duties: as for how 
human beings are made (e.g. their motivational structure), it would be utterly counterproductive to 
try the enforcement of over-demanding duties. As a rule of thumb when reasoning about 
enforceable duties, there are only two kinds of them: the duty to benefit others when gains are 
substantial and costs are not individually excessive and the duty not to harm others. 
As a further complication, if the adverse social effect is due to the aggregation of the choices of 
several individuals, no particular person seems to bear a personal duty to change his behavior, for 
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his effort will not suffice and somebody else’s change would have the same effect. The duty does 
not fall upon anybody in particular. There are of course several normative disagreements regarding 
the allocation of responsibility in these cases of collective action. I believe that the philosophical 
research has not provided a satisfactory answer as yet to this problem (Glover and Scott-Taggart 
1975) and the utilitarian will anyway be content with whatever solution addresses effectively the 
problem, aside from allocations of duties and responsibility. In dubious circumstances we should 
however decide for restrictions only if there is clear evidence that consequences could be vastly 
harmful, as it is the case for certain environmental issues: this is not the case here. I conclude that, 
unless the decrease of productivity due to lifestyle diseases is substantial and threats some basic 
requirements of justice, there is no personal duty to care for personal health, nor (a fortiori) public 
authorities might enforce restrictive regulations on these bases.  
 
3.1.3 The burden of care and lifetime incomes 
 
The precocious outset of a chronic disease might force patients out of their jobs and/or other 
productive contributions to the social fabric, temporarily (absence) or forever (retirement). Is there 
any personal duty to protect one’s own health as a consequence of this socially-relevant effect? 
Could this duty be enforced by public authorities by means of public health policy? I argued above 
that the answer can be positive only in very limited circumstances, for instance to insure the 
fulfillment of minimal requirements of justice. Instead, the simple fact that a higher ratio of active 
to inactive people is socially favorable, does not ground any duty for protection of personal health. 
When the demographic pattern of a society is skewed toward children or the elderly, the productive 
segments of the population must carry a higher burden of care: the larger these segments, the lower 
the burden. Increased ratio active to inactive is thus positive both for productive individuals, who 
might enjoy shorter working times and/or a higher share of the total production, and/or for those 
who mainly receive resources, e.g. in term of quality of services (if more resources are channeled 
toward the care of the inactive).  
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There are some provisos to be made here. (1) The distinction productive/unproductive is not simple 
to make and the distinction working/non-working is just a rough approximation thereof. Retired 
individuals do contribute – sometimes substantially – to societal production, e.g. with volunteer 
work and family care. Also, people with chronic conditions can continue to function quite normally 
for a long time even beyond the formal working places, for instance in intellectual pursuits. So, the 
ratio active to inactive should be employed with caution, because early retirement due to health 
conditions is not as such a social loss. We do measure active contribution to the social fabric with 
incomes, yet this is a convenient operational shortcut rather than an interesting moral fact. 
(2) Sometimes the claim that the ratio of active to inactive people constitutes a social preoccupation 
depends again on assumption regarding the sustainability of public sector spending, i.e. pensions. 
The ratio is however one of the many variables that influence sustainability and it is not in general 
true that its improvement is good, not even pro tanto: after all working is by definition a cost to 
individuals and the shorter they work, the better for their well being (keeping fix their incomes).  
Furthermore, there might be a personal loss of income due to nutrition related diseases that is due 
to three effects: (1) discrimination against the obese; (2) absenteeism and early retirement, (3) 
lesser productivity due to negative feedbacks of disease with education and/or physical strength.  
Higher incomes are social goods as well as personal goods, both in term of tax revenues and 
increased capacity to purchase products. Notice however that income levels is again a zero-sum 
game for societies (at least generally): if lean a is chosen for a high-paid job rather than overweight 
b, the effect for society of a’s higher income levels is null. If a and b belong to two different 
countries, there is indeed an advantage to a’s country, but again the aggregate international effect 
might be neutral or positive depending on distributive effects, which here I simply assume are 
neutral. 
The issue of lifetime earnings will be tackled again in chapter 5 dedicated to social health 
inequalities: smaller earnings in disadvantaged people are indeed morally significant. Yet there is 
no personal duty to earn as much as possible: earning more is often associated with somebody 
else’s earning less and, if not in conditions of extreme necessity as depicted before, by earning less 
no injustice is made. 
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3.1.4 There is no duty to be as productive as possible 
 
In the last two sections, I have shown that there are no duties to be healthy on the base of 
productivity considerations, a fortiori public authorities cannot intervene on these bases. Having 
discarded these forms of “conscription”, let us have a look on whether public authorities can 
improve productivity for different reasons that have nothing to do with duties. 
A non-intrusive campaign – for instance the delivery of reliable nutritional guidelines to the 
population, might have the effect of increasing personal and aggregate productivity: this counts in 
favor of the policy. The direct objective of the measure is beneficent and removes a cause of 
socially inefficient choices: lack of awareness95. Yet the policy is recommendable also because the 
impact on GDP of chronic disease due to loss of productivity is high (estimates range from 1% to 
8% in different countries, according to Sassi 2010): notice that no restrictive policy can be based on 
this argument, but yet the result cannot be plausibly considered a drawback of any food policy. In 
general, these policies do not count as enforcement of a duty but as improvement of personal 
condition, as in the case of schooling and the social investments in human capital. 
Even stronger measures can be justifiable on grounds of efficiency: when the individual effect of 
an action is small (indeed, negligible) but the aggregate result at the population level is harmful, 
incentives to change behavior can be morally appropriate. If aggregate societal losses are high, than 
it might be reasonable to channel some resources to introduce positive incentives (e.g. reduction of 
taxes on certain healthy products), i.e. if the expected return is higher. Again, simple utilitarian 
considerations recommend these policies. 
Although individual contribution is small, if the aggregate effect is socially harmful, public 
authorities may want to introduce incentives for behavior-change. The efficiency reasoning belong 
to two categories: they are dependent either by the mismatch between individual and social costs of 
unhealthy eating (e.g. moral hazards) or by the kind of coordination required in collective-action 
problems, where nobody alone could make a difference and somebody else could always substitute 
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every individual action. I discuss more at length the second idea in section 3.2 since it is formally 
identical in the case of health expenses. The pragmatic solution to the puzzle of collective action 
deserves instead a brief comment. 
Although the fact that personal choices alone cannot make any difference excludes that there are 
personal duties attached to productivity-affecting behaviors, public authorities are legitimate to act 
on the bases of beneficent purposes if the stakes are very high. They would not be enforcing a duty 
but, rather, promoting social goods. What this argument can justify is however little: if the purpose 
is generally beneficent, mandatory programs are not justified. Notice that this is more than a 
thought experiment. China capital city Beijing re-introduced compulsory calisthenics for workers 
in 2010: at 10 am and 3 pm radios are transmitting exercise music as a measure of public health 
due to the growing costs of loss of productivity associated with obesity (according to Sassi (2010), 
China is the most affected country in this respect). This measure is however quite intrusive and the 
beneficent argument cannot go thus far. 
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3.2 The cost of diseases and the varieties of appeals to personal responsibility for health 
 
Albert Hirschmann (1991), in his contribution on the rhetoric of reaction, has singled out a dialectic 
pattern that emerges here and there in the conservative arguments against universal welfare 
regimes: by providing public resources to the needy, the result will simply be their increase in 
number. According to this conservative argument, welfare services disincentive personal 
responsibility, pushing the worse-off in poverty traps and attracting newcomers to the welfare 
“rents” paid by the conscientious efforts of the others. In the words of Hirschmann, welfare 
regimes are thought to be self-defeating by the conservatives. This argument dates back to 
Ricardo’s discussion of the English poor laws, and re-surface from time to time against the modern 
welfare state (Barry 1997), notably in Murray (1984).  
The debunking of this argument in the case of nutrition requires three steps: the distinction between 
a right-based and a broadly utilitarian version of the argument (in this section), the philosophical 
critique of the right-based version (section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) and the empirical analysis of whether or 
not the utilitarian version of self-defection applies to our case (3.2.4).  
The structure of this chapter mirrors my previous treatment of antipaternalism: this is not surprising 
because I already observed that an underlying theme of this work is the preferential treatment of 
philosophical issues in term of good and bads. As in the previous case, the pars destruens (3.2.2 
and 3.2.3) will be conducted at a general level against theories of justice that may seem relevant for 
these issues whereas the pars construens (3.2.4) is more specific to food policy and concentrates on 
goods and bads of health policies against food lifestyles. 
There are two readings of the argument from self-defection and indeed two main divergent 
understandings of what “responsibility for personal health” entails96. The first reading is based on 
distributive theories centered on the moral importance of efforts, deserts and/or personal 
responsibility: people that do not take care of their health forgo existing welfare entitlements or 
anyway cannot be treated equally to those who instead look after their well being more accurately. 
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reduced to these main kinds. 
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The second reading is instead a pure consideration regarding efficiency: given human 
psychological tendencies, providing health care to everybody independently from efforts to be 
healthy might be unsustainably costly because some or most people will exploit the opportunity to 
externalize costs and behave irresponsibly.  
If I am correct, there is no defensible understanding of the first reading (I discuss two version of 
this argument, respectively in the next section and in the following), while the second reading is 
based on uncontroversial moral principles but do not apply to the case of nutrition. Remember what 
will be the result of this line of thought: I will have proved that there is no harm to others in being 
more expensive to public services, i.e. the harm generated by unduly drawing their resources 
because of unhealthy personal choices. Still public authorities can improve the design of the 
structure of incentives and disincentives to avoid societal losses: the foundation of the policy will 
be outright welfarist rather than justice-based.  
The latter thesis has practical importance, since it suggests how to approach the design of 
appropriate disincentives on the bases of the cost of lifestyle diseases. The purpose of incentives 
cannot be to make unhealthy eaters pay what they owe to the public services and to their fellow 
citizens. Rather, the purpose of disincentives will be to avoid that the number of unhealthy eaters 
increases as a result of the existence of public health services. While the argument for intervention 
is morally appropriate in this form, I put forward some cautionary remarks as for whether it applies 
to food policy: evidence of effects on the prevalence of unhealthy lifestyles of public health 
services is scant. 
 
3.2.1 What (if anything) can justify cutting in expenses 
 
Before starting the philosophical discussion, I hasten to present a cautionary remark regarding 
costs. A common refrain of the chapter will be the social goodness of decreases in health costs. 
This seems uncontroversial but in fact the uncontroversial version of the thesis is the following 
disputable and arguably false common-place: spending less to achieve the same results is always 
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better. That this is disputable is most easily seen from this uncontroversial equation: someone’s 
expense (and a fortiori public expenditure) is always somebody else’s income. By substitution, the 
common-place becomes: paying somebody less or less people to achieve the same results is always 
better. This is not disputable: it is clearly false. 
In the specific case of health, the health system is an important sector of any advanced economy, 
which contributes to national income and well being independently from the provision of health 
services. For instance, 9.3% of GDP can be attributed to health expenses in Italy according to the 
figures for 2010 of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. There are people 
directly employed in the health care and a vast number of industries gravitating around its 
provision, down to biomedical research and development. Also, the health sector employs highly 
specialized people, involves the development of high-technology enterprises (i.e. biomedical 
industries) and includes services that are not easily de-localizable: for all these reasons, the claim 
that health expenses ought to decrease must be always taken with a grain of salt. Resources are 
scarce but this does not mean that health care is a bad allocation of those scarce resources. 
Decreased expenditures are morally recommendable only under very specific conditions regarding 
who pays, who gets paid, and the nature of the service or good that is being exchanged. For 
instance, the same population health outcome can be achieved by the health system with less 
expenses in case less people get sick (i.e. the burden of disease decreases) and nothing else change 
(i.e. technology is fixed). Given the human suffering involved in disease, the gain normally offsets 
most losses of income in these cases. In other words, nobody would argue that it is good to keep a 
decent level of incidence of disease in order to rescue the health sector.  
Also, if income is generated for powerful drug companies and expense is paid by poor tax-payers, 
distributive considerations might recommend or indeed require decreasing health expenses, 
although a different fiscal arrangement would achieve the same purpose as well.  
Moreover, if there are competing societal goods that could be financed only if health expense 
decreases and if the gain from these goods is superior then any loss due to lost income in the health 
sector, then decreasing health expense is a social good: this is required by allocative efficiency 
alone rather than because shrinking costs as such are morally recommendable. 
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For the purpose of this thesis, I will simply assume that these conditions are met: a decrease in 
health expenses due to a reduced burden of disease is overall good (net of losses of income), the 
distributive effect of a decrease in health expenses is either neutral or positive, and there are 
morally recommendable alternative employments for resources that are spared by preventing 
lifestyle diseases, included allocations in other programs of the health sector. In this sense - and 
only in this sense - health costs due to unhealthy behaviors are social bads. 
It is also important to highlight what instead I am not saying. The sustainability of public budgets is 
sometimes mentioned as a rationale for the thesis that health expenses should decrease. Given the 
epidemiological tendencies toward a higher prevalence of costly chronic diseases due to lifestyles 
and aging populations and the technology-rich nature of most biomedical innovation, we have 
spent, we are spending and/or we will spend too much. In other words, health expenses – be it 
public or, in some cases, private - are unsustainable. This is not what I am saying by claiming that 
health costs should be contained and that the cost of lifestyle diseases is one key political 
justification for preventive measures. Whether or not budgets are sustainable depends again on the 
structure of incomes and expenses: who gains, who pays (in case of public budgets: how public 
expense is financed) and the nature of services and goods that are exchanged. It is not in general 
true that sustainability of budgets requires the containment of expenses. In the case of personal 
budgets, investments (i.e. increased expenses) might improve sustainability in the long term, i.e. in 
the case of education and resulting higher incomes associated with better jobs. In the case of public 
budgets, tax revenues are not independent from public expenditures and indeed there are competing 
models in political economics about their relationship, ranging from liberal orthodoxy that expects 
quite generally a negative correlation97 to post-Keynesianism that predicts positive correlation, and 
uncontroversially so in case of economic recession and for certain sectors of public spending98. 
Certainly, the effect of decreasing public expenses on sustainability of public budgets is a debated 
topic in contemporary political economics, with on-going revisions of the common wisdom. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Alesina and Ardagna (2010) for a general argument in favor of the liberal orthodoxy regarding the 
issue. They offer a theoretical model in which by cutting public expenses, tax revenues increases because 
investments increases under the prediction that tax rates will decrease after cuttings. Their theory is called 
“expansionary austerity”. 
98 Stuckler and Basu (2013) develop at length this idea with a focus on health spending, which has – 
according to their analyses – among the highest return.  
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the liberal model was common in policy guidelines from international financial institutions, new 
data following the implementation of austerity policies are forcing to amend previous estimates of 
the effects of budget cuttings99.  
What I am saying in this chapter is independent from the solution of this riddle that will turn out to 
be correct in any single circumstance. When I speak of viability of the health system or the problem 
of health costs, I will be uncommitted to the particular version of these concerns that stems from 
contemporary preoccupations with the sustainability of public budgets. I will simply assume that 
there are overall better ways of using resources, either privately or publicly, than curing lifestyle-
dependent chronic disease and/or that the decrease of costs depends on a lesser burden of disease, 
which I assume to be a so substantial gain in well being to trump the potential negative effects of 
decreased incomes in the utilitarian calculus. Notice that if the liberal orthodox model relating 
public spending and their sustainability is correct, there will be a further argument in favor of 
decreasing expense in countries where health care is public. If not, still there are general 
conditional reasons to look at efficiency, reasons that are unrelated to financial sustainability 
strictly conceived. If indeed “efficiency” means simply “better ways of spending resources” (as it 
should), then efficiency is an entirely uncontroversial value. Still we ought not to smuggle into the 
concept of efficiency morally disputable claims about the sustainability of public budgets. 
 
3.2.2 Responsibility and justice: desert based theories 
 
Desert based distributive theories generally include the claim that people should be rewarded for 
their efforts, i.e. that their resources and/or well being should match how much they are talented 
and/or work hard (Daniels 1978). The argument in the case of lifestyle and health goes in this way: 
it is unjust that those who take care of their health and those who instead conduct unhealthy habits 
pay (and receive) the same to (from) the health system. The reasons why this is unjust depends on 
whether the theory is resourcist, i.e. personal resources for welfare should match personal efforts, 
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their recent revisions. In chapter 4 of Stuckler and Basu (2013) there is a general introductory discussion of 
the issue. 
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or welfarist, i.e. personal well being should match personal efforts100. In the first case, resources are 
not allocated according to efforts because they are given equally to those who take care of 
themselves and those who do not, while in the second case, the resources that are provided interfere 
with inequalities in well being that tend to be morally appropriate if left alone (e.g. unhealthy-
living people would pay for their care thus decreasing their welfare). 
Notice that the welfarist version of the theory is not as harsh as it may seem: it does not entail that 
people deserve to get a severe disease if they are reckless, only that they should pay for their care 
and forgo other opportunities for well being if they do. If they cannot pay, there could be non 
desert-based reasons to provide health care, e.g. compassionate reasons, or even desert-based 
reasons, if we maintain - as we should - that nobody deserves to be sick. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I will keep the two versions together and criticize them independently from the “harshness 
critique”: the main objection centers on the very notion of effort and its application to unhealthy 
behaviors, which appears in both versions. The objection shows that efforts and desert cannot make 
the moral work they are supposed to do in desert based theories, at least in the case of health 
behaviors. 
Consider the well-known empirical correlation between early child-bearing and incidence of breast 
cancer101: women who conceive earlier in their life have significantly reduced chances of getting 
breast-cancer (Kobayashi et al. 2012). Yet we would not say that early child-bearing is an 
appropriate effort that ought to be rewarded. Moreover, we would not say that, by postponing 
pregnancies, women are behaving recklessly and should pay if a breast cancer occurs: women do 
not forgo their welfare entitlements if they decide to post-pone pregnancies or not to give birth at 
all. Yet why should this be so in desert based theories? After all these women are not acting as they 
should in order to prevent a serious disease, and those instead who carefully got pregnant earlier on 
might have forgone other valuable life opportunities doing so. If the desertist finds this conclusion 
implausible – as indeed he should - he must explain why it is so. Which is the relevant difference, 
in their theory, between postponing pregnancies and eating too much fat?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Here as in the following I will not enter in the debate regarding the appropriate focus of distributive 
justice (Sen 1979, Cohen 1989, Daniels 1990). In particular, I will not distinguish between a focus on 
resources and a focus on well being: as far as I can see, that distinction is not crucial for the purposes of this 
work. 
101 I elaborate an argument described in Wilkinson (1999) for the case of tobacco prevention.	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The difference-makers must be something different from “efforts” to be healthy, i.e. acting 
according to health guidelines even at some cost. It seems that there is some moralizing judgment 
that falls upon unhealthy eating but not upon avoiding or postponing pregnancies that is doing 
some work beyond the stage of the desertist verdict. For instance, the social perceptions of the two 
activities might be such that the first is considered inappropriate while the second is deemed to be 
respectable102. Is there any reason to believe that the social perceptions are morally appropriate? 
After all, the most common complaint about unhealthy eaters is that they are costly: but this applies 
to postponing pregnancy as well, so it cannot count as vindication of the asymmetric social 
perception. Healthy nutrition as appropriate effort that deserves rewards seems to depend on 
moralizing relics of a worldview that condemn gluttony: rather than a desert-based theory, the 
targeting of unhealthy eating seems to rely on a sin-based conception of personal duties. 
A possible reply of the desertist is the following: while there are indeed pro tanto reasons to claim 
that by postponing pregnancy, women act recklessly and so they forgo some entitlements to 
resources for care, there are independent reasons to protect women reproductive choices, e.g. on the 
bases of the centrality of reproductive choices for personal liberty. So, an all-considered judgment 
can rescue desertism from its implausible consequence, since it gives only a weak pro-tanto weight 
to recklessness. While perhaps this strategy works to rescue the claim that desert-based theory do 
capture some moral relevant facts, the price is at the end that desert-based considerations are 
always revisable taking into account broader issues, which at the end is what we were claiming: 
desertism is not an appropriate theory to discuss personal distributive entitlements. The pretense of 
the desertist was to extract a theory starting from morally relevant facts regarding deserts: yet to 
make it plausible it must either to take on board several other facts unrelated to efforts (e.g. facts 
regarding the social desirability of certain activities), or put theoretical restrictions on the concept 
of desert making the theory less than intuitively appealing. 
This is also what is shown by the famous “fireman” counter-example: what is the difference 
between a fireman who do not protect adequately his life to save somebody’s life and a rock-
climber that puts his life at risk to challenge previous achievements of his fellows? The response 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Also, it is richer women that gives birth later – and people may tend to judge differently (arbitrarily so) 
risks that are taken by rich and poorer people. 
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that some higher compensation in case of accident is due to the first is morally correct – I think 
nobody disagrees - but it does not depend on efforts at all. Rather, it depends on considerations 
regarding appropriate ways to create certain social goods, e.g. incentivizing dangerous but useful 
jobs like firemen. What is good, praiseworthy, etc. does not depend on independent facts about 
desert but on reasons regarding the social goods that we want to achieve by praising something as 
good, deserved, etc. Perhaps we can decide that unhealthy eating should be targeted by 
disincentives, but this cannot be due to considerations based on desert-based allocations, since 
there is no fact of the matter that explains the latter notion.  
Eventually, one might reply that there is a similar theory which entails the same consequences but 
does not mention efforts, only costs. Acting to be healthy (e.g. jogging) is a cost to many 
individuals, and if this is not taken into account in payments for health services, some healthy-
living people will simply pay twice for the same service while there is no morally relevant 
difference to justify different costs. This is unfair. 
The objection to this version of the theory is that it seems to depend on disputable personal 
conceptions of well being that keep in high esteem binge-drinking and/or sedentary activities: only 
this assumption justifies the claim that healthy activities are always a considerable cost to 
individuals. Yet there are many people who enjoy being abstemious and being physically active: 
for those, the double-counting objection does not seem to work. Perhaps, it works only for healthy-
living people who actually enjoy unhealthy activities, yet it is unclear why in this case their 
behavior cannot be taken at face value as genuine expression of their preferences.  
The issue of double cost is however serious, but its moral relevance does not depend on 
considerations regarding fairness. The idea is that tax-payers contributing to health care systems are 
participating to an insurance schema that will cover unexpected catastrophic costs. Yet there is an 
asymmetry of information here, unhealthy living people do know that their chance to get sick are 
higher, and yet pay the same: this might render the system unsustainable in some particular 
119	  
	  
cases103. This is again a consideration regarding efficiency however, according to my general 
thesis. 
 
3.2.3 Responsibility and justice: luck-egalitarianism  
 
Historically, luck-egalitarianism is a theory of distributive justice that unfolds a small comment of 
Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971): any inequality which is due to external circumstances rather 
than personal choices is morally arbitrary. That is, if we assume that inequalities require 
justifications, un-chosen circumstances cannot provide any. Notice the key difference with desert-
based theorists: luck-egalitarians do not focus on proportionality between personal choices and 
outcomes, either in resources or wellbeing. Cases where two people are equally well-off, one 
because made good choices, the other for pure fortune, are beyond the scope of the theory: i.e. the 
difference is not morally relevant for luck-egalitarians. Luck-egalitarianism is an egalitarian theory 
in a strict sense: it assumes equality as the benchmark and maintains that any other distributive 
patterns require moral justification. 
Also luck-egalitarians debate on whether the appropriate focus of distributive justice should be on 
resources, welfare or opportunities for welfare (Dworkin 1981, Arneson 1989, Cohen 1989). 
However, they all agree at least on the following proposition: 
 
(LE) if somebody is worse-off (or master less resources, etc.) than others for reasons that are 
unrelated to his own choices, then he must be compensated on grounds of justice (Barry 2001). 
 
 There could be cases in which people ought to be compensated for their condition even if a 
personal choice explains it, but at least inequalities due to un-chosen circumstances are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See supra section 3.2 
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unacceptable for luck-egalitarians, because un-chosen circumstances, background conditions, 
natural differences, etc. are morally arbitrary. 
The family of luck-egalitarian theories collects a basic intuition of desert-based theory of 
distributive justice, namely that personal responsibility, efforts, desert, etc. weigh morally, and 
apply a quasi-corollary, namely that bad luck does not weigh morally (since it excludes personal 
responsibility), to a broad class of inequalities, encompassing even “natural” misfortunes that were 
previously expunged from distributive considerations.  
Although the talents that are endowed upon people are sometimes pure natural phenomena, i.e. 
nobody is causally involved in their outset, still injustice can occur in these cases for luck-
egalitarians if ensuing inequalities are not remedied, i.e. by denying misfortunate individuals what 
is due to them. This is not the position of other theorists of justice (e.g. Rawls 1971): differences in 
natural talents are perhaps bad but never unjust, only differences that are under social control can 
grounds duties of justice because duties of justice rule the structure of social cooperation and 
nothing else. 
The distinction that was made by Parfit (1984) between telic and deontic egalitarianism is quite 
helpful in tracking the latter divergence. Telic egalitarians focus on inequalities whatever their 
origin, and indeed even in cases of inequalities of people belonging to different societies, countries 
and even ages. Deontic egalitarians are instead interested in the ways in which inequalities are 
brought about in the societal intercourses between persons, i.e. whether inequalities are unjust 
depends on whether there were unrightfully determined. Luck-egalitarianism belongs to telic 
theories since luck-egalitarianism does not put any restriction on the scope of the theory, i.e. the 
causal relationships occurring between the subjects whose inequalities are under discussion does 
not matter.  A moderate version that we can keep in mind is that of Dworkin (2011): natural 
inequalities can be unjust, namely when they could be remedied and they are not. This is deontic 
and avoids unpalatable claims about individuals that are causally independent; still it retains the 
rejection of the natural vs. social distinction which is typical of other luck-egalitarian theories. 
The moral recommendations of luck-egalitarianism are generally thought to be politically 
progressive: Dworkin (2011) argues that the theory was explicitly designed to employ a basic 
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conservative intuition about responsibility to claim for vast re-distributive programs and foster 
social and economic equality. Yet some features of the theory can be employed in rather different 
way by denying compensation to those who have been imprudent or put at risk their well being: 
this is because bad choices in a vast number of fields are more frequent among the socially 
disadvantaged. This is also why the theory is relevant for discussing lifestyle diseases and public 
health policy. 
For instance, it has been argued that luck-egalitarianism singles out at least a pro-tanto reason to 
de-prioritize patients in transplant waiting list if their condition is due to their lifestyle (Segall 
2009).  More generally, luck-egalitarianism has been proposed as the foundation of a “liberal 
egalitarian” approach to public health (Cappelen and Norrheim 2005, Buyx 2007), i.e. public health 
systems should take into account personal responsibility for health in the allocation of resources for 
reasons of justice. While the second claim is the proposition that I will attack in this section, it is 
worthy to spend some words on the first issue, transplants, to understand what is at stake here (and 
for completeness, since the issue is indeed frequently addressed discussing the ethics of health 
policy and lifestyle diseases).  
 
3.2.3a Luck, choice and scarce vital resources 
 
Transplantations are very scarce resources: demand far outweighs the raw material which is 
available. Which factors are morally relevant for setting up a transplantation waiting list? This 
question is as difficult as any other moral question can be: it involves dramatic consequences and 
requires subtle reasoning regarding which lives are worth-saving. If the question is put in this form, 
it should be clear why any criterion which takes into account responsibility is very problematic: 
nobody after all would say that people who willingly damaged their health are not worth-saving. 
Yet this is exactly what luck-egalitarians, if pressed, must admit: this would require ample 
revisions of common medical practices because – things standing - the majority of waiting lists are 
responsibility-independent. It does not matter if you are the responsible of the accident that nearly 
killed a passerby: both you and the passerby will receive the same amount of care. This is wise for 
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a series of reasons, not the last because hospitals are not courts and they should not be for reasons 
of efficiency (i.e. speed in intervention). 
The case of lifestyle diseases in transplant are in one sense more complicated: people with a health 
condition due to unhealthy habits might have a lessened life-expectancy than homologous patient 
whose condition is due to chance for clinical reasons, e.g. their overall clinical condition is worse 
because they have multiple damages to different organs. In this case, the first might be de-
prioritized in waiting lists on utilitarian grounds (e.g. maximizing aggregate utility) under the 
common assumptions that years of life, or quality-adjusted years of life (QALY), are a good proxy 
of utility and that the latter approximate crucial social goals. Though this does not regard directly 
the argument that I am making here, I mention that this is not as nearly as unproblematic as it may 
seem: it involves controversial judgments on which life are worth saving, for instance those that are 
longer and with less suffering overall. It also depends on the claim that people would prefer a 
shorter but healthy life then a longer but disease-burdened life and permits inter-personal trade-offs 
between persons. This might be correct in some cases but it is not necessarily so always, and so it is 
disputable as an allocative criterion which should capture what is best for society (Harris 1987). 
Responsibility-sensitive list would by-pass entirely these quandaries and just de-prioritize patients 
with unhealthy lifestyles. 
 
3.2.3b The anti-egalitarianism of luck-egalitarianism 
 
Although responsibility-sensitive public health is explicitly associated with luck-egalitarianism in 
the literature, there is a logical step from that theory to the practical principles of making people 
pay for their self-inflicted health condition and/or de-prioritize them in the use of scarce resources. 
The theory simply states that un-chosen circumstances do not justify inequalities, yet it is silent on 
the fate of inequalities which instead are due to personal choices.  It is thus incorrect to argue that: 
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As for inequalities resulting from freely chosen behavior, such as lifestyle choices or risky behavior (so-
called ‘‘option luck’’), these do not warrant compensation and individuals should have to buy private 
insurance against possible resulting negative consequences [under LE, mine]. In this theory, personal 
responsibility is one of the most important criteria for allocation in medicine. A public healthcare system 
need compensate only for treatment of conditions that do not result from chosen behavior. (Buyx 2008, 
p.872) 
 
The logical step to Buyx’s conclusion depends on the claim that the distributive criterion LE of 
luck-egalitarianism is a self-standing political principle that exhausts the scope of distributive 
justice – a further axiom that many luck-egalitarians would indeed introduce. Now, consider the 
consequence of the conjunction of the latter assumption with LE in the case of lifestyle diseases: 
perhaps there are beneficent reasons to help those who fall prey of some health condition because 
of their choices, yet welfare compensation is not due to them as a matter of justice. Yet duties of 
beneficence are generally supererogatory, they are not enforceable through fiscal systems and the 
power of state. 
The application of LE to our case study is thus the following: nobody ought to be forced to pay for 
welfare compensations to somebody whose welfare losses are attributable to bad choices. It is a 
duty to pay for fulfilling requirements of justice, yet forced beneficence is illegitimate104. To 
correct this distortion to luck-egalitarian justice where there is a public health system in place, we 
may want to increase costs of unhealthy activities so individuals who are responsible of their 
disease will not extract illegitimately resources from others. Notice that if there is a non subsidized 
health system (e.g. all services are paid by consumers and their private insurances), there is no 
distortion of this kind. The luck-egalitarian would however hasten to notice that a non subsidized 
health system is highly unjust: people will face alone the consequences of pure luck within that 
system. Luck-egalitarianism will thus recommend a subsidized health system with responsibility-
corrections as a general philosophy of just health systems. 
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The main problem for luck egalitarians that would like to apply their theory to health issues are the 
embarrassing anti-egalitarian consequences of their principle of distribution: those who are denied 
services under LE belong disproportionately to socially disadvantaged groups. This is exactly what 
the literature of social inequalities in health behaviors shows. Bad and outright reckless choices are 
systematically more common among the poor, in health as in other fields (Anandi et al. 2013) 
Luck-egalitarian theorists might bite the bullet and accept this consequence, thus jeopardizing the 
egalitarian credentials of their theory. A more common move will be to deny that lifestyles are 
really due to choice in case of social determination: disadvantaged people are not responsible for 
their unhealthy choices (e.g. Roemer 1993, Brown 2013). 
This should be a familiar move by now: it mirrors the deontological antipaternalist retreat to soft-
paternalism in cases where choices are clearly bad for personal welfare. There is a conceptual 
kinship between the distinction soft-hard paternalism and the distinction that grounds luck-
egalitarianism, i.e. choice vs. circumstances. In both cases, it matters morally whether a certain act 
is a genuine autonomous choice or whether it is somehow defectively so. In the first case, the 
antipaternalist argues for inviolability and the luck-egalitarians attributes responsibility, while in 
the second case the antipaternalist retreats protection whilst the luck-egalitarian attributes 
consequences to luck.  
In this section, I will argue against the luck-egalitarians on the bases of this fundamental thesis that 
he shares with deontologist: that autonomy is a morally important phenomenon that makes weighty 
moral difference respectively, in distributive justice as much as in legitimacy of interference. 
Autonomy is indeed very important, but there are no simple facts out there that we can use for 
moral judgments: these facts are generally not independent from our underlying normative 
assessment of the situation. 
In particular, I attack the move of denying autonomy in cases of (social) determination of health 
behaviors. In most cases, this thesis is incomprehensible or plainly wrong: it relies on a theory of 
what autonomy is which is incompatible with the laws of nature or, when it is not - it does not 
entail that people are less then autonomous in the case of bad health choices due to social structure. 
Luck-egalitarians must accept the embarrassing consequence of their theory in case of social 
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inequalities in health behaviors, thus giving up the egalitarian nature of their theory. A better option 
would be doing away with the theory altogether - as I will argue in the next chapter. 
In the following, I move a series of objection to luck-egalitarianism, starting from some general 
problems down to the issue of social inequalities in health behaviors. Toward the end, I will argue 
that whatever its merits, luck-egalitarianism cannot be a reconstruction of the purposes of 
egalitarian policies (Anderson 1999, Scheffler 2005) and a fortiori luck-egalitarianism cannot be 
the correct reconstruction of liberal-egalitarian health systems, as proposed by Buyx (2008).  
Imprudent fireman 
 
The argument that I employed above (section 3.2.2) to show that desert-based theories must resort 
to external standards of social goodness to suspend responsibility for welfare in cases like the 
dangerous but socially beneficent behavior of firemen shows even in the case of luck-
egalitarianism that the autonomous nature of choice cannot be all that matter to their distributive 
proposal (LE).  
Segall (2009) has proposed to substitute “reasonable avoidability” to “autonomous choice” as 
analysis of responsibility to save the phenomena within luck-egalitarianism. For instance, it is not 
reasonably avoidable to be fireman, since it is highly undesirable that nobody does it. Even if it 
works, this is mere re-labeling, and do not disprove our point: the luck-egalitarians cannot look out 
there and decide about distributive just patterns simply looking at the autonomous nature of 
personal choices. Reasonableness, in “reasonable avoidability”, includes considerations regarding 
facts that are unrelated to the distinction choice-circumstance. For instance, it includes judgments 
about the social desirability of there being firemen. This is of course compatible with luck-
egalitarianism, since the latter is just a theory about the moral irrelevance of external circumstance, 
but yet the theory becomes much more complex than previously imagined and cannot claim 
intuitive appeal, let alone “collecting the intuition of the conservatives for progressive purposes” 
(Scheffler 2005). 
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Abandonment of the imprudent 
 
Luck-egalitarianisms seems to entail that people who are reckless or imprudent should not be 
compensated for their lesser welfare, yet this is harsh in cases where the suffering is severe, as in 
the case of diseases. In this case, the objection is more convincing than in the case of desert-based 
theories: the luck-egalitarian is not interested in matching well being and responsibility, so he 
cannot argue that it is morally relevant for his theory that nobody deserves to get sick.  
Rather, he must employ non luck-egalitarian considerations to grant care to the imprudent. This 
however shows that luck-egalitarianism, if it is relevant at all, is just one of the many distributive 
principles that ought to be taken into account when deciding allocations. Also, luck-egalitarian 
recommendations can be turned down whenever other principles command differently (Scheffler 
2005). Whether or not bad health is due to choices (i.e. voluntary autonomous acts) is perhaps one 
among other considerations that we may want to employ in distributive discussions, but the moral 
weight of these facts is hardly unique. Certainly, it is not the case that individuals forgo their 
welfare entitlements simply because their choices were bad: a purely luck-egalitarian allocative 
theory has little to recommend in its favor, so it is a weak base to ground a “liberal egalitarian” 
public health. 
 
Socially-determined autonomous choice is not an oxymoron 
 
So far I have argued that the autonomous nature of a choice is hardly a morally unique fact as far as 
allocative decisions are concerned. Here I will argue that this alleged fact is not nearly as 
uncontroversial as it is imagined.  
The distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous choices is itself drawn, where the 
drawing is possible at all, starting from further prescriptive considerations. The question “is x 
responsible for its choice y?” is not conceptually independent from the question “is y an 
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autonomous choice of x?” This was explained in section 2.1.1 starting from compatibilism: there is 
no sui generis phenomenon as x’s choices that can serve as a benchmark for judgments of 
autonomy. First, dependency on external factors or determination does not exclude autonomy. 
Second, the distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous choices is de facto made 
resorting to moral considerations. Let us study these point is turn. 
Consider the case of social inequalities in unhealthy behaviors. Which mechanisms do explain the 
recurrent pattern of increased incidence among poorer people? The question is surprisingly little 
studied, yet Pampel (2010) in a review has listed self-medication to stress and heavier discount of 
long term benefits among the most likely reasons why socially disadvantaged people “indulge” in 
unhealthy behaviors. But do these mechanisms exclude autonomy and thus ground that “flight for 
autonomy” that would rescue luck-egalitarians from the implausible consequence of their theory 
applied to health inequalities? 
In the case of self-medication, the behavior looks like an appropriate rational response to adverse 
situations. Levels of stress due to poor working and housing condition and financial strains can be 
addressed by recurring to short-term reliefs (e.g. alcohol consumption) when better options are not 
available. This is certainly worrisome but it is as autonomous as it can be. If our intuition in case of 
disease resulting from this predicament is that the person was not forgoing his entitlements by 
living unhealthily, this must depend on the moral problems associated with the underlying adverse 
conditions rather than the fact that the choices were not fully autonomous: indeed, they were.  
The same could be repeated for heavy discount of future losses and/or benefits: independently from 
unhealthy lifestyles, poorer people do expect to live less and their earnings are anyway smaller. 
Discounting future harms very heavily is fully rational if this is so: unhealthy lifestyle, again, are 
chosen. More precisely, the bare fact of socio-economic determination is not sufficient to exclude 
responsibility.  
Anandi et al (2013) provided the most recent experimental evidence that poverty impairs cognitive 
functioning: this might explain why choices are worse among the poor. The underlying model that 
they propose is utterly simple: 
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The poor must manage sporadic income, juggle expenses, and make difficult trade-offs. Even when not 
actually making a financial decision, these preoccupations can be present and distracting. The human 
cognitive system has limited capacity. Preoccupations with pressing budgetary concerns leave fewer 
cognitive resources available to guide choice and action (Anandi et al 2013, pg. 976) 
 
What is crucial here is that one cannot conclude from the truth of this model (if it is indeed true) to 
the non autonomous nature of the poor choices:  cognitive impairment due to stress and limited 
cognitive capacity are a common phenomenon, indeed universal, which is simply more frequent 
among the poor given their dire circumstances. Nobody would say that my bad financial choices 
were non-autonomous because I had just finished a demanding chess game: this is a reason why 
they were bad that does not impinge on their autonomous nature. 
More generally, if in cases of social determination we believe that the moral appropriate response is 
not the denial of compensation, this cannot depend on facts about the non-autonomous nature of 
socially determined choices. Luck-egalitarians must eventually decide either to accept moral 
consequences that are incompatible with deep-seated egalitarian intuitions (i.e. social determination 
of health is worrisome) or to distort the concept of autonomy (e.g. in order to deny that social 
determination is compatible with voluntariness) until it becomes obscure and unrelated with our 
common judgments about it.  
Furthermore, if compatibilism about free will is correct, that obscure notion does not possibly 
single out any real phenomenon: no choice is autonomous if it requires sui generis causal powers of 
the will (e.g. full control). While some luck-egalitarians may want to accept this conclusion and 
conclude that no inequality is justified, it remains unclear why a moral theory relying on a 
distinction which never applies to the world as we know and as it is can be true. This would be the 
ultimate vindication of the progressive employment of the theory, but the vindication is hardly 
viable for those who retain intuitions about responsibility since it amounts to argue that the set of 
autonomous choices is empty. 
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Naturally, there could be other ways of arguing that the health behaviors of socially disadvantaged 
people are not appropriately autonomous, for instance recurring to more sophisticated theories of 
responsibility. This is very natural: once we understand there is no sui-generis free-will, we would 
like to know when we can still apply the concept of autonomy and when we cannot. 
Here I mention just the proposal due to Rebecca Brown (2013) that relies on the theory of freedom 
as “fitness to be held responsible” by Philip Petitt (2001). In Petitt, people are fit to be held 
responsible only if the circumstances of their choices are compatible with the following aspects of 
freedom: 
 
1. ‘the freedom of an action performed by an agent on this or that occasion,’ 
2. ‘the freedom of the self implicit in the agent’s ability to identify with the things thereby done, rather than 
having to look on them as a bystander,’ 
3. ‘the freedom of the person involved in enjoying a social status that makes the action truly theirs, not an 
action produced under pressure from others.’ 
 
Brown (2013) argues that the evidence regarding the unconscious nature of most food choices and 
their dependency on environmental clues is incompatible with the requirement (2) and that social 
determination of health behaviors is incompatible with requirements (3). Yet this cannot be what 
Pettit had in mind with his theory, simply because it would entail that people are never fit to be 
responsible. I already explained above what is the flaw of the horn of Brown’s claim pertaining 
social determination. Also, in section 2.3.2 I conducted an extensive discussion on why behavioral 
and psychological evidence regarding food choices does not show that people are not in control of 
their choices but only that these choices are often very bad. The same discussion proves here that 
food choices are not, in general, cases where people observe their action “as bystanders”, as in the 
elegant formulation of Pettit. Even Pettit’s theory cannot be used to rescue luck-egalitarianism from 
its non-egalitarian consequences. The theory cannot be so rescued simply because disadvantaged 
people are usually in full control of their life. 
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Brown’s conclusion, however, are entirely compatible with mine: 
 
We might have other reasons for punishing bad behavior, or for introducing more of a role for personal 
responsibility into healthcare: it may be more economically efficient, or it might help preserve the view of 
ourselves as autonomous individuals in control of our own lives. However, unless we consider a form of as-if 
responsibility, and not the more substantive merit-based form, this will require agents to have sufficient 
freedom in order to be fit to be held responsible. (Brown 2013, pg. 4) 
 
Although in this case the practical consequences of the two approaches (e.g. upholding 
responsibility-sensitive theories and denying autonomy vs. upholding autonomy and dropping 
responsibility-sensitive theory) are overlapping, the discussion conducted so far is crucial to the 
general purpose of this thesis of discussing principles that are in general relevant for public health 
fighting unhealthy behaviors. Responsibility-sensitive theories are a key pillar of an influential 
approach to public health that I will try to debunk in the next chapter. While in this specific case 
the practical consequences of the theory may seem overlapping (if Brown’s claims were correct), it 
is crucial at this point to move a full-blown attack to responsibility-sensitive approaches to public 
health: their significance goes well beyond the detailed discussion of the arguments for intervention 
in the case of unhealthy behaviors. 
 
Roemer’s classes of references 
 
A different approach to the luck-egalitarians “flight from autonomy” is Roemer’s (1998). Roemer 
has proposed to allocate responsibility to individuals to the extent their personal behavior deviates 
from the norm of their own group. For instance, if 60% of people in a certain socio-economic 
segment smoke, then any individual belonging to that group will be responsible at 40% if he 
smokes. Similar discounting ought to be made for whatever class of reference is known to have 
significant correlations to the outcome under discussion. Roemer’s proposal should rescue luck-
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egalitarianism against the egalitarian objection regarding social stratification of bad choices and 
improve the sensitivity of the concept of responsibility employed in the theory.  
The same approach can be employed to address another limitation of the theory due to the 
existence of conditions with multiple causes. For instance, lifestyle will never be the only cause of 
sickness: genetic predispositions are often involved. Assume that two persons, a and b, have 
respectively an increased 20% and 40% chance of lung cancer if they smoke because of mutation A 
and, respectively, B. Then, if they both smoke and they get a malignancy, the responsibility for the 
outcome should be discounted of, respectively 20% and 40%. 
Yet the proposal of the class of reference has two problems: (1) in the case of social determination, 
it confounds correlation with causation; (2) its extension to all kinds of determination (i.e. different 
from social determination) is utterly implausible and entails that responsibility never exists. 
(1) Assume for the sake of the argument that if a habit is determined by social status, then it is 
correct to discount responsibility. Yet the epidemiological evidence does not say anything as such 
about determination: there could be a common cause of both the social status and bad choices (e.g. 
laziness, as argued by the moralizing conservative) that is relevant for responsibility. Also, the 
mechanism mediating between social status and health behaviors might be very different in each 
case, and perhaps only sometimes it will be correct to claim that indeed the choice was not properly 
autonomous, as discussed above.  
Roemer’s proposal applies more smoothly to other cases, where indeed we know that the 
correlation is causal and cannot involve steps that could be attributed to personal choices (e.g. 
asbestos exposure - cancer), but does not apply to the correlation between social status and health 
behaviors, so it does not rescue luck-egalitarianism. Notice that if Roemer replies that social 
determination is special for reasons that have nothing to do with responsibility, then my point 
would be anyway proven: what matters ultimately is the underlying social disadvantage, rather than 
the autonomous nature of choices.  
 (2) How do we decide the appropriate classes of reference for discounting responsibility? A 
smoker will belong to a certain economic group, will be female or male, young or old, prone to 
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addiction or not, etc. and for each class there might be a statistically significant effects on the 
chances of smoking. Why does Roemer focus on social status? It cannot be that social 
determination is particularly relevant for discussing autonomy: indeed in most cases it is not all, if 
the point (1) is correct. So either we choose ad hoc some classes or we consider all relevant classes 
to discount responsibility. Yet this latter option leads to an implausible result: nobody is ever 
autonomous. For if compatibilism is true, for each behavior, each individual must belong to some 
classes of references that jointly determine the behavior. This is because there cannot be a residual 
class of reference dependent on an irreducible factor of “personal choice”: it is most likely that 
nothing of that kind exists. Again, the coherent extension of the theory entails that nobody ever 
chooses. While this is an important metaphysical position (e.g. free-will eliminativism), it is at least 
bizarre to build up a moral theory from a distinction that is never instantiated. 
 
The value of equality 
 
More generally and aside from the particular conceptual problems of luck-egalitarianism, the 
theory does not seem an appropriate reconstruction of egalitarian policies even if it can be made 
coherent (Anderson 1999). This is not as such a compelling moral argument, but suggests that 
something has gone wrong in the discussion about the ideal of equality in public policy conducted 
under luck-egalitarian assumptions. The moral intuitions about socially-determined autonomous 
choices show that egalitarian concerns typically do not take the form of searching a correct 
allocation of responsibility and appropriate distributive patterns that reflect the latter.  
Egalitarians are chiefly interested in how inequalities, especially socio-economic inequalities and 
distinctions of status, impair the perspective of the disadvantaged and bring about social bads 
(O’Neill 2008). This observation is at the end a comment over the labeling of a theory: a dispute 
over the brand of “egalitarianism”. Yet labeling matters, if not in philosophy, at least in public 
debate: I hope to have provided some evidence as for why luck-egalitarianism is not egalitarian 
after all, especially in health policy. 
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Subsection Conclusions 
 
We may sum up the conclusion of sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, the pars destruens of this chapter, 
relying on a distinction that Scanlon (1988) has made between “responsibility as attributability” 
and “substantive responsibility”. The first sense of responsibility regards “whether some action can 
be attributed to an agent in the way that is required in order for it to be a basis for moral appraisal” 
(Scanlon 1988, pg.248), the second sense instead regards outright attributions of duties and 
depends on moral reasoning. We say that an agent x is responsible for a choice in case some 
conditions about x’s agency are satisfied (responsibility as attributability), while we say that a 
certain choice is x’s responsibility if there are moral reasons for x to act in that way (substantive 
responsibility). In the last sections, I argued that people are responsible for their unhealthy lifestyle 
in the first sense (because the “flight from autonomy” move of luck-egalitarians does not work) but 
they are not responsible in the substantive sense because there are no moral reasons that generate 
duties on them to behave differently (i.e. responsibility-sensitive theories are inappropriate in case 
of social health inequalities).  
Although practical guidelines of this conclusion overlap with those of luck-egalitarians who deny 
the autonomous nature of unhealthy lifestyle, my proposal has a number of features that make it 
superior. In particular: 
(1) it does not attribute to disadvantaged individuals a defective capacity for autonomous agency. 
In other words: it does not entail that disadvantaged people are somehow excusable for their 
weaknesses. Rather, it entails that there is nothing that they should be excused for in the first place. 
(2) it does not distort the concept of autonomy to save the (egalitarian) moral phenomena, but 
instead it is compatible with conceptions of autonomy and responsibility that are fully compatible 
with naturalistic world-views. 
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(3) last but not least, it suggests that egalitarian thought might be on a wrong track if it equates – 
even for progressive purposes – social policy with the allocation of responsibility.  
3.2.4 Efficiency: moral hazard and negative externalities 
 
The conclusion of the last sections does not show as such that public authorities cannot intervene 
on the basis of others-affecting behaviors, only that these interventions cannot be justified on the 
bases of distributive right-based claims. Indeed there are other arguments, broadly utilitarian, that 
may justify intervention. In particular, there could be particular losses in aggregate well being when 
the effects of personal choices affect other people - for a series of theoretical reasons that I explain 
in the current section. Although this version of the argument from responsibility is the only 
defensible version of conservative complaints about self-defeating welfare services, it is doubtful 
whether the theoretical models that ground preoccupations about these inefficiencies apply to the 
case of unhealthy food choices. 
Most personal behaviors affect other people, sometimes negatively. Aside from extreme cases of 
outright harmful activities where damages cannot be offset by any amount of gain in welfare, inter-
personal coordination from the point of view of well being requires that benefits are larger than 
damages. The obvious limitation of this criterion is that damages and benefits might accrue to 
different individuals.  
To avoid this issue, the adjudication of public interventions in welfare economics adds a neutrality 
constraint, the Pareto principle, which recommends only those policies that make somebody better-
off without damaging anybody. The principle prevents interpersonal trade-offs and is based on the 
idea that the action of public authorities is at least justifiable, even to its staunchest enemy, if it 
does not harm anybody while making improvements for at least somebody.  
Also, the Paretian principle forbids any kind of redistribution, which must be defended on other 
grounds and within broader conception of the role of public authorities. Even this very minimal 
benchmark for justification seems to support intervention against unhealthy lifestyles, e.g. in the 
form of taxation on unhealthy consumptions in the presence of public health systems.  
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From the utilitarian standpoint, although the effects of unhealthy eating might be such that tax-
payers will have to bear additional costs to provide remedies to diet related diseases, the benefits 
that people gain through unhealthy diets (e.g. pleasure, social consumptions) might counterbalance 
this loss of welfare due to augmented costs.  
Economics models define the optimal trade-offs as the one where benefits equate losses: any other 
solution would be less desirable from the standpoint of aggregate welfare. Specifically, the optimal 
level of consumption of a certain good is defined by the balancing of the strength of the consumer’s 
desire for it and the efforts of society that are needed to produce it. Under standard assumptions of 
rationality of the actors involved, the balancing is done in practice by markets and the optimal level 
of welfare should be reached without public intervention. The justification of this claim would 
require some work, but we may assume it since it is the basic result of microeconomics. 
Yet the market price of unhealthy goods in presence of a public health system cannot play its 
organizing role at its best: the effort of producing unhealthy goods is determined in monetary terms 
solely by the expenses of private firms producing sugary drinks, butter and chocolate bars. This 
mechanism does not suffice for optimal balancing: part of the societal efforts consists in the health 
costs of diet related diseases, and these are not accounted by prices since they do not enter into 
decisions of firms about production. 
Prices and levels of consumption of unhealthy items in presence of public health systems cannot be 
optimal. Prices do not reflect the encounter of efforts of production and desires for consumption 
because prices do not account well-enough for health “externalities” that will be paid by society. 
Crucially, the argument is purely aggregative: there is no issue of fairness related to society paying 
for personal “vices” due to anomalous personal preferences. Rather, the aggregate welfare is not 
high as it could be because the pricing mechanism cannot work smoothly: the result is a pure loss 
in terms of well being. The idea is straightforward: at the optimal level of consumption, the 
satisfaction of consumers and producers are jointly maximized, while at any other level - included 
the level reached when health costs are ignored - somebody must be worse-off than it could be.  
The argument for taxation of unhealthy behaviors (which is the typical measure defended on these 
grounds) is thus as follows: taxes are justifiable if they correct the market mechanisms by re-
internalizing social costs of unhealthy behaviors. That is, taxes should squeeze into market prices 
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the health cost of bad diets to move the level of consumption at the optimum. There must be a rate 
of taxation - the optimal rate - that eliminates aggregate welfare losses without damaging anybody, 
as required by the Pareto principle. Although consumers will re-arrange their consumption to new 
levels suffering some frustration, the revenues of the optimal tax must be more than enough to 
over-compensate the loss: this is the basic result associated with the name of welfare economist 
Pigou that is sometimes associated with these taxes. The argument depends on very minimal 
assumptions about the role of public authorities. Taxes on unhealthy consumption are not forms of 
disincentives against bad habits, but small correctives of market mechanisms.  
It has been argued that while several behaviors have health externalities, cherry-picking diets for 
taxation shows contempt toward habits that are more frequent among the less well-off and seems 
associated with ancient moralistic attitudes toward vices, i.e. gluttony. While the stigmatizing 
effects of policy should indeed be considered (see section 2.1.3), the argument is rather weak. In 
one sense, diet taxes do arbitrary select some behaviors for targeting, but this is hardly unfair: if the 
Pigovian reasoning is correct, nobody is worse-off as a consequence and this cannot be 
discriminatory as such. Discrimination is at least a morally arbitrary allocation of advantages and 
burdens: aside from stigmatization, targeting diets instead than other behaviors do not affect 
allocations in debatable manners.  
The trouble of the argument presented above is to be found instead in its empirical details. While 
the model is based on sound logical reasoning, it remains unclear whether the model applies to any 
specific case. Let us make this exercise for food. 
First of all: how do we measure the social cost of unhealthy eating? The task seems quite 
straightforward: we figure out the costs of health services that are used to tackle diet related 
conditions and then we set an appropriate rate of taxation that will render tax revenues equal to 
health costs.  
Aside from the complication with disease causality, this is not sufficient, because some societal 
costs of lifestyle related diseases are not included in health care costs. For instance, a chronic 
condition is often disruptive of active contribution to society, and this is also a loss – as it has been 
discussed above. This objection calls for refinement of the policy, not for its rejection – yet the 
worse is yet to come. 
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The crucial objection is different: costs of chronic conditions are associated with public gains if 
diet related conditions shorten life-expectancy and/or decrease lifetime health care and other social 
expenses, as contributions for pensions. We might discover by empirical analysis that there are 
positive externalities of unhealthy habits: then, Pigovian considerations would recommend their 
subsidy. Let us see why. 
Precocious deaths are a public good in terms of lessened costs and, as public goods, precocious 
deaths are not provided at the optimal level because prices of unhealthy foods are too high. In fact, 
prices of unhealthy foods do not account for the relief of social efforts that is due to beneficial early 
deaths. This is obviously repugnant: we should not subsidy unhealthy habits because they shorten 
life-expectancy of “costly” people, no matter if there is at least one sense in which early-deaths are 
indeed a public good.   
Repugnancy aside, the argument shows at least that there might be no arguments from negative 
externalities in favor of sugary drink taxes (and the likes) if costs were thoroughly figured out. The 
calculations have been done for several countries and the results are somehow ambiguous: while 
obese people cost more on yearly bases, on average they live less (ca. 8 years on average), and the 
combined effect is somewhat neutral (Sassi 2010 – discussed in chapter 2). This is why the 
Pigovian argument is empirical dubious and probably irrelevant: the effects on public budgets of 
unhealthy lifestyles is, for what we know, small. Hence, there is simply no or little externality to 
eliminate. 
Prices and levels of consumption might be un-optimal from a second standpoint. If health costs are 
subsidized, people may tend to overeat because they fear less the ensuing consequences: a (minor) 
form of moral hazard. The idea is that while the background conditions change in terms of health 
care security, preferences for consumption adapt to the new circumstances. People come to invest 
less in healthy activities and indulge more in risky behaviors upon introduction of public health 
insurances because their previous conduct depended, among other things, by the fear of disease 
cost. This is at least problematic because increasing the incidence of diseases is not the purpose of 
the health system: that is, resources were not channeled to health care to incentive unhealthy 
lifestyles. 
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The problem is not so much that the modified preferences are somehow defective: in this respect 
the term “moral hazard” is misleading because it seems to entail a moral judgment. Rather, the 
issue is purely one of sustainability and efficiency: public policy cannot generate the problem that 
they seek to address. There must be better ways of spending money, so intervention is again 
granted under simple utilitarian principles. Yet it is unclear if there is ever moral hazard due to the 
presence of socially funded health systems: let us look at the case of nutrition.  
There are three reasons to doubt that bad nutrition is a case of moral hazard. Unhealthy behaviors 
related to diet are more common among the poor, they appear to be increasingly endemic in 
emerging countries that lack Europe-style health systems (Popkin 2001), and obesity is equally 
frequent in two countries with very different health systems (things standing in 2013), the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  
The first observation seems at first sight irrelevant where health-care is publicly subsidized, but in 
fact health conditions are in any case costly, and indeed they might be financially disastrous, even 
in countries with robust welfare institutions. Poor should fear more this perspective since they do 
not have assets of their own to face sudden financial threats, so we would expect that their 
investment in “good” health behaviors should be higher if the expectation of costs plays any role in 
the choice. Yet unhealthy behaviors are more common among the poor: this is an anomaly in the 
theory of moral hazard, since the theory entails at least that choices are determined by expectations 
regarding costs. 
The second case is more straightforward: obesity and overweight are diffuse even in countries 
where the consequences of health conditions fall entirely on the individuals. The establishment of 
universal health coverage would be a good natural-experiment to test the hypothesis of moral 
hazard, if not for the presence of many confounding factors: after all universal coverage for health 
associates with high GDP pro-capita and hence with all the features of wealth that are associated 
with increased health problems due to nutrition (e.g. sedentary lifestyle, urbanization, etc.). That is 
why these empirical observations are obviously inconclusive: the relevant environment of choice, 
nation-wide arrangements for health provisions, is not amenable to experimental manipulation and 
anyway a host of confounding factors will taint the results of comparative studies.  
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More generally, the problem of moral hazard is very unlikely to be ever relevant to health 
behaviors because the cost of health care is just one of the aspects of the suffering involved with 
diseases, and perhaps not even the most important. Pain, frustration, sometimes death are 
consequences of diseases that cannot be – quite obviously – socialized.  
 
So far, I have argued that people are generally responsible for unhealthy lifestyles and that these 
unhealthy lifestyles may affect other people. I also explained why this is not un-rightful: the socio-
economic context of choice makes responsibility-sensitive judgments of responsibility 
inappropriate. In this section, I explained that there could be other bads associated with the relation 
between personal choices and health costs, i.e. lesser aggregate well being, and that these are 
legitimate reasons for intervention. These two theses are the chief result of the chapter. The next 
section deals with some corollaries pertaining to other forms of the appeal to personal 
responsibility for health (Voigt 2013): I show that they are either reducible to previous arguments 
or void. 
 
3.2.5 Appendix: minor arguments for personal responsibility for health 
 
This chapter has been dedicated so far to the societal effects of individual choices and the ethics of 
holding people responsible for the health consequences that may ensue from them. While I 
distinguished two main versions of responsibility-based arguments in favor of public health 
interventions against unhealthy lifestyles (i.e. distributive and economic), I would like to mention 
two further ideas that are sometimes employed in discussion about responsibility. First, proper 
respect to persons includes appropriate considerations of personal responsibility (Brown 2013). 
Second, the participation to institutions that provide services and draw resources to and from 
everybody must be fair, where fairness is understood in terms of reciprocity and/or solidarity (Buyx 
2008). I analyze these two arguments in turn arguing that, if properly understood, they cannot be 
independent from the main versions above. 
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Treating persons as responsible. Those who deny autonomy to socially-determined behaviors 
acknowledge the thorny moral issues involved in these attributions, here is Brown’s version of this 
concern: 
 
I do not seek to argue that all those from deprived backgrounds are incapable of making robust, character-
driven decisions about their lifestyles. Nor do I show that all those engaging in unhealthy behavior are not 
morally responsible for their actions. (Brown 2013, pg. 4) 
 
This thread of reasoning in favor of holding individuals responsible is grounded on the moral 
claims of the targeted individuals rather than the claims of affected third parties. Sometimes, the 
responsibility-oriented reforms of traditional tools of health and social policy might be defended on 
these grounds.  
Are they convincing in the case of food choices? That is, does proper respect for agents require 
that, in case their choices have bad consequences for them, they should be rescued from disastrous 
consequence but anyway held responsible and participate (e.g. economically) to their remedy? 
Starting again from Scanlon’s (1998) distinction between “substantive responsibility” and 
“responsibility as attributability”, the misleading nature of the latter question should be clear. On 
one hand, the answer to that question is positive: people ought to be held responsible (i.e. 
attributive responsibility) of their unhealthy behaviors and the proper respect for them requires that 
their capacity for autonomous agency is not questioned. On the other hand, the answer is also 
negative (i.e. substantive responsibilities”) because people do not have particular duties regarding 
their health - at least if my argument above is correct. Proper respect to persons requires that their 
character as autonomous agent is not put into question, yet this does not equate the claim that they 
should bear whatever distributive consequences of their behaviors. 
Fair contribution and reciprocity: the communitarian argument. Although there are communitarian 
arguments in favor of universal welfare regimes (Heath 2011) based on the idea that some goods 
should be subtracted from the “corruptive” effects of market exchanges (Sandel 2012), the appeal 
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to fair participation is a common topic for communitarians that characterize welfare systems as 
“solidaristic” and those who insists on reciprocal duties and rights (Etzioni 1993). Political science 
has proven that the appeal to solidarity was endemic across diverse political forces while the 
European welfare services were set up (Sternø 2005). The perception of common risks could 
indeed guarantee the “sense of community” often invoked by solidaristic rhetoric.  
How do we derive a moral argument on personal responsibility for health from these 
considerations? Reconstructing the communitarian argument, Voigt (2013) mentions the duties of 
reciprocity that supervenes, in condition of scarcity of resources, on the presence of health systems. 
To maintain sustainability, everybody must do his fair share, both on the contributive side and the 
side of claiming services. There are indeed two ways of unduly over-using the system (i.e. health 
services): either claiming services without contributing (e.g. in case of tax evasion) or claiming 
more services because of personal choices that could be avoided. It should be clear, however, that 
an appeal to reciprocity is not sufficient, alone, to specify the content of contributive duties and 
provision rights. The idea of reciprocity is void without an underlying distributive ideal, so the 
communitarian argument reduces to the problem discussed above. 
One might reply to the reductio at the distributive argument pointing out that public health systems 
are simply justifiable on efficiency grounds (Heath 2011) and that individual duties and rights 
depend quite simply on the rules that make the system working. However, the communitarian 
argument would become undistinguishable from the argument from efficiency in this version. 
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4.  Promoting Equality in Public Health.  
The Moral Significance of Social Health Inequalities 
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Socio-economic egalitarian values permeate public policy: the structure of fiscal contribution, the 
provision of services for welfare and the regulation of the job market are key leverages that public 
authorities employ to address societal inequalities in wealth and income. Following the recognition 
that complex epidemiological patterns are juxtaposed to socio-economic inequalities105, a strand of 
egalitarianism has developed from within public health too. Public health officials and decision-
makers are embedding the fight against social health inequalities in their strategies, programs and 
interventions under the labels “tackling the determinants” of health inequalities and “closing the 
gap” between the health of poorer and richer people (Marmot and Wilkinson 2006). Also, they 
increasingly embed distributive concern in the exercises of economic evaluation of health services, 
going past a purely “aggregative” approach which ignored the complexities of unequal societies in 
the utilization and outcomes from services (McIntyre and Mooney 2007). 
The fight against social health inequalities is the third broad strand of justifications for public 
policy against unhealthy nutrition that I explore in this work: we may want to fight unhealthy habits 
because they are more common among disadvantaged strata of our populations and we despise the 
consequence thereof. Here I evaluate the arguments that underpin the approach of social 
epidemiologists and discuss with specific attention to nutrition the moral and political significance 
of health inequalities due to differences in lifestyles.  
The characteristic feature of my proposal is a focus on egalitarian reasons. While there could be 
several non-egalitarian grounds to tackle health inequalities (e.g. ameliorating the health of 
populations in a cost-effective way), my purpose here is to single out and discuss the main features 
of egalitarian public health.  
While in the previous chapters there was a balance between critical and constructive sections, my 
argument here will be mostly critical. I do not present a full theory of the moral significance of 
health inequalities but discuss the main limitations of non-egalitarian views or quasi-egalitarian 
views in the light of social health inequalities. My reluctance in providing positive argument is 
nonetheless theoretically motivated: I will suggest that a renewed attention to the fight against 
social inequalities will ultimately depend on empirical work, in economics as well as in other social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See infra section 1.2.1. 
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sciences, aimed at highlighting the goods that more equal societies are able to promote. That is: the 
more convincing egalitarian arguments will be consequentialist in nature, rather than based on 
theories of individual rights and entitlements. 
The chapter is divided into three distinct parts. The next two sections are introductory. (4.1.1) 
collects some background information regarding socio-economic inequalities in advanced 
economies that will be valuable for the discussion and (4.1.2) explores whether “health” as such 
could be the focus of distributive justice (i.e. prescriptive theories regarding the inter-personal 
allocation of goods), given the prima facie oddness of the idea of “distributing health”. 
The second part, that includes sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, is dedicated to two views of social justice 
that purportedly explain why health inequalities ought to engage public actions, namely Powers and 
Faden’s (2006) sufficientarian welfarist theory and Norman Daniels’ (1985, 2008) employment of 
Rawls’ theory of justice in the field of health policy.  I do not take issue with these views, which do 
single out important moral preoccupations regarding health inequalities. Yet I will sketch some 
observations as for why these theories are unlikely to exhaust the kind of moral reasons that 
motivate public action against health inequalities. This is important for my purposes because the 
first theory is a non egalitarian reconstruction of public health while the second theory put 
forwards egalitarian considerations as for why certain inequalities in health might be unjust (i.e. 
they are associated with harms). I will instead claim that social and economic equality and resulting 
health inequalities are bad, i.e. undesirable state of affairs, independently from whether or not harm 
was made106, i.e. independently from the frustration of some entitlement. 
In the last part (section 4.3), I will work toward the deconstruction of a particular egalitarian view 
centered on equality of opportunity from the standpoint of the analysis of social inequalities in 
health behaviors. The view that I analyze has not been explicitly defended by political philosophers 
and has not been discussed explicitly in the context of social inequalities in health. However, it 
could be extracted from policy documents and other political resources. I will call it “neo-liberal 
egalitarianism” since it unfolds some theses, both normative and empirical, that are commonly 
associated with that political project. I will argue that, in the light of social health inequalities, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See also the distinction between telic and deontic distributive theories (section 4.5): Daniels’ view is 
deontic while here I try to defend a telic view of why resource egalitarianism is compelling. 
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moral merits of the principle of equal of opportunity in the field of public health are doubtful 
(4.3.1), its economic rationale do not stand scrutiny (4.3.2) and its recommendations, if taken 
seriously, are not different from the old “outdated” egalitarians concerns for economic equality 
(4.3.3). The aim of this third part is obviously not the debunking of such a massive and proteiform 
edifice as neo-liberal egalitarianism, but I would like to pinpoint some anomalies of that paradigm 
starting from a very limited fragment of policy and explain why its application to health policy is 
untenable. As much of this thesis, I hope that this effort can have some illustrative meaning. 
The conclusion of the chapter is the following. I offer a reasoned support to the egalitarian turn in 
public health policy and defend the moral importance of the approach of “tackling the social 
determinants of health”, in particular living conditions, employment and income: these are crucial 
factors in the emergence of diet related diseases. Yet I argue for a justification of that approach 
which is more frankly egalitarian. In particular, I argue that resource egalitarianism should be again 
considered a viable political ideal, for broadly consequentialist reasons. 
These consequentialist reasons will be essential to turn the table on anti-egalitarianism. The pursuit 
of equality in resources has been called into question from several standpoints, ranging from the 
conservative to the progressive. Equality in economic resources is at most an instrumental aim 
rather than an intrinsic good, the pursuit of equality leads to unsustainable inefficiencies and less 
wealth for all, equality threatens personal achievements that are praise-worthy, equality of 
resources between individuals with different needs is unjust. Both equality as a distributive pattern 
and resources as focus of egalitarian justice have been questioned in political theory and the 
rejection of that ideal has been a long-standing common place in the last decades in the public 
sphere.  
These theoretical preoccupations - even if they were sound - must at any rate be weighed against 
the goods attached to economic equality, which are substantial even in a very small fragment of 
policy like health behaviors inequalities. There are indeed broader theoretical and sociological 
developments that might push in that direction: to this topic is dedicated the next section.  
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4.1 The circumstances of socio-economic inequalities  
 
This introductory section addresses two distinct issues. First, it reviews some theoretical and 
sociological developments that may lead to the renewal of the tradition of socio-economic 
egalitarianism. The exercise is meant to provide some information regarding the context in which 
health inequalities happen but it is quite crucial to defend the general approach defended in this 
work as well, since I will basically argue that other egalitarian views are correct but, as it were, 
untimely. The second section is instead dedicated to health as a focus of distributive justice: it may 
indeed seem puzzling to consider personal health something of which we may speak of just (or 
unjust) distribution. I would like to dissolve that important preliminary worry. 
 
4.1.1 From the rise of socio-economic inequalities to the new egalitarianism. 
 
In 2011, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has issued a report 
on the causes of economic inequalities, “Divided we stand”, implicitly acknowledging that socio-
economic inequalities within OECD countries have become a major political concern in high-
income countries. Following the 2008 economic crisis in the United States and its long-standing 
reverberation in the Euro currency zone, the topic of economic inequalities (e.g. income, wealth) 
has achieved a renewed relevance in public debates, both because inequalities are perceived as 
intrinsically intolerable in the face of the severe social consequences of the crisis and because 
inequalities and their magnitude might not be extraneous to the very outset of the economic failure. 
Before mentioning the latter issue – which is crucial for the approach that I recommend, let us look 
at the most striking recent trends in economic inequalities and their principal drivers. 
While human societies are universally characterized by sharp differentials in the personal mastering 
over resources and power -  this is at least true for those that moved beyond an organization based 
on hunting and gathering (Bohem 2001) - the extent of inequalities and the nature of their 
underlying mechanisms change with time and place. Within most Western societies (i.e. Europe, 
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US, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand), economic inequalities reached their minimum at 
the end of the thirty years that followed the second world-war. Then, the wealth generated by rapid 
economic growth was substantially appropriated by wages – and increasingly so throughout that 
period indeed. The bargaining power of employees was relatively strong, a set of services was 
universally provided outside the market by the state (e.g. welfare state, public schooling) and 
taxation was sharply progressive (Streeck 2013). In Italy, the peak of that trend was reached in the 
middle ‘70s, while welfare provisions have been traditionally weak in the country and show signs 
of regression in the last years.  
While post-fiscal income inequalities are significantly compressed in several European states by 
the public provision of services and progressive taxation, the fall of wages in comparison to other 
sources of income is generalized (OECD 2011). For example, German real wages (i.e. salaries 
corrected for inflation rates) have stagnated between 1990 and 2009 (OECD 2012), even though 
economic growth occurred in the meanwhile: economic inequalities must have increased there (if 
we assume an unequal distribution of capital-associated incomes). In most European countries the 
following is the case: pre-fiscal income inequalities are widening and the equalizing power of the 
state (i.e. fiscal structure + delivery of services and public spending) is fading (OECD 2011) 
Which are the underlying drivers of these phenomena? While the debate on the ultimate drivers is 
open, the OECD (2011) reported some purported explanations of these trends. The relative 
weakness of the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis employers is certainly a proximal 
explanation as it is the fading progressive nature of the progressive nature of fiscal systems. 
Indexes of job market protection have been systematically decreasing in the last decades in western 
countries and their decrease is significantly associated with lower wages (Brancaccio 2011). 
Where does this weaknesses and the associated reforms in the labor market stem from? The OECD 
report (2011) mentions technological change and international liberalization of markets (i.e. 
globalization) as the main drivers of the trend. On the one hand, technological innovation has 
created a surplus of low-paid workers and a high demand of a highly-skilled work-force: while 
several manual tasks have been replaced by technological devices, there is increasing request of 
engineering and management skills. On the other hand, market liberalization has had a differential 
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effect on the two strata of workers: while the latter are mobile and can bargain their wages since 
they are scarce world-wide, the former are mostly bound to their countries and abundant, thus 
employers can threaten de-localization where labor is cheaper. The result is an increasing gap in the 
income level between different strata of the work-force and relative losses of the latter in 
comparison with other source of income (i.e. yields of capitals).  
The latter phenomena is a very important complementary factor driving inequalities: gains from 
financial activities rose percentagewise more than GDP in the last thirty years so there must have 
been a distributive conflict between salaries and financial gains, which was won by the latter. The 
process may have taken different forms: the appropriation of a larger share of total economic 
output, the seizure of assets that were previously public, a favorable fiscal regime or even outright 
tax evasion (Gallino 2011). 
The relation of these dynamics with global distribution of wealth is unclear: while some countries 
are experiencing growth and sections of their population were lifted up from extreme deprivation, 
e.g. China - the absolute numbers of the poor worldwide is historically very high. Also, the most 
successful countries in terms of GDP-growth (i.e. the so-called “BRICS”) are following very 
different pathways in this respect, with South-Africa being the less equal country in the world (as 
measured by Gini coefficient for income) and Brazil being one of the few countries where the Gini 
coefficient for income inequalities has actually decreased in the last decade (while remaining one 
of the highest in absolute terms). 
Aside from humanitarian concerns regarding a world were desperate deprivation is endemic despite 
the enormous production of wealth (which is the moral problem of inequalities according to some 
authors, i.e. Singer 2010), income inequalities have captured the attention of policy-makers because 
of their role in the on-going economic crises. In other words, inequalities might be at the centre of 
political debates not so much because of distributive or humanitarian concerns, but rather because 
they might be a liability in the very process of accumulation, i.e. economic growth. The question is 
no longer – as in the orthodox wisdom (LeGrand 1992) - whether there could be growth without 
economic inequalities but rather whether growth is actually possible (or whether it could be more 
sustained) given the current level of economic inequality. The issue is obviously debated and 
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involves intermingled normative and empirical issues, yet is worthy in this context to sketch some 
views as for why there could be a causal correlation between inequalities and slow growth and 
economic failure. This is indeed the kind of consequentialist reasoning that may speak in favor of 
resource egalitarianism, as I suggested above. I propose two examples, one for the US and one for 
the Euro-zone. 
Recent analyses by Stiglitz (2012) have suggested that the credit and house-bubble that led to 2008 
debacle in the US stock-exchange and the ensuing economic worldwide crisis cannot be considered 
extraneous to the level of inequalities in the US society, where the aggregate demand necessary to 
sustain economic activity was kept afloat by reckless lending and dubious financial practices (i.e. 
sub-prime mortgages) to poorer strata of the population. The key point of this perspective is that 
the crisis was not due to the criminal behavior of the few or to frauds on the part of the borrowers, 
but was instead an intrinsic feature of (private) debt-dependent growth: private debts substituted 
public investments as engine for economic accumulation (see also Gallino 2011 and Streeck 2013, 
from a different perspective and tradition, for the same point). Weakness of wages and the Ersatz-
demand in the form of debt which was necessary to create appropriate (global) demand are, 
according to Stiglitz, one main element of the recipe for crises. Again, here we do not need to 
accept this or other explanations, only remind the underlying reasons that might bring to a 
resurgence of egalitarianism. 
In the Euro-zone, the mechanisms of the crisis have been quite different from the US and indeed 
diverse within it as well. The mainstream wisdom among policy-makers attributes to excessive 
(public) borrowing and lack of competitiveness-enhancing reforms on the part of weakest countries 
the outset of the (sovereign-debts) crisis: as a consequence, massive de-leveraging and structural 
reforms are the most common measures that have been taken there. However, observers of different 
political and theoretical leanings have observed that the pathological trade imbalances within the 
Euro-zone – stifled by the common currency – might be underpinning the crisis in some (deficit) 
countries (Bagnai 2012). For our purposes, it is important to notice that among the latter, there are 
those who claim that the dynamic of increasing inequalities (due to stagnating wages) in the core 
(surplus) countries (e.g. Germany, see above) is a key factor in the outset of imbalances: core 
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countries manage to keep prices and imports at low levels (and boost they exports) because of this 
explicit policy of “salarial moderation”, which outcompete weaker countries, as in a model beggar-
thy-neighbor mercantilist policy (Lieb 2013). In this context, the re-activation of core-countries 
internal demand with inflation and higher wages would be the natural (egalitarian) response to 
imbalances, together with egalitarian policy that might re-activate internal demand for internal 
products in deficit countries. Again, this issue is overly complex but it is important here to track the 
sociological sources of a new interest in economic egalitarianism. 
From a long-term perspective, these events in US and Europe might have challenged the received 
view about the relation between growth and economic equality, according to which equalizing 
policies are expected to decrease the aggregate social output as a result of their disincentivizing 
effects. A renewed attention to demand-side policies is however just one of the threads of the new 
consequentialist egalitarianism that is re-surfacing in the last years, though if successful between 
decision-makers it might become by far the most important. 
 A paradigmatic popular piece of work in the same consequentialist direction but from a different 
perspective is that of Pickett and Wilkinson (2009). The two authors - Wilkinson being the leading 
social epidemiologist that edited the collection on the social determinants of health along with 
Michael Marmot - collected a wide series of data associating levels of income inequalities (as 
measured by national Gini coefficients) with costly social bads, notably for our purposes obesity 
and nutrition-related diseases.  
In their popular book, they argue that unequal society “almost always do worse”. Although their 
methodological approach is open to a number of criticisms (O’Neill 2010) - and their book is 
obviously a piece of activism more than science - Pickett and Wilkinson are representative of a new 
way of arguing in favor of socio-economic equality: they single out uncontroversial goods that are 
attached to equal societies. The approach is broadly utilitarian and so it might seem quite 
extraneous to traditional egalitarianisms, yet some of the goods that are highlighted by the two 
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authors might be considered egalitarian goods, especially those that regards social relations and 
communitarian values107.  
I will mention in the following (section 4.3.2) some goods that are related to public health and 
nutrition-related diseases whose achievement depends on the pursuit of resource equality. 
However, I will mainly suggest an approach to the normative discussion on health inequalities that 
is somehow inspired to Wilkinson and Pickett: rather than deciding which health inequalities or 
underlying distribution of resources are unjust according to some standard of justice based on 
individual entitlements (Whitehead 1992), we should look at which recommendable goods more 
equal societies will foster and weigh them against possible costs, those highlighted by traditional 
economic theory (they are bona fide empirical hypotheses to be tested). 
 
4.1.2 The distribution of health 
 
The notion of “distributive justice” is in part misleading since it brings into mind the idea of goods 
that are literally re-distributable, i.e. material assets that can be taken from one individual and 
passed on to another. Health is obviously nothing of this kind: if somebody has poor health, there is 
nothing that can be done by taking health from those who are healthy.  
Yet the notion of distribution has an even bigger flaw: it may suggest the picture of a field of 
policy, “distribution”, that is relatively independent from the rest of public actions. Also, it might 
outline a picture in which “the economy” produces certain outputs that can be taken and distributed 
according to specific patterns by public authorities. Fiscal policy is the paradigmatic example of 
distributive policy that might come to mind, yet fiscal policy is not necessarily neither the most 
important nor the most effective device that public authorities might employ to pursue specific 
distributive aims. Needless to say, there are several problems with the picture of a sharp distinction 
between production and distribution. I mention three of them in the following: at the end it should 
be clear that there is no problem in discussing health as a focus of distributive justice. A sharp 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 O’Neill 2008 for a discussion of non-intrinsic egalitarian goods of egalitarian distributions. 
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distinction between production and distribution – from which the suspicion toward the idea of 
distributing health stems – is perhaps appropriate for the middle age, where the lords would seize 
part of the harvest collected by servants, yet it is quite inadequate for contemporary societies. 
Continuity between distribution and production. The notion of “distribution” gives the idea of a 
dispersal of pre-existing things to be distributed. Yet nothing of this kind exists: as it should be 
clear from the discussion in previous section, accumulation depends on the distributive patterns that 
are in place (i.e. who owes what) and in turn it leads to specific distribution of resources and goods. 
The idea that distribution and production can be separated might be suggested - though is not 
entailed - by economic-liberal arguments about the virtues of unconstrained economic activity: 
production is left to market forces and public power comes downstream to flatten the unwanted 
distributive consequences of their unconstrained functioning. However, the sphere of politics and 
the sphere of markets are not so easily separable: historically, free markets were highly artificial 
creations of the political power (Polany 2001 [1944]) and it is impossible to imagine production 
without authoritative decisions regarding distributions, i.e. enforcement of property rights108. While 
this observation might seem uncontroversial, some in the economic profession felt it had to re-state 
it, so indeed the mainstream picture might have overlooked the issue: 
 
We [now] understand that even unfettered competitive markets are based on a set of laws and institutions that 
secure property rights, ensure enforcement of contracts, and regulate behavior and product and service 
quality, we increasingly abstracted from the role of institutions and regulations supporting market 
transactions in our conceptualization of markets. (Acemoglu 2009, pg.4) 
 
No difference between distribution and re-distribution. An associated contraposition is that 
between distribution and re-distribution, sometimes associated with pre-fiscal and post-fiscal 
incomes, which is taken to have some moral weight by some theorists (i.e. prima-facie entitlements 
to pre-fiscal incomes). Murphy and Nagel (2002) pointed out that the distinction cannot have that 
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moral value, since the former depends on the latter. Distributive pre-fiscal patterns would have an 
entirely different shape with different fiscal provisions regarding re-distribution.  
Although I agree with their observation, they could have been even more radical: they are still 
taking as paradigmatic case the fiscal system and are (correctly) pointing out that there is no 
distribution without re-distribution. For the sake of their argument, they mention throughout their 
book those public goods funded through taxation (e.g. roads) that make possible economic activity. 
This is strategically understandable since those are example that mainstream economic is likely to 
accept, yet the conceptual and moral mistake that they are trying to identify and debunk is more 
easily highlighted shifting the focus from fiscal systems to – for instance - labor policy: the 
fundamental features of distribution and production depend on the latter, but it is clear that nothing 
like the distinction between distribution and re-distribution or that between production and 
distribution might come into mind reflecting on labor policy. While the distinction between pre-
fiscal and post-fiscal incomes is certainly useful to measures the distributive effects of different 
regulations and institutions (e.g. labor policy vs. fiscal system), it does not overlap with the 
morally-laden difference between distribution due to unconstrained economic activities and re-
distribution enforced by the state.  
 
The distribution of distributable and non-distributable goods. Goods as increases in life 
expectancy, decreases in incidence of disease, health care, etc. are just some of the many goods that 
social cooperation brings about. These goods are among the most valuable products of functioning 
societies. They are very different from liquid material assets because they are attached to persons, 
but they are not fundamentally different. There is indeed a continuum between “liquid” wealth and 
personal goods, and the degree of transferability is determined both by the nature of the good and 
the social context. Let us consider the case of houses: although they might change property, they 
are arguably more at the centre of this continuum, at least because people might feel attached to 
their “home”. In certain cultures, homes are definitely closer to personal health than to cash as for 
their inter-personal transferability.  
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The idea that there we can easily single out “distributive” policies and laws is extraneous to 
decision-makers: any policy deals with the distribution of goods and its effects will influence 
people’s lives differentially depending on several variables, most notably socio-economic status. 
Although others variable could track important distributive effects of health policy (e.g. age, 
gender), the focus here will be on socio-economic disparities, given their relevance for the case of 
nutrition and their prima facie moral priority, which is due to the compounded effects of different 
types of disadvantages that typically fall upon the socio-economic disadvantaged. 
 
4.2 The moral significance of health inequalities: previous proposals 
 
This section is dedicated to previous prescriptive theories regarding health inequalities. The 
disparities in mortality and morbidity that are dependent on social factors may offend our moral 
sensitivity. Why is this case? Which is the moral theory which can reconstruct these intuitions? Are 
they reliable or do they depend to untenable assumptions?109  
Whitehead (1992) firstly proposed a criterion to single out health inequities among the broader 
category of health inequalities (a purely descriptive notion). Under her conception, any avoidable 
social health inequality which is regarded as unjust counts as inequity, since it amounts to 
avoidable harm. The idea is however flawed. To begin with, the condition of “being regarded as 
unjust” seems redundant or circular. Also, the restriction to social health inequalities does not fit 
the interest in natural inequalities which is typical of some varieties of contemporary 
egalitarianism, notably luck egalitarianism (see section 3.2.3). The major problem is however that 
the condition of avoidability is simply too vague. If avoidability is interpreted in a strict sense, i.e. 
mere possibility of averting a certain inequality independently from the consequences, the 
conception is obviously false: remedying to all remediable health inequalities could be so costly as 
to cause overall worse harms to the population. If instead avoidability is taken to be avoidability 
provided that consequences are acceptable, one must obviously refer to external standards for the 
judgment, and so the criterion is void. 
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Public health ethicists have focused for long on the issue, providing reasoned answers to the 
questions: “Which health inequalities are unjust?” and “Why?” For the moment, I focus on some 
important answers to those questions, claiming that they suffer from crucial limitations. This will 
leave a space for a simpler and pragmatic approach: health inequalities are important for 
egalitarianism and justice in two ways. First, they signal some key benefits that resource egalitarian 
policies might bring about, namely an increased level of health. Second, their removal can in turn 
be instrumental for the pursuit of resource egalitarian aims that are recommendable for independent 
reasons. 
 
4.2.1 Humanitarian values and the sufficientarian critics of egalitarianism 
 
Powers and Faden (2009) have argued that health social inequalities are morally worrisome 
because they constitute important causal hubs in a network of “densely interwoven disadvantages” 
that trap persons at intolerably low levels of welfare. They explain the latter notion describing five 
“uncontroversial” dimension of personal well being – health, personal security, reasoning, respect, 
attachment and self-determination – and the associated thresholds of minimally acceptable (i.e. 
sufficient) welfare. Their aim is to reconstruct the goals of public health around an objective that is 
ultimately sufficientarian: there is no egalitarian value in their discussion of the purposes of public 
health but only humanitarian concerns for desperate deprivation.  
The approach fits a long tradition of critiques of egalitarian values centered on their reducibility to 
non-egalitarian concerns, e.g. sufficiency of welfare or priority of the needs of the worse-off 
(Frankfurt 1988, Parfit 1997). The complaint against egalitarianism is at any rate always similar: 
nothing specifically egalitarian is left once sufficientarian or other non-egalitarian duties are 
fulfilled. Any further insistence on equality amounts to fetishism or it is outright wrong, as the 
leveling down objection should show: if egalitarians are serious, they should prefer - at least pro 
tanto - a state where two people are equally worse-off than a state where two people are both 
better-off than the latter but unequally so.  
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Rather than a technical treatment of the subject questioning the universality of Powers and Faden’s 
six dimensions of welfare or the moral significance of their thresholds110, I suggest that it is better 
to pay some attention to why robust egalitarianism is again on the stage in Western countries 
despite theoretical observations regarding the leveling down objection or the reducibility of 
egalitarianism to some humanitarian concern. In the last decades, since absolute poverty did not 
generally increase in the EU (though this is not the case for some countries in Southern Europe in 
the latter years), it seemed just natural to attribute several emerging social bads to social 
inequalities as such: this is after all Pickett and Wilkinson’s (2009) approach that we discussed 
above. While incomes have been stagnating and life expectancy has risen for all, comparative 
economic inequalities widened. In this social context, sufficientarianism perhaps gets it right in 
moral theory, but certainly cannot be a compelling and fruitful platform for reasoning about 
contemporary policy issues. The theoretical strength of Powers and Faden’s account is indeed its 
main liability: although they highlight timeless humanitarian concerns, their work is somewhat 
untimely, since strict egalitarianism has again a bite in wealthy but unequal societies that are 
experienced as dysfunctional. On the other hand, their framework can perhaps be put at work in 
contexts where extreme poverty and harmful limitations to personal well being are still prevalent.  
Aside from the particular pattern of distribution that they are employing, Powers and Faden’s 
attempt to describe in details which are the dimensions and goods that matter for justice is in line 
with the influential tendency of social philosophy inaugurated by Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach (see Nussbaum 2011). Although the latter’s contribution stemmed from the 
aforementioned “equality of what” debate on the currency of egalitarian justice, their proposal has 
developed into a framework for various normative exercises, which contains detailed insights on 
what matters for people (i.e. a theory of value in the sense of the introduction). Recent 
developments in that tradition include the original methodology employed in Wolff and De-Shalit 
(2007) to prioritize among different kind of goods. When isolated from its problematic and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The notion of a threshold looks particularly worrisome at theoretical level: it does not distinguish between 
being desperately under the threshold or just below it (indeed it gives priority to the needs of the latter, since 
they might easily be brought over the threshold). Also, it seems in any case morally arbitrary: if the good for 
which we fix a threshold is indeed good to have, how it comes that there is an abrupt discontinuity between a 
certain amount of the goo for which we do have an entitlement and a higher amount for which we do not? 
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untimely sufficientarian scaffold, Powers and Faden’s core normative proposal retains its contact 
with this fruitful tradition. 
 
4.2.2 Norman Daniels and the right to health 
 
The attention of analytic political philosophers to distributive issues dates back to the work of John 
Rawls, which we encounter several times in the previous pages. Rawls’ “A theory of justice” 
(1971) describes the fundamental outline of a just liberal society centered on fairness, where 
institutions and the use of power can be justified equally to all cooperators independently from 
their actual worldviews, specific values and interests. The core content of the theory, which is 
deduced from an imagined contractarian position, consists in three principles: 
(1) Equal liberty 
(2) Fair Equality of opportunity 
(3) Difference principle 
The three principles are not equally important in Rawls’ theory and they should be implemented in 
lexicographic order: in no case a lower ranking principle (e.g. 3) can be realized by violating a 
principle of higher order (e.g. 2). The liberal character of the theory is due to the priority of the 
principle that ensures to each the fundamental civil and political liberties, i.e. liberty of religion, 
consciousness, political equality, etc. The principle of fair equality of opportunity must be 
interpreted as the notion that social positions should be allocated independently from social-
backgrounds of births and people should be given appropriate means to develop their talents 
irrespective of social class. The difference principle states that the only justification for inequalities 
is the amelioration of the condition of the worse-off: removing inequalities is always 
recommendable unless the removal will damage the worse-off.  
The kind of inequalities that Rawls studies regard “primary goods”: resources that are needed to 
persons for their pursuits independently from the details of their plans of life, e.g. income, wealth, 
power, and the social bases of self-respect. For the sake of simplicity, Rawls did not discuss 
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explicitly the case of inequalities in natural skills and health and left unfulfilled the task of 
extending his approach to these cases.  
Among his theoretical successors, Norman Daniels proposed a theory of justice pertaining health 
care (1985) and health (2008) that explicitly follows the original Rawlsian inspiration. Daniels did 
not rely on the principle regarding the distribution of primary goods (i.e. the difference principle) 
but rather extended the principle of fair equality of opportunity to cover the pre-requisites for being 
functioning cooperators in society, thus modifying its original meaning in Rawls’ theory. 
In particular, he argues that full economic and social participation requires a set of skills that are 
normal for Homo sapiens. Daniels’ equality of opportunity gives normative value to the norm of 
our species, i.e. those minimal features of human beings that allow societal cooperation and the 
pursuit of ordinary life plans. In Daniels, the notion of “normal species function” (Boorse 1977) 
takes up important moral weight and grounds a societal duty to bring people to that norm, e.g. by 
providing health care in case they fall ill.  
Daniel’s principle is summarized by Buchanan as follows (1984, pg. 62): “Social resources are to 
be allocated so as to insure that everyone can attain the normal opportunity range for his or her 
society”. As observed in the same comment, Daniels’ theory is most suitable for extension from 
health care to the tackling of social determinants: 
 
It gives us a way of ranking various health-care services as to their relative importance for normal species 
functioning and provides a principled way of defining the class of health-care needs which does not limit 
them to medical needs as defined by the current health-care delivery system (Buchanan 1984, pg. 63). 
 
Which is the moral status of social health inequalities in Daniels’ view? In his theory, there is no 
moral difference between social and “natural” disease (e.g. disease whose incidence is uncorrelated 
with socio-economic indexes): both ground a (conditional) societal duty to provide care and/or to 
implement policy that would prevent the outset of the damaging condition. 
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While critics have particularly targeted the mysterious and disputable character of the notion of 
“normal species functioning” and “range of opportunity that is normal for our species”, we might 
begin with the observation that Daniels’ theory is hardly a reconstruction of health care as it is. 
After all, health care is normally provided on beneficent grounds, to avoid the kind of human 
suffering which disease brings about: that people are sick is the bad that health-care is meant to 
remedy and a theory that commends maximal relief of pain due to diseases (compatibly with other 
aims) is an equally plausible reconstruction of that enterprise. Insofar theories in line with Rawlsian 
methodology reconstruct the outline of liberal-democratic societies, this descriptive limit has 
indeed some relevance. 
Notice however that both in Daniels’ theory and in the beneficence framework, there must be a 
proviso requiring compatibility of health-care spending with other social aims, duties and social 
pursuits. Given the technological advances in life sciences, there are always new medical needs that 
can be met – even if we accept that the threshold of “normality” is the normative benchmark - so 
both beneficence and equality of opportunity will recommend their satisfaction. This is because 
species normality is perhaps characteristic of human beings, but cannot be independent from the 
context – including medical technologies. 
There is a sort of theoretical impasse for any prescriptive theory of health here: without the proviso 
commending compatibility with other social aims, the pursuit of health becomes a bottomless pit, 
with the proviso, all hard-problems regarding the allocation of scarce resources (both between 
sectors and within the health sectors) remain underdetermined. 
While the resolution of this under-determination has been most often addressed with the 
introduction of procedural constraints on the political process that leads to allocative decisions 
(especially in Daniels 2008 and Fleck 2011)111, I would like to point out one important theoretical 
consequence of these deliberative approaches. Daniels’ original enterprise was to flesh out societal 
duties regarding the provision of health-care and was later extended to health in general, thus 
covering also the “tackling the determinants” approach that is the object of this chapter (Daniels et 
al. 2000). Given the hard prescriptive problems regarding distribution of scarce resources, he left 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Within the health system, utilitarianism-inspired economic evaluations are often employed for priority 
setting. This however does not explain how much efforts we should reserve to health. 
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the decisions regarding these duties to the political process. The source of obligation in the new 
framework is no longer some kind of personal right (e.g. to be a functioning cooperator, to health, 
etc.) but the decisional procedure itself. This is an outright abandonment of the right-based 
approach to health-care allocation which was sought in the old framework. It should be clear how 
this development is compatible with the broadly utilitarian approach that is upheld in this work: the 
question is no longer whether or not health inequalities threaten personal rights, but rather whether 
the fight against social health inequalities can do any good and is valuable for society. 
  
163	  
	  
4.3 Neoliberal egalitarianism, equality of opportunity and health 
 
Esping-Andersen, G. (2002), in the introduction to a volume dedicated to new “activating” 
approaches to welfare planning, argues that a renewed focus on personal responsibility is ultimately 
“nourished by sociological developments” (pg. xiii). In particular, the old unconditional welfare 
provisions were suitable to a society where persons were insured against unpredictable or universal 
risks: it was based on “supposedly objective statistics and probability theory” (ibidem). In brief, 
anybody could expect to have equal chances to get sick. Also, most people get old and so they 
share that exposition to risk as well. The nature of the new risks that are nowadays prevalent – he 
mentions single parenthood and shortage of skills, but evidently lifestyle diseases belong to the 
category as well – is such that the link with personal behavior is more obvious. Personal choices 
rather than “objective risks” ground the new welfare risks according to Esping-Andersen. 
Furthermore, he claims that these sociological developments call for a reform of traditional welfare 
services and even to new attention to responsibility-based distributive theories (see also section 
3.2). 
Specific concerns about traditional welfare regimes and their sustainability (see section 4.3) plus 
the theoretical challenges against resource egalitarianism (see section 4.1) coalesced and gave rise 
to an entirely new form of egalitarianism centered on equality of opportunity. The shared 
consensus of policy-documents, governmental drafts and scholarly contributions is often centered 
on this new ideal and has replaced previous prescriptive goals (Ferrera 2013). This form of equality 
of opportunity has even replaced in the public rhetoric some traditional arguments in favor of social 
policy. 
Joseph Heath (2011) has described three kinds of justifications of welfare regimes (broadly 
conceived): egalitarianism, communitarianism and public economics. Under the egalitarian 
justification, the welfare state has mostly distributive functions: the provision of services out of the 
market through funding by progressive taxation flattens the distribution of resources. Under the 
communitarian justification, the welfare state strengthens societal bonds providing common 
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services: this explains welfare services that are not straightforwardly redistributive, e.g. public 
higher education. Under the public economic justification, welfare states remedies to a broad range 
of market failures, from the provision of public goods to the management of natural monopolies. 
The new welfare centered on equality of opportunity appropriated all three forms of justification, 
giving them a new meaning: just distribution is depicted as the provision of equal opportunity, 
communitarian aims should be pursued with a renewed attention to personal duties and 
responsibility that were threatened by the “right” approach which had been prevalent once (Etzioni 
1993) and equality of opportunity remedies to the inefficiencies of the old paradigm. 
In the Italian public debate, the approach to social policy centered on equality of opportunity has 
been proposed as foundational for the “new left”. Scholarly contributions, interventions on 
newspapers and books are marshalling that approach, notably Rustichini and Reichlin’s “Equità e 
libertà. Ripensare la sinistra” (2012) and Alesina and Giavazzi’s (2007) “Il liberismo è di sinistra”. 
Especially the latter book explicitly identifies the kinship between equality of opportunity and 
neoliberal politics (the Italian word “liberismo” is most correctly translated as “neoliberalism”), 
and indeed the latter authors are influential economists that have provided theoretical 
underpinnings to neoliberal structural reforms in the country. 
The purpose of this section is simple: I will point to some philosophical anomalies of the concept 
of “equality of opportunity” drawing from the literature on social disparities in health behavior. 
The purpose is indeed to argue that the principle of “equality of opportunity” is hardly that 
uncontroversial and overarching political principle that is often depicted. In brief, the next sections 
will illustrate the case against equality of opportunity and the sort of “open society” that it 
formalizes. In the spirit of the current approach, I will not attack the idea that individuals are 
entitled to an open future but rather the kind of alleged superiority in terms of efficiency and cost 
that equality of opportunity boasts.  
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4.3.1 What is equality of opportunity? 
 
The fundamental ideal of equality of opportunity is that of a society without castes: personal 
achievements of people should not depend on their background, i.e. the socio-economic status of 
their parents. Theorists disagree as for what kind of things might legitimately determine differential 
achievements, but most theories targets most typically advantages and disadvantages that are 
socially inherited112 and it is to those theories that I focus.  
A rough metrics of equality of opportunity is inter-generational mobility, typically defined as the 
predictability of adult personal income from data regarding parental incomes: low predictability 
(i.e. high mobility) is normally a sign that equality of opportunity is being realized. The two 
notions – intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity – are however not equivalent in 
any appropriate reading of “opportunity”, for a series of reasons. First, income is just a rough 
measure of opportunities, since other social rewards are independent from incomes (e.g. social 
acknowledgments) and some personal plans of life might disregard social rewards and monetary 
rewards. Also, if skills where biologically heritable, there could theoretically be equality of 
opportunity with no social mobility. Assume that some biological heritable skills are associated 
with an income premium and that the latter do not fall into the scope of the principle because they 
cannot be remedied (or for any other reason): then there would be lesser social mobility than 
possible without the principle of equality of opportunity being violated. 
The principle of equality of opportunity requires at least formal equality of opportunity: there 
cannot be discriminatory regulations regarding the access to rewarding positions, nor 
discriminating social rules that prevent in any other way the social functioning of people. However, 
most admit that there must be provisions to off-set the effects of social backgrounds on the 
development of personal capabilities, especially education and public schooling.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 We tackle the issue of the normative relevance of the distinction between social and biological heritability 
in Loi, Del Savio, and Stupka (2013). 
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Why is the ideal of equality of opportunity not subject to the objections against resource 
egalitarianism that pertain the instrumental nature of resources, the responsibility-insensitive 
character of egalitarianism and the economic inefficiencies associated with equalizing outcomes?  
First, opportunities seem to be intrinsically worthy, independently from what is actually done with 
them. Experiencing limitations due to social background is bad in itself, even if the use of 
opportunities would be sub-optimal. The idea of capabilities as focus of distributive justice unfolds 
a similar observation: opportunities are simply part of personal well being, while resources are 
useful only as means to personal ends. Those who argue for equality of opportunity cannot be 
accused of “fetishism” (Keller 2009), i.e. of attributing value to things that are only indirectly 
valuable and sometimes not valuable at all. In this sense, equality of opportunity employs as a 
focus of distributive justice a currency which is valuable as such, substantial liberty. 
Second, the ideal is compatible with any responsibility-sensitive theory, and indeed seems to be 
required for any version of responsibility-sensitive theory to take off the ground. Socially inherited 
features are things for which people are not responsible, and therefore addressing unequal 
opportunity levels the playing field upon which responsibility-sensitive processes will happen. Any 
differences in social outcomes - were equality of opportunity realized - would be due to efforts and 
talent, which is indeed what responsibility-sensitive theories are requiring. 
Third, while there could be some negative effects on the total production of wealth dependent on 
equality of opportunity policy (e.g. productive disincentive due to the impossibility of bequeathing 
wealth to biological children), the effect of pursuing equality of opportunity policy is thought to be 
positive as far as accumulation of wealth is concerned. There is more than one argument to make in 
this respect.  
In the case of formal equality of opportunity, the argument from efficiency depends on the 
inefficient allocation of labor that discrimination brings about. Let us define the optimal allocation 
of jobs one in which individuals are most productive: skills of people will differ and there must be 
a particular employment of their talents that maximize social productivity. Now, any discrimination 
introduces irrelevant constraints on the process of allocation: for instance, a talented immigrant will 
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be wasted for productive purposes if laws prohibiting certain employments to immigrants were 
enacted. Without legal discrimination, this is predicted not to happen and indeed markets should 
lead naturally to lesser discrimination: any firm refusing to employ individuals for discriminatory 
skill-irrelevant reasons are using productive factors (in this case, they are spending money in 
human resources) less than optimally and will be replaced by better firms that do not discriminate – 
at least theoretically. Naturally, models based on assumptions of rationality might fail quite 
impressively in social contexts characterized by complicated social norms (e.g. racism), however 
there are at least ideal-condition reasons to believe that equality of opportunity might promote 
efficiency. 
As for robust equality of opportunity, although the expenses that are necessary for cultivating 
talents can be large, they can be thought as investments that might have positive yields in the long 
term. Any potential talent which is not developed is a waste, a societal loss. The economic theory 
that underlies these arguments normally uses econometrics data regarding the relevance of human 
capital for economic accumulation, thus the jargon of social policy as “investment” which is 
typical of equal opportunity theorists (Esping-Andersen 2002). Without equality of opportunity, it 
is expected that human capital will not be as high as it could be, especially because some talented 
but poor people will not emerge. The argument cannot be as polished as the previous one because 
obviously there are expenses associated with robust equality of opportunity (whereas non 
discrimination policy is less burdensome if purely formal), yet it can be substantiated, for instance, 
with empirical literature regarding investments in education and economic performances.  
Notice that in both cases equality of opportunity is expected to have positive effects on economic 
activities via the amelioration of productive factors. This kind of consequentialism is utterly 
different from that of theorists claiming that equal distributions of resources will ameliorate and 
stabilize the economy from the side of consumption (Stiglitz 2012). Here the normative 
adjudication will depend on the resolution of complex scientific issues, which cannot be ignored in 
moral reasoning but seldom emerge explicitly113.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 But see Hausman (n.d.) contra Bowles and Gintis, who also worked on equality of opportunity in Bowles 
and Gintis (2002). 
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4.3.2 The health benefits of economic egalitarianism 
 
While the pursuit of resource equality may have unwanted consequences in terms of incentives, the 
calculus of costs and benefits must certainly include also the latter. This very minimal proposition 
motivates the book by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) “The spirit level”, which we encountered 
already and has drawn a renewed attention to issues pertaining economic equality and its moral 
significance. The book contains several graphs associating income-inequalities (as measured by 
Gini coefficients) with a variety of social ills: at the end the book builds a strong case for the idea 
that “more equal societies do always better”. The burgeoning inequalities of the last three decades 
have created the ideal environment to measure the effects of them in contemporary societies. 
The worse performances in terms of diet related diseases of more unequal countries have been the 
object of a study by Offer et al. (2010), who started from the observation that English-speaking rich 
countries stand apart as for rates of obesity as they stand apart in case of income inequalities. Their 
work is indeed quite interesting because they offer a plausible mechanistic explanation of the 
association between inequality and obesity that is centered on the social model of those societies. 
They indeed observe that market-friendly liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) are 
characteristic of those English speaking societies and speculate that: 
 
economic uncertainty and unequal market and household experiences have increased stress, and that stress is 
conducive to weight gain; that market-liberal reforms have stimulated competition in both labor and 
consumption markets, and that this has undermined personal stability and security. It has affected people 
more strongly lower down the social scale. Hence the more intensive the competitive and market orientation 
of welfare regimes, the higher the level of body weight, at both aggregate and personal levels. (Offer et al. 
2010, pg. 298). 
 
169	  
	  
In particular, they focus on some welfare-regime variables as predictor of obesity rates, finding that 
levels of job-market protection and economic security – typically low in market liberal societies, 
are inversely correlated with obesity rates.  
Their result replicates with aggregate measures at the macro level what Anandi et al. (2013) 
suggested with behavioral microeconomics studies that highlighted the effects of poverty on 
decision making capabilities, though Offer et al. (2010) do not mention among the potential 
explanations of their findings that particular pathway. For our purpose, it is however noteworthy 
the conclusion of their discussion, where they suggest  “that the economic benefits of open and 
flexible markets, such as they are, maybe offset to cost to personal ad public health which are 
rarely taken into account” (Offer et al. 2010 pg. 307). These simple consequentialist considerations 
are indeed one of the two ways in which health inequalities findings can be employed by resource 
egalitarians to illustrate the moral merits of their proposal: there are benefits along with possible 
inefficiencies associated with economically more equal societies. 
 
4.3.3 Equality of opportunity for health requires economic equality 
 
A surprising result of Pickett and Wilkinson (2009) analysis is the strong correlation between 
income inequalities and unequal opportunities. One justification for highly unequal distribution of 
resources in societies is thought to lie in their “openness”: where the intervention on the outcomes 
of markets in term of income is small, inequalities are compensated by the fact that everybody has 
a real chance of improving his own condition. This seems to be false: there is a robust association 
between income inequalities and unequal opportunities (as measured by inter-generational social 
mobility) in studies that compare different countries: in Western Europe, the less mobile societies 
are the UK and Italy, whose level of income inequalities rank among the highest. 
The most intuitive hypothesis regarding these findings is based on the observation that the effect 
might be mediated by schooling. One obvious advantage of richer families is the purchase of better 
schooling opportunities for their children. Public schooling or an efficient market of loans might be 
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thought to be effective in the removal of these inequalities in opportunity. Yet this policies are 
bound to be insufficient for at least two reasons: (1) results in school are not explained by 
schooling alone because they depend on broader environmental drivers that exert their effect very 
early in life (Cunha and Heckman 2010) and (2) school results explain just a part of income 
differentials (Franzini and Raitano 2011) and there is indeed a growing literature on school-
independent soft skills that influence the performances of individuals in the job market (Bowles 
and Gintis 2002). 
Among the channels of inheritance of economic inequality there is health and diet related diseases, 
since we have seen above that there is both a negative effects on income of obesity and diet related 
diseases and intergenerational inheritability of these conditions (section 1.2.1). In particular, 
epigenetic effects might render environmental exposure quite stable and difficult to remedy with 
downstream measures. Diet associated diseases illustrate again this issue. 
A paradigmatic case is that of nutrition during pregnancy (Sullivan et al. 2011). Subtler features of 
maternal diets may program the newborn for conditions that will be visible only later on, e.g. high 
fat diets in mothers increase the risk of adult obesity in children (Chmurzynska 2010). Hence – 
quite independently from behavioral channels of transmission of childhood obesity, epigenetic 
programming may be partially responsible for the inheritance of dietary health conditions. At the 
current level of technological development, this speaks against downstream remedial measures and 
in favor – if we are to take equality of opportunity seriously – upstream interventions on families. 
Insuring that environments of development are not hugely different as a consequence of disparities 
in wealth would however require wide distributive efforts targeting inequalities in outcomes in 
parenting generations. Policy recommendations of the principle of equality of opportunity are thus 
no different from those of the ideals that it allegedly had to replace. 
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4.4 Conclusion: the meaning of social health inequalities for egalitarians 
 
This chapter has focused on the prescriptive meaning of social health inequalities, within the 
general purpose of this thesis of analyzing the various justifications for public action against diet 
related diseases. I have preliminary argued that health is an appropriate focus of distributive justice. 
Also, I sketched the general sociological and cultural reasons that might lead to the emergence of a 
new consequentialist egalitarianism centered on resources (i.e. income, wealth). The purpose of this 
chapter has been that of situating the findings in social epidemiology within that new emerging 
framework: (a) health inequalities signals potential benefits of egalitarian policies and (b) their 
removal can be an effective tool for the pursuit of economic equality. 
I illustrated this thesis – which crucially depends on empirical findings – by criticizing social 
philosophies that are influential among theoretician (4.2) or among decision makers (4.3) as for 
their relevance in this context. In the first case, the two theories that I took into consideration – 
despite capturing important concern regarding humanitarianism (Powers and Faden’s 
sufficientarianism in section 4.2.1) and the relations between citizens’ right and health (Norman 
Daniels’ theory in section 4.2.2) – cannot help in the philosophical reconstruction of the egalitarian 
turn in public health as sketched in 4.2.1. In the second case, I highlighted some moral weaknesses 
– to be added to those that had been the object of section 3.2 - of a neo-liberal version of 
egalitarianism centered on equality of opportunity. 
The promises of preventive intervention in the fight against health inequalities and resulting socio-
economic disparities provide strong arguments for action, strengthening the “ideology of the good 
choosers” objection to non intervention of section 2.2.3. Naturally, measures that do not worsen 
health inequalities are recommended. For instance, campaigns based on the delivery of 
information, even if they are able to reach everybody, will not be taken up equally across the 
population. This is not because health literacy is in general scarce among the disadvantage, but 
because further impediments to its actionability are often in place. 
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On the other hand, as suggested already in the conclusions of chapter 4, egalitarian considerations 
suggest a firm insistence on unconditionality in health care. While disparities in health behaviors 
will perhaps not disappear until the underlying inequalities are removed, the unconditional 
provision of services out of market remains a key distributive policy - since use is expected to be 
higher among the disadvantaged. Access to health services is however unequal in most countries, 
even those that put in place a robust health system, especially in specialist services (Hanratty et al. 
2007). Addressing this issue is clearly recommended by the prescriptive considerations that were 
unfolded here.   
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5.  Conclusion. 
 The Ethics of Public Health in the Face of Diet Related Diseases 
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In 1986, John Bailar and Elaine Smith published in “The New England Journal of Medicine” an 
article that “shook the world of oncology by its roots” (Mukherjee 2010). They calculated whether 
there had been any benefit from the decades long “war on cancer” based on aggressive innovation 
in surgery, chemotherapy and radiotherapy. They measured age-normalized cancer-related deaths 
between 1962 and 1985, the number of deaths due to cancer in the period correcting the figures to 
account for demographic shifts toward older cancer-prone populations. The result was shocking: 
cancer-related deaths had increased by 8.7 percent despite intense efforts. The measure of success 
chosen by Bailar and Smith is obviously not neutral: for the children who were cured of their 
leukemia those efforts made all the difference, nor it should be underestimated the effect that the 
hope for a cure makes to societal well being. Yet Bailar and Smith measure makes good sense of 
the rationale for public health. Mukherjee refers in the same context of a famous article by John 
Cairns (1985) on the “war on cancer”, where he sweepingly claims that “[since] the death rates 
from malaria, cholera, typhus, tuberculosis, scurvy, pellagra and other scourges of the past have 
dwindled because humankind has learned how to prevent these diseases […], to put most of the 
effort into treatment is to deny all precedent”. 
Aside from preoccupations regarding induction, there is a central problem with this claim: whereas 
the causative agents of infective diseases and the maladies resulting from malnutrition are 
complications of poor conditions, diet related diseases are side effects of processes that improved 
human welfare: food security and a more comfortable life in the first place. Since we should not 
want to undo these advantages, we must devise solutions against their side effects - diet related 
diseases. While people will continue to get sick, public health and social polices might minimize 
those avoidable damages. In this work, I defended some principles that can motivate, justify and 
guide that effort. Here is a summary. 
 
Paternalism. While interventions against unhealthy choices violate antipaternalism concerns 
centered on liberty, I have argued that the latter are clearly overstated in public health or outright 
flawed. The only form of antipaternalism which should be taken seriously in this context is 
consequentialist and centered on welfare. That version of antipaternalism illuminates how the 
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empirical literature on individual decision making and cognitive limitations can be put at work in 
normative discussions. Where there are general reasons to believe that choices will be bad and 
there are dispositive of interventions that will not damage good choosers, interventions are 
legitimate and ought to be carried out under the general obligation of beneficence.  
 
Personal responsibility for health. I distinguished the social consequences of personal dietary 
choices in effects on productivity and effects on health care costs. As for the former, I have argued 
that there are duties to be as productive as possible only in very specific circumstances, and 
certainly not in the context of diet related diseases. Also, I told apart two ways in which the impact 
on costs of bad diets might sustain appeals to personal responsibility for health: economic 
arguments and distributive arguments. While economic arguments are prescriptively 
uncontroversial but hardly relevant for empirical reasons, distributive arguments suffer of 
important moral flaws. In general, I recommend a skeptical attitude on responsibilization policies, 
which can be justified only if they might remedy serious issues of efficiency. 
 
The moral significance of health inequalities. While arguing that previous proposals do not help in 
situating the fight against health inequalities in egalitarian social philosophies, I described the 
contribution that social epidemiology might offer to the effort to achieve robust economic equality, 
an ideal that is being re-invigorated by recent sociological and cultural developments. On one hand, 
the fight against social health inequalities might avoid the persistence of resource inequalities, 
especially trans-generationally. On the other hand, the very existence of diseases associated with 
social inequalities illustrates the goods that a renewed pursuit of equality might foster.  
 
Philosophical ideals, while open to moral reasoning and criticism, will at the end be embedded in 
real-world political decisions that are taken – at least partially – also for other reasons. The 
practical recommendations of moral theory will be in this scenario only roughly applicable to real-
world settings. They are not inert, though – i.e. they cannot be made coherent with any kind of 
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policy. In particular, I would like to suggest that the three theses above support a particular style of 
policy making that is definitely recognizable and distinguishable from its main opponent. Starting 
from the latter, policy making in general and social policy in particular have been increasingly 
focused on individuals, their responsibility, and their productive importance for society. More 
specifically, policy making has been viewed as a tinkering enterprise in the “structure of 
incentives” that socio-economically uncharacterized individuals encounter, a tinkering enterprise 
that should promote responsible choices and, when costly, justified in terms of returns to society, 
normally in terms of increased productive capacities and decreased social costs. Libertarian 
paternalism and its awareness of human limitations and constraints due to environments of choices 
is an important and welcome amendment of that tradition. Yet that tradition, if the three theses 
above are correct, suffers from several limitations – and it is not the only available alternative that 
we have.  
Social epidemiologists have been focusing right away on environments and social conditions in the 
study of personal choice: their socio-economic consciousness provides a neat avenue into the 
“architecture of choice” that class-agnostic libertarian paternalists can reach only at the end of a 
clumsy detour. The case of responsibility is somehow similar: liberal egalitarians typically take up 
the ethos of responsibility just to realize that it is inadequate in socio-economically stratified 
societies. They must then take the philosophically implausible route of denying the possibility of 
personality-driven autonomous choices in disadvantaged people to save their egalitarian 
credentials. Why do not they recognize from the beginning that “responsibility” is the most typical 
tool of the conservatives and hence cannot be the base for any meaningful progressive social 
policy? It is however in the case of social health inequalities that contradictions are most apparent: 
concerned theorists resort to the language of personal entitlements and/or supply-side gains due to 
equal opportunity, thus entering into the meanders of most-debated philosophical issues and 
contentious economic theories. This is strange since they could easily point out the kind of goods 
that we expect in socio-economically equal societies from the advantageous point of observation of 
almost forty years of common experience in enlarging inequalities. While these detours are perhaps 
a strategically superior vehicle to advocate certain policies and solutions in the hostile 
environments of contemporary public rhetoric, for the sake of democratic debate, it would be better 
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to present clearly the main alternatives. This work was intended to be a contribution to the latter 
pursuit. The hope is that similar things can be said in the case of other challenging issues in social 
policy as well.  
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